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Abstract
This study in applied ethics addresses whether the ontology of corporaƟons as rights-bearing
arƟĮcial legal persons allows them to be held morally responsible as unitary enƟƟes and members
of the moral community, or if their status requires ascripƟon of moral responsibility to reduce to
their individual parƟcipants. I argue that moral responsibility is ascribable to corporaƟons not on
the basis of their agency as metaphysical natural persons but as irreducible non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems. The moral issue is illustrated through a case study of the global Įnancial crisis of 2007-08.
Legal personhood is essenƟal for understanding corporaƟons because they are legally constructed,
not natural. Personhood is fundamental for corporate accumulaƟon of consƟtuƟonal rights in US
law. However, the dominant aggregaƟon legal theory treats corporaƟons as non-enƟty ĮcƟons
reducible to only their parƟcipants. While the law suīers theoreƟcal indeterminacy about
responsibility, corporaƟons act collecƟvely and intenƟonally. There are two views of corporate
collecƟve intenƟon: 'state-of-mind' (SoM) and 'course-of- acƟon' (CoA). SoM requires that the
nature of collecƟve agents suĸciently conform to a natural agent for ascripƟon of responsibility.
CoA concerns itself with what the enƟty plans and executes and its consequences, even if it is an
intenƟonal system. I argue CoA of intenƟonal systems resolves problems of corporate moral
responsibility because they are conversable members of the moral community.
I conclude we may assign moral responsibility to corporaƟons as unitary non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems, and not only to individual parƟcipants. The metaphysical quesƟon of the ontology of
corporaƟons need not be resolved because as collecƟve, jurisƟc intenƟonal systems we can assign
moral responsibility to them despite their not having intenƟonal states of mind or agency. To
preserve Įnancial stability and democraƟc processes Įnancial sector corporaƟons must be
suscepƟble to legal, social and moral responsibility.
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1CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION
IntroducƟon
In the late summer of 2007, while people around the world were enjoying their annual holidays,
slowly and almost silently a devastaƟng but avoidable global Įnancial crisis (GFC) had begun to
erupt.1 In its wake, this crisis brought the worst and longest-lasƟng socio-economic destrucƟon and
instability since the Great Depression of the 1930s. More than ten years aŌer its onset, the full
eīects have yet to completely materialize. However, the people and insƟtuƟons that caused this
crisis have gone unpunished in any meaningful way. Indeed, they have not been substanƟvely held
to account for the consequences of what they intenƟonally did and no top oĸcials or senior
managers have been charged, sentenced or punished for the harms that followed. The condiƟons
that gave rise to the crisis, which is not yet ended, unsurprisingly began to reappear just over ten
years later.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether it is possible to assign moral responsibility to
corporaƟons, and if so, how might that be done.2 There are two arguments for the necessity of
assigning moral responsibility to corporaƟons. First, legal redress is insuĸcient because of legal
exempƟons and protecƟons that corporaƟons have secured based on their standing as legal ĮcƟons
(as well as the scale of harms made possible by globalized corporaƟons).3 Second, the current
1In this study I will refer to the acute global Įnancial crisis of 2007-2009, and the chronically persistent period of
economic and Įnancial distress and instability since then, as the GFC.
2My deĮniƟon ofmoral responsibility follows Eshleman in his 2016 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy arƟcle (Eshle-
man 2016, pp. 10–13). Eshelman describes P. F. Strawson's merit-based responsibility argument in which it is the acƟons
of others that reŇect their posiƟve or negaƟve aƫtudes towards us in what they do that aīects us for good or ill. Straw-
son calls these parƟcipant reacƟve aƫtudes because they are natural aƫtudinal reacƟons to someone's aƫtude to us
(Strawson 1962). The aƫtudes we express (resentment, love, anger, forgiveness) are those issuing from our immersion
in an interpersonal relaƟonship and regard the person acƟng towards us as a parƟcipant in the relaƟonship too. We do
not need external excuses even if another's acƟons are determined to hold people responsible . When we hold people
responsible we do so on the basis of what they have done, how they have merited our praise or blame based on what
we demand of them.
3A legal ĮcƟon as I use it in this thesis is an assumpƟon or an asserƟon that something that is not true, is true (as
a fact), and gives to that person or a thing a quality that is not natural to the person or thing. It thereby establishes a
2philosophical debate is mired in arguments about the ontology of corporaƟons that have not
yielded a clear philosophical grounding for assigning responsibility to corporaƟons.4 This thesis
argues how the legal barriers and philosophical stalemate can largely be traced to the inŇuence of
neoliberal thought and by doing so that it is necessary to make this moral assignment of
responsibility, and that it is possible to do so by deĮning corporaƟons as non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems. That is, I will argue for corporate moral responsibility by looking at what corporaƟons do,
not what they are.
In this thesis, the GFC will be used to illustrate selecƟve points, in parƟcular, the breadth and
severity of harms possible by widescale corporate wrongdoing. (Details of the crisis, while useful,
are not essenƟal for the philosophical argument and can be found in the Appendix.) The Įnancial
crisis that began in August 2007 may have led to the greatest transfer of wealth in human history.
We do not yet know if it is true that the wealth transfer (only parƟally in the form of bank bail-outs)
is the greatest ever because the process is ongoing, and the Įnal tally is incomplete. While there is
a growing body of research on the causes and consequences of the GFC there have been few
credible research eīorts to calculate the costs either in monetary or non-monetary terms.5
However, this thesis is a more general exploraƟon in applied normaƟve ethics. The focal problem of
corporate moral responsibility in this thesis is not hypotheƟcal. It is an aƩempt to address actual
cases of wrongful acƟon by (what are claimed to be) agents, but it remains controversial to assign
moral responsibility to them as agents. The controversy is due to conceptual confusion and
theoreƟcal incompleteness as well as poliƟcal indecision about the true nature of corporaƟons.
purpose for or a disposiƟon toward that person or thing that otherwise would oīend reason and truth.
4I understand the ontology of the corporaƟon as the metaphysical reality, essence or nature of a corporaƟon as a
collecƟve enƟty.
5In Chapter 5-Responsibility I will brieŇy document the monetary and other harm ensuing from the GFC. There have
been credible empirical aƩempts to esƟmate the both the damages and costs that have been already been experienced
and those that have yet to be realized.
3Structure of the Study
A sketch brieŇy describing the structure, organizaƟon and content of the succeeding chapters is
oīered below.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the set of ideas that we know as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the
theory and the ideology that, I will argue, underlies current problems with ascribing moral
responsibility to commercial corporaƟons. Neoliberal theory as a poliƟcal philosophy rests on a
parƟcular set of ideas, and it is the inŇuence of those ideas, and the socio-economic policy
consequences that have followed from them that are focal issues of this chapter.
In Chapter 3- Personhood, I discuss the problem of corporate personhood and how personhood
relates to the suscepƟbility of corporaƟons to assignments of moral responsibility. Personhood is
the starƟng point, because personhood is the concept that makes it possible for corporaƟons to
claim and exercise rights. The chapter begins with a brief history of legal personhood, and then
documents the deĮciencies of jurisprudenƟal interpretaƟon and legal applicaƟon of the concept of
personhood. QuesƟons about the assignment of moral responsibility to legal persons as
rights-bearing collecƟve agents are speciĮcally examined.6 The Įnal secƟons discuss alternaƟves to
personhood-based responsibility.
In Chapter 4-CollecƟve IntenƟon I address philosophical problems of agency of collecƟves and
collecƟve intenƟon7, as well as the relaƟonship between collecƟve agents, their deliberate acƟon
6There are two diīerent kinds of groups as collecƟve agents; one is aggregaƟve, an informal, temporary collecƟve, but
without decision-making features. The other is corporate (conglomerate) with a formal structure and decision-making
capability. A corporate group forms an idenƟty as a group agent through its charter and documents of incorporaƟon.
There are two accounts of group agency: one is that the group must have mental states in order to have the capacity
for intenƟon. The other argues that for a group to have intenƟon it must engage in group cogniƟon processes. Certain
groups are intenƟonal agents and can be held accountable and morally responsible on the basis of their pracƟces of
making sense of others. If a collecƟve can be an intenƟonal agent by reason of its pracƟces, Tollefsen argues that in
pracƟce the mental states necessary to intenƟonal agency are not internal to the agent, but to the disposƟonal state of
a whole system and not just to a brain or mind.(Tollefsen 2015).
7CollecƟve intenƟon is understood through two contending conceptualizaƟons. The two points of view that I disƟn-
guish are State-of-Mind and Course-of-AcƟon. A State-of-Mind perspecƟve requires that the nature of a collecƟve agent
4and moral responsibility for intenƟonal acts and foreseeable harms. I describe the debate in the
literature between (1) those who argue that corporate enƟƟes must reduce to their morally
addressable individual agents for the corporate acƟon taken and (2) those who hold that
corporaƟons can be held responsible as ontological primiƟves, i.e., as irreducible,
responsibility-bearing unitary enƟƟes. 8 The debate centers on the requirements of moral agency.9
One side maintains that it is impossible to conceive of a corporaƟon as an ontological primiƟve.
Rather, corporaƟons are, they say, things that must reduce to the individuals of which they are
composed because only individual human beings are capable of moral agency, and only moral
agents can bear moral responsibility. CorporaƟons, because they are legal ĮcƟons, do not possess
the metaphysical characterisƟcs of natural human beings and thus cannot qualify as moral agents.
Because they are not moral agents they cannot bear moral responsibility. In between these two
extremes of the debate there is a spectrum of intermediate posiƟons. This enduring disagreement
about what moral agency itself demands has not yielded a soluƟon to problem of corporate moral
responsibility.
In the Įnal secƟon, I look to the alternaƟve of collecƟve intenƟon. CollecƟon intenƟon is
understood theoreƟcally from two points of view. I disƟnguish these views with the shorthand
labels state-of-mind (SoM) and course-of-acƟon (CoA). The former requires that the nature of
collecƟve agents suĸciently conform to that of a natural agents’ state of mind to permit an
ascripƟon of responsibility. The laƩer (CoA) concerns itself not with the nature of the agent, but
what course of acƟon the agent plans and executes and its consequences, even if the agent is an
suĸciently conform analogously to that of an individual, natural agent to permit a legiƟmate ascripƟon of responsibility.
In a Course-of-AcƟon view ascripƟon of responsibility is concerned not with the nature of the agent, but what course of
acƟon the agent plans and executes and the consequences of that acƟon.
8I am using the term ontological primiƟve to describe a primary fact about an enƟty as something that can neither be
reduced to another fact nor can the enƟty be further reduced to consƟtuent parts.
9Moral agency as I am using it refers to an agent understood to have the capacity to act, and that agent is conceived
as having the ability or capacity make moral judgments based on an understanding of right and wrong, to be able to give
reasons for the acƟon and be held accountable for the acƟon.
5intenƟonal system. I also review a spectrum of posiƟons on reducƟonist and holisƟc theory of
collecƟve intenƟon from leading theoreƟcians including John Searle, Michael Bratman, Raimo
Tuomela and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that the concept of course-of-acƟon of intenƟonal systems
oīers a way to resolve problems of corporate moral responsibility.
ResponsibiliƟes of collecƟve agents are considered in Chapter 5. Agency can be viewed either as
reducƟonist and methodologically individualisƟc or as collecƟve and methodologically holisƟc.10
The quesƟon addressed in this chapter is whether with respect to norms of social integraƟon and
the common good collecƟve responsibility is owed to individuals and communiƟes by unitary
agents even if they are legal ĮcƟons or if responsibiliƟes must always rest in an atomisƟc way on
individual real human beings.
I argue that collecƟve enƟƟes such as commercial corporaƟons can be part of the moral
community.11 I claim that they belong to the moral community on the basis of several factors
essenƟal to the acƟons they take, the consequences of those acƟons and their capacity as enƟƟes
to answer to challenges to give reasons for what they do. That corporaƟons are not senƟent does
not necessarily exclude them from the moral community. But their ability to form and sustain
collecƟve intenƟons is only parƟally suĸcient to make them suscepƟble to moral judgements.
I conclude that corporaƟons as legal persons can plausibly be held responsible on the grounds that
they are morally addressable and raƟonally conversable (they can give reasons for what they do) as
10Methodological individualism is the view that groups are reducible to the individual. Methodological holism is, in
general terms, the view that groups are not reducible to the individual; groups are understood to have a separate exis-
tence from the individuals comprising them (Tollefsen 2015, p. 4).
11I am following Shoemaker in deĮning the moral community: "...our pracƟces in voicing the praise and blame expres-
sive of holding someone morally responsible, in the paradigm case, consist of an interplay between at least two agents,
one who addresses a moral demand to the other via the praise or blame and the other who ostensibly hears, under-
stands, and either accepts or rejects the demand, and such an exchange is possible only for those who have the capacity
to enter into a certain kind of relaƟonship with one another. Call those who share this capacity, then, moral agents, and
call the collecƟon of moral agents a moral community" (Shoemaker 2007, pp. 70–71). See also Darwall, (Darwall 2006,
pp. 20–22).
6systemic unitary enƟƟes.12 I treat these unitary corporate enƟƟes as non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems and on the basis of their systemic characterisƟcs I claim they are suscepƟble to
assignments of moral responsibility.
In this view, corporaƟons are understood as collecƟves, that is, they can be taken as not reducible
to their individual consƟtuents. If the individuals were removed, there would sƟll be something
remaining to be made accountable for its acƟons and to be held responsible for the consequences.
AscripƟons of moral responsibility apply not only to natural persons as individual agents, but to
these collecƟves as well. Also on this view, it seems essenƟal that corporaƟons have agency
analogous to that of natural persons if they are to be deemed capable of bearing moral
responsibility. Those who argue in favor of corporate moral responsibility hold that corporaƟons
themselves can bear praise for the good they do as well as blame for the harms they cause because
they saƟsfy the requirements of moral agency. CorporaƟons are, in short, suscepƟble to blame
because they are moral agents, and moral agency is the requisite condiƟon for moral address
(Sepinwall 2016). Moral address requires that reasons be given by an agent for what the agent
thinks, intends and does. The giving of those reasons demands conversability on the part of an
agent or enƟty.13
In Chapter 6 I conclude that it is possible to assign moral responsibility to corporaƟons on the
following grounds: the metaphysical quesƟon of the ontological nature of corporaƟons need not be
resolved because we can assign to them moral responsibility despite their not having intenƟonal
states of mind. But, because they are rights-bearing legal constructs with presumed duƟes and
obligaƟons they ought not to do intenƟonal or foreseeable harm in pursuit of their aims. Their
12Moral conversaƟons involve the exchange ofmoral reasons between those enƟƟes in a relaƟonship . The exchange of
moral reasons between those in a moral community with the normaƟve capacity for reason-based address and response
(conversability) is part of the pracƟce of praising and blaming the eligible party to the exchange (Shoemaker 2007, p. 71).
See also Peƫt (Peƫt 2013).
13The requirement of conversability will be developed more extensively in Chapter 5-Responsibility.
7purpose is to help solve social and economic problems that cannot be done by individuals. Human
beings react to intenƟonal vicƟmizaƟon when it is deliberate, selĮsh and damaging; this is a natural
response and provides further grounds for assignment of moral responsibility to corporaƟons but
without relying on seƩling the quesƟons about the ontology of agents, or the use of uƟlitarianism
in holding an enƟty as morally responsible.
Finally, I report Įndings and assess the implicaƟons of risks for individuals and communiƟes as well
as for democracy from poliƟcally powerful Įnancial sector corporaƟons. I Įnd that Įnancial sector
corporaƟons increasingly no longer fulĮl their original purpose as means to socially and
democraƟcally useful ends. Although norms of Įnancial sector corporaƟons are not
well-understood, in their pursuit of risky pracƟces they have become divorced from human
interests and needs, especially with respect to public goods. More frequently they treat individuals
and communiƟes as mere means to achieving their own selĮsh aims and the growing scope of un-
or mis-regulated Įnancial sector markets is increasingly and globally dangerous. While no systemic
global collapse followed the GFC there are no guarantees with respect to future systemic crises that
a collapse would not occur, and it is arguably likely that the result would be much worse than the
Great Recession following 2009. CorporaƟons are now so powerful that they act to override or
distort democraƟc control for their own ends. The implicaƟons for democraƟc socieƟes are that
corporaƟons must be regulated to protect the common good, to prevent vicƟmisaƟon, and to
pursue their original purposes. The standard of moral judgement becomes poliƟcal (in the sense of
belonging to the polis and the poliƟcal community) as an expression of the social order. This is not a
maƩer of party poliƟcs but of the poliƟcal in the sense of the whole social order and that which
holds it together as a coherent and funcƟoning community, one that is interdependent and greater
than any of its consƟtuent parts.
8Chapter 2-What is Wrong (in Theory) with Corporate Moral Responsibilty (in PracƟce?)
IntroducƟon
This chapter is concerned with the set of ideas that we know as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the
theory and the ideology that, I will argue, underlies current problems with ascribing moral
responsibility to commercial corporaƟons. Neoliberal theory as a poliƟcal philosophy rests on a
parƟcular set of ideas, and it is the inŇuence of those ideas, and the socio-economic policy
consequences that have followed from them that are focal issues of this chapter.14 CollecƟvely,
these ideas have formed the dominant socio-economic theory of the economies of the Anglophone
naƟons and most of the rest of the developed world.15 The socio-economic inŇuences of this
collecƟon of ideas were felt world-wide as they have been implemented in a wide range of poliƟcal
policies during the post-WWII period.
Neoliberal theory was intended to promote and insure individual freedom from state control and
government tyranny through implementaƟon of a set of economic policies. It has undeniably
produced consequences that led to signiĮcant posiƟve economic and social development. Equally
undeniably neoliberalism has also produced signiĮcant and growing negaƟve eīects. One of those
eīects, due to the dominance of neoliberal theory and the economic, poliƟcal, and social policies,
pracƟces and aƫtudes it has enabled, was to make possible conceptual arguments that have
14In this chapter I am using the term neoliberalism to indicate a poliƟcal philosophy, except where otherwise indicated.
By poliƟcal philosophy I mean neoliberalism as a method or system of argument about the way the world ought to be
and also as a way to explain and elucidate the moral reasoning behind the collecƟve decisions taken by a social order.
That is to say, neoliberalism as a poliƟcal philosophy is how we relate the content of our thought to our acƟon; it is a
prescripƟve world view. However, neoliberalism is typically understoodmore narrowly and pragmaƟcally as an economic
policy program. While not interchangeable, these terms are oŌen used by neoliberals, journalists, and others in ways
that confuse and blur the disƟncƟons between them as poliƟcal and economic conceptualizaƟons. In this chapter and
elsewhere I will endeavor to make clear which usage is relevant to my – and to the neoliberals’ – argument.
15For the purposes of this chapter, I will call this dominant theory neoliberalism, but over Ɵme the theory has been
known by a number of names and has been oŌen variously referred to as laissez-faire, libertarianism, free-market cap-
italism, Freiburg School or Chicago School fundamentalism, as well as other terms according to its parƟcular historical
form and implementaƟon. So, the current version of the theory that is under examinaƟon here I will simply refer to as
neoliberalism, because it has become the predominant usage in the post-WWII period.
9proven to be important obstacles to ascribing moral responsibility to corporate enƟƟes. To
understand how that happened, this chapter has two principal aims as it argues against
neoliberalism: one aim is to examine the ideas that consƟtute the theoreƟcal basis of
neoliberalism, and the second is to show how those ideas, and distorƟons of the theory formed
from them, have been deployed to resist or refute ascripƟons of corporate moral responsibility.
In the contemporary form of economic organizaƟon of the advanced western socieƟes, generally
referred to as Įnancial capitalism, it is my contenƟon that by looking at the theoreƟcal foundaƟons
for the arguments of neoliberalism it is possible to idenƟfy its principal set of ideas and,
importantly, their assumpƟons. In those ideas and assumpƟons we can discover how it is possible
that they shield corporaƟons and their collecƟve acts and omissions from moral responsibility.
Consequent to their wide-spread adopƟon, the implementaƟon of neoliberal ideas has led to global
Įnancial crises and very signiĮcant impairments of socio-economic stability in the naƟons that have
been aīected by those crises, and injuries to the well-being of people all around the world.16 This
criƟcal understanding of the theoreƟcal foundaƟons of neoliberalism is essenƟal to understanding
both the conceptual and pracƟcal problems of corporate moral responsibility.
This chapter has four structural elements. In the Įrst element I introduce the basic concepts of
neoliberalism as a body of thought. In the second structural element I present a brief history of the
development of neoliberalism as a theory and ideology. The third element of the chapter addresses
the problems and distorƟons of neoliberal theory in the contemporary period; this includes both
indirect and direct eīects on aƩempts to assign moral responsibility to corporaƟons. The fourth
element makes a speciĮc connecƟon between the theory of neoliberalism and its relaƟonship to
the persistent problem of ascripƟon of moral responsibility to commercial corporaƟons. These
elements are elaborated in brief form below.
16It is, of course, not just the crises themselves, but the neoliberal policy remedies that have been applied to resolve
the crises that have caused further injury and deprivaƟon to the aīected populaƟons.
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A Short Survey of the Four Chapter Elements
This short survey previews the structure of this chapter. I want to examine the theoreƟcal basis that
lies in the history of neoliberalism and its economic, poliƟcal and legal arguments that are either
producƟve of poliƟcal condiƟons or pracƟcal eīects in policy and pracƟce that are brought against
ascripƟons of corporate moral responsibility. The Įrst chapter element disƟlls the two essenƟal
arguments of neoliberalism: individualist absoluƟsm and demands for limited government (a weak
state). Those arguments are typically raised in opposiƟon to ascripƟons of moral responsibility of
corporaƟons.
In the second structural element of the chapter I will brieŇy cover the history of modern neoliberal
thought. I present there a short descripƟon of the development of neoliberalism, and describe the
collecƟon of ideas by which it is comprised. The purpose of presenƟng an historical element in this
chapter is to lay a suĸcient foundaƟon for understanding subsequent problems, deĮciencies and
distorƟons with later applicaƟons of neoliberal theory to policy. In this second element the short
descripƟve history is itself comprised by three periods. The Įrst is an early period of European
thinking about the philosophical roots of individual liberty and threats to that liberty as seen by
early neoliberal thinkers. A second historical period is concerned with the Ɵme between the world
wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, but is mostly concerned with how events during the 1930s
inŇuenced neoliberal thinkers. The third period comprises the rise, consolidaƟon and the further
development of neoliberal thought following WWII to the present Ɵme.
The third structural element of the chapter shiŌs from historical to conceptual aspects of
neoliberalism. In this part I examine the problems and distorƟons of neoliberal thought as it was
originally conceived and show those ideas to be conceptually Ňawed and thus wanƟng as a
conceptual framework. Neoliberalism is asserted to be a theory whose economics are a law of
nature, but in reality it is a human construct, a poliƟcal policy-oriented ideology and not purely an
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economic theory, as it is claimed (Kotsko 2018). Neoliberalism can be shown to be based on faulty
assumpƟons about human nature and economic behavior. The insistence on the part of its
adherents that neoliberal economics is a form of natural law has led policy-makers to aƩempt to
solve social and poliƟcal problems with economic policies that match neither the nature of human
beings nor the demands of contemporary economic, social or poliƟcal problems. In this part of the
chapter I will show how neoliberal theory contradicts itself. Due to this contradicƟon neoliberalism
produces socio-economic results that, rather than enhance economic acƟvity, have wide-spread
negaƟve eīects such as slower economic growth, growing social and economic inequality,
diminished insƟtuƟonal research and development, lower reinvestment in producƟvity-enhancing
capital stock, and reducƟons of worker training and educaƟon as well as suppression of wages and
beneĮts. I will also address how neoliberalism mis-applies idealized eighteenth century principles
about the nature of the economic order to the very diīerent socio-economic reality of the
twenty-Įrst century.17
The fourth element is also conceptual, but addresses the philosophically and legally more diĸcult
connecƟon between neoliberal theory and corporate moral responsibility. In this, the fourth
element of the chapter, I examine and explain how the diĸculƟes in assigning moral responsibility
to corporaƟons has become embedded in legal as well as socio-economic thinking and pracƟces as
they are informed by neoliberal theory. The fourth element of the chapter will show how it is that
the core set of ideas comprising neoliberalism have failed to cohere, yet sƟll have the persistent
eīect of permiƫng the avoidance or evasion of assignments of moral responsibility to corporate
enƟƟes. The rise of neoliberalism as a popularized body of ideas has culminated in problemaƟc and
distorted socio-poliƟcal policy pracƟces under the rubric of an eĸcient and eīecƟve economic
17The emphasis in this chapter is on corporate capitalism, by which I mean capitalism in the liberal-democraƟc post-
WWII, New Deal, Great Society and Washington Consensus period. This form of capitalism is characterized by predomi-
nance of the legal corporate organizaƟonal form as contrasted with previous organizaƟonal forms such as mercanƟlism,
partnerships, or individually owned industrial enterprises. A parƟcular emphasis is put on Įnancial capitalism.
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theory in our current, Įnancialized form of capitalism. The funcƟonal beneĮts of Įnancial
capitalism are expressed in claims that are made for it of providing essenƟal social and public
goods.18 But in reality it is neoliberalism’s deĮciencies and irraƟonaliƟes that produce serial crises
requiring bail-outs and rescues and various forms of impoverishment in austerity periods during
economic recovery that characterize the current, Įnancialized form of capitalism. It is here where
we see the actual outcomes of Įnancialized capitalism in the retardaƟon and impairment of social
development, diminished well-being, and weakened community solidarity rather than an
enhancement of the essenƟal aspects of the socio-economic order. In addiƟon, it is in a normaƟve
sphere that Įnancial capitalism appears as self-contradictory (Jaeggi 2016). Yet despite these
empirical and normaƟve realiƟes, eīorts to hold Įnancial sector corporaƟons to even the most
modest moral responsibiliƟes are of liƩle avail.
A Brief IntroducƟon to the Basic Argument of Neoliberalism
The basic argument of neoliberalism is that there is a remedy for the ancient problem of how best
to protect individual liberty in the long struggle between the demands of the collecƟve (the state)
and the desire of individuals for freedom. The soluƟon to this problem of the preservaƟon of
freedom for individuals, according to neoliberal thought, is to do what is required to secure
individual liberty by prevenƟng the inevitable tyranny of centralizaƟon (and consequent loss of
individual autonomy) that is alleged to come with socio-economic and poliƟcal collecƟvism (Hayek
18One crucially essenƟal public good is Įnancial stability from which everyone beneĮts and none can be excluded.
But in Įnancialized capitalism stability is also one of the most diĸcult of all public goods to supply. The neoclassical
economics and economic policies of neoliberalism that underpin Įnancial capitalism tend to accept without quesƟon
that Įnancial markets are self-regulaƟng and intrinsically stable. They are not. This is because “...instability is baked in
the economic cake.” (Wolf 2012). Expansion of credit in free-market economies (in which issuing credit becomes an asset
with a matching liability of the borrower as an obligaƟon to repay) is limitless and can be expanded at zero cost. Because
there is no incenƟve for private enƟƟes (Įnancial insƟtuƟons such as banks and e.g., other enƟƟes in the shadow banking
sector) to restrain themselves from issuing credit there is an inherent instability built into credit decisions and into the
overall economy. Milton Friedman, a Chicago School neoliberal economist, recognized in this a risk of banking collapses
and the need for prophylaxis by government intervenƟon but this is diĸcult to substanƟate in the literature. It remains
a contenƟous claim about Friedman; for example see (Machaj 2007).
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2001, p. 64), (Jones 2012, p. 68). How is this to be prevented? If collecƟvism is the result of central
government (i.e., the state) and how it collecƟvely organizes, plans, decides and controls the
allocaƟon of resources on behalf of its subjects then in its simplest form, the neoliberal argument
goes, it is collecƟvism (strong-state government) that is the problem. By absoluƟzing the individual
and shrinking government to the greatest possible extent, neoliberals say, the liberty of the
individual can be protected and preserved.
AddiƟonally, and to further resolve this problem of the threat of tyranny, neoliberal theory issues
two demands: Įrst, that there be an acknowledgement of the reality that there cannot be a
consensus agreement on the values and the ulƟmate ends and aims of social life. Their fear is that if
liberal technocraƟc central planners determine – in place of a general consensus – what is the best
life, and how it should be lived or provided for, there will inevitably be disagreements and conŇict
over the assumpƟons underlying the values that are asserted by their determinant consensus. The
second demand of neoliberalism as an answer to the potenƟal for conŇict owing to a lack of general
consensus is to acknowledge the primacy of the (economic) price mechanism, which allows
markets to determine what is of value rather than to have the value-determinaƟon made by a
planning collecƟve of technical experts. The primary deĮciency of any collecƟve of planning
experts, neoliberals say, is that even experts cannot possibly have all the informaƟon that can be
brought to bear in a compeƟƟve market. The correcƟve for this deĮciency, according to neoliberal
theory, is the price mechanism.
In summary, neoliberal policies have aimed to deregulate economic acƟvity, to promote free trade
globally and to build a market that is both global and free of government intervenƟon to the
greatest degree possible, save for legal protecƟons of property rights and to insure compeƟƟon in
markets. In diīerent Ɵmes and in diīerent places the pursuit of these goals has followed a common
theme – a set of ideas about individualism, small states, self-regulaƟng markets and the price
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mechanism. Without doubt, under neoliberal theory great wealth has been produced and
freedoms have been enhanced in many places, especially in the post-WWII period. But since the
global Įnancial crisis of 2008 it is clear that the negaƟve consequences of neoliberal policies have
breached normaƟve expectaƟons to the extent that despite its proponents’ rhetoric about
economic eĸciencies and liberaƟng qualiƟes, the social, moral and poliƟcal deĮciencies of
neoliberalism raise the most serious quesƟons about its claims. This quesƟoning and growing doubt
about the net socio-economic value of free market fundamentalism is especially true about both
the desirability of a limited role for government and of unregulated acƟviƟes of corporaƟons
around the world. A brief look at the history of neoliberalism will help in understanding how we
have arrived at this state of things.
A Brief History of Modern Neoliberalism – Roots and Origins
Coherent sets of ideas either as a theory or as an ideology are likely to neither lead back to a
solitary Įgure working completely alone nor are they likely to have come to fruiƟon in total
isolaƟon (Mannheim (Undated ediƟon) [1936], p. 3). To the extent that this is true as a
generalizaƟon, it is certainly true of the body of thought we idenƟfy as neoliberalism. The roots and
origins of neoliberalism reach back to criƟques of Plato and Aristotle and forward to the current
period in which the neoliberal theory of globalized economic and poliƟcal development are
idealized. While it is not my intenƟon to explore in detail the enƟre corpus of literature surrounding
neoliberal theory, it is my intenƟon to oīer an overview of the body of neoliberal thought itself as a
way to understand the philosophical quesƟon at issue in this study – the quesƟon of corporate
moral responsibility.
It is neoliberalism as a theory against which I am arguing because its emphasis on individualism and
a minimal state obscures the corporaƟon and masks its role in socio-economic life from scruƟny
with respect to outcomes, regulaƟon and from normaƟve expectaƟons to constrain aberrant
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behavior in the interest of the societal collecƟve. As a consequence, the potenƟal is diminished that
they will meet the obligaƟon they carry to provide public goods, or at a bare minimum, not do
intenƟonal injury. Neoliberal theory derives from a combinaƟon of classical liberalism of eighteenth
century laissez-faire which asserts the necessity of negaƟve freedom for commercial interests from
government intervenƟon, with further iteraƟons of liberal theory such as Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand”.19 In the nineteenth and twenƟeth centuries liberalism then developed more elaborated
ideas of the minimal state, individual autonomy and property rights that have been expressed in
post-WWII neoliberalism. It is those more extensively elaborated ideas that have played a crucial
role in our diĸculƟes with corporate moral responsibility.
There are three Austrian economists that are central to understanding the origins and development
of neoliberal thought. While many others were involved in the contribuƟons made to the whole
body of thought I will focus on Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek as the most
prominent representaƟves of neoliberalism as a theory, an ideology and as a collecƟon of policy
prescripƟons and pracƟces. Their books, Popper's Open Society volumes, Mises' Bureaucracy and
Hayek's The Road to Serfdom were inŇuenƟal and persuasive contribuƟons to establishing
neoliberalism as the dominant theory of capitalism in our Ɵme.
There are many ways to portray the phases and development of the modern period of
neoliberalism, depending on what features and characterisƟcs require emphasis and analysis.20
Here I am dividing the modern period of the development of neoliberalism into three phases to
capture the evoluƟon of the ideas and the concerns that occupied the principal neoliberal Įgures as
follows: Įrst is the inter-war period of 1918-1945, during which modern neoliberal thought
19It is classic liberalism that I am referring to here. Liberal poliƟcal principles include those holding that every individual
has a right to life, freedom from arbitrary capricious unlawful rule, as well as private property rights. It is foundaƟonal
that government must not violate these rights in without recourse to independent legal protecƟons. See the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on JS Mill (Brink 2018).
20See David Stedman Jones for one example of twenƟeth century phases of neoliberalism: (Jones 2012, pp. 6–8).
16
emerged as a set of principles and a policy program. The second phase is the post-WWII period
when neoliberalism came to dominate both the economic and the poliƟcal thinking of
Anglo-American economics and poliƟcs. From about 1980 in the third phase marked by the elecƟon
of Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher the transatlanƟc network of neoliberals aƩempted
to globalize both the theory and policy pracƟces of individual absoluƟsm and weak-state limited
government.21
Before the three phases of modern neoliberalism’s development, however, there were criƟcisms of
collecƟvism by neoliberals that reached back to ancient philosophy. Beginning with Plato,
neoliberals found reasons to worry about the collecƟvist tendencies of Plato and others. On Karl
Popper’s reading, Plato is the Įrst to embody in the state a collecƟvist society in which the whole
(the state) is greater than the individual. In volume one of The Open Society and Its Enemies: The
Spell of Plato Popper oīers criƟcism of Plato, Aristotle and Heraclitus.22 In these thinkers Popper
sees their historicism as the root threat to the open, free society he idealized.23 According to
Popper, the state for Plato is a collecƟve that can determine human development or the
disintegraƟon of society. In such a society, Popper says, the truth becomes elasƟc and is what
serves the state as the embodiment of the collecƟve and subordinates any other consideraƟon as a
pracƟce that “[…] injures and endangers the city” (Popper 1971b, 1:143). The truth, as the product
of the criƟcal powers of the individual, would be subordinated to the needs of the collecƟve. For
21In globalized Įnancial capitalism it is notoriously diĸcult to eīecƟvely regulate MNCs whose characterisƟc global
operaƟons make them opaque to oversight and intervenƟon by individual naƟonal governments. The consequences in
the global Įnancial crisis of 2008 of this third phase are dealt with below.
22In volume two, Popper perceived a similar threat from Hegel and Marx for their subversion of the freedom of the
individual.
23Historicism, as it was criƟqued by Popper, is the a doctrine that assumed there is a set of changeless laws of historical
development that regulate human aīairs. This doctrine holds that history is controlled by speciĮc evoluƟonary laws and
upon discovery would enable the predicƟon of the desƟny of humankind. This, according to Popper, began with Plato
and conƟnued in Aristotle, Heraclitus, and then Hegel and Marx. Popper sees the doctrine as a threat to social freedom
because it undermines individual freedom. More speciĮcally, Popper argued that historicist thought caused confusion
about the basis for a free, open society (Jones 2012, p. 42).
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Popper this is an descripƟon of what could only be understood as a closed, tribal society, based on
magical thinking and inimical to the requirements for social development and human progress
(Jones 2012, p. 41).
Individualism and altruism, which lead to the breakdown of tribalism and the rise of democracy, are
for Popper the basis of Western civilizaƟon, and it was individualism that was at the center of
neoliberal philosophy as conceived by Popper, Hayek and Mises. Individualism was understood to
be central to Anglophone Enlightenment economic and poliƟcal thought. The New Deal and social
democracy were viewed as taking freedom of choice from the individual and this formed the
background of Popper’s anƟpathy to the ancient philosophy of Plato. Historical prophecy became
confused with reasoned hypothesis through the scienƟĮc claims of dialecƟcs and historical
materialism. For Popper, it is not through historical prophecy but our own scienƟĮc predicƟons that
the future depends.
In volume two of The Open Society and Its Enemies, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and
the AŌermath, Hegel, seen by Popper as an historicist (a historicism of prophecy and necessity),
exempliĮes the renaissance of tribalism and restores the totalitarianism of Plato (Popper 1971a).
But, for Popper, belief in historical prophecy erases the incenƟve for individuals to take
responsibility for their individual choices and freedom of acƟon.
Popper thought that in periods of social change historicism became prominent and that this was
the case when Hegel adopted much of Heraclitus’s thought and incorporated it into his reacƟon to
the French RevoluƟon as an example of the periodic disappearance of tribal forms of social life. This
was true as well of the period of the 1930s and 1940s in which historicist and utopian ideas resulted
in catastrophic events associated with facsism, Nazism, Communism and world war. A dogmaƟc
faith in holisƟc explanaƟons derived from what were purported to be laws of historical inevitability,
in Hegel’s case that of the naƟon-state and in Marx’s case as a criƟque of capitalism, the
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inevitability of class warfare and the ulƟmate dictatorship of the proletariat. In place of these,
Popper urged a non-dogmaƟc exercise of criƟcal reasoning, of debate and a unwavering pursuit of
truth and scienƟĮc knowledge.
The alternaƟve for Popper, as an anƟdote to the dangerous ideas of historicism, is recogniƟon of
the need for reform to blunt the worst aspects of capitalism, but through pragmaƟc reform, not
class war. There is a role for government intervenƟon in Popper’s view, one which is indirect as a
legal framework of protecƟve insƟtuƟons with clearly delineated powers. This would allow
government to make policy adjustments based on debate, discussion and experience. There is
another, more direct mode of intervenƟon that limits the power of the state insƟtuƟons to act. This
is discreƟonary power of the state to act on a short-term basis, but it too carries risk of abuse or
seizure of state power by rogue actors. In any case of state intervenƟon Popper has a concern that
it would concentrate too much power in the state apparatus. Popper acknowledged that individuals
had to be responsible to take decisions, but this depended on puƫng faith in individual criƟcal
reason and this makes assumpƟons about individuals and their raƟonal capaciƟes, criƟcal reasoning
and tolerance for public debate and discourse that are hard to jusƟfy. Philosophically, Popper was
inspired only by Socrates, whose idea of freedom was rooted in individual criƟcal raƟonality.
Popper’s challenge was to establish the applicaƟon of criƟcal reason to social problems within a
liberal democraƟc framework and free market capitalism with a heavy emphasis on individual
liberty, i.e., to progressively raƟonalize the irraƟonal. His chief fear was of the erosion of individual
criƟcal faculƟes by historicist ideas (Jones 2012, p. 41). Ludwig von Mises, who like Popper
understood Plato’s anƟpathy to democracy, argues that he “elaborated a plan of totalitarianism.”
“The outstanding fact about the contemporary ideological situaƟon is that the most popular
poliƟcal doctrines aim at totalitarianism, the thorough aboliƟon of the individual's freedom to
choose and to act. No less remarkable is the fact that the most bigoted advocates of such a system
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of conformity call themselves scienƟsts, logicians, and philosophers. This is, of course, not a new
phenomenon. Plato, who even more than Aristotle was for centuries themaestro di color che
sanno, elaborated a plan of totalitarianism the radicalism of which was surpassed only in the
nineteenth century by the schemes of Comte and Marx.” (Mises 1962, p. 132).24
Neoliberalism in the modern period has emerged as a disƟnct body of thought over a long Ɵme,
beginning with the liberalism of Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. Among Smith’s sources
were the work of David Hume and David Ricardo and the anƟ-corn law arguments of the
Manchester School (Jones 2012, p. 11).25 Although the early period of neoliberal thinking goes back
to Smith, this period is more correctly described as part of classic liberalism that traces a historical
line from Thomas Hobbes to John Stuart Mill. In this period of liberalism the central assumpƟon is
that the individual has primacy over the polity, but the polity has precedence over the economy. It
is essenƟal to liberal economic freedom that the poliƟcal liberty of the individual be preserved
(Schmidt 2018, p. 70).
From the 1920s to 1945
In the twenƟeth century neoliberalism took on its disƟnctly contemporary character. In Vienna
during the 1920s economists led by Ludwig von Mises were engaged in a debate about economic
planning that centered on the quesƟon of whether the price mechanism or central planning would
be the most eĸcient distribuƟon of scarce resources.
Mises was InŇuenced by Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics. Menger
and the Austrian school held a strong belief in both free markets and Įxed economic laws that were
centered on individuals.26 The special focus of the Austrian School was the power of the price
24The phrase is from Dante (Inferno IV), Maestro di color che sanno refers to Aristotle: literally, "the master of those
who know".
25Liberal senƟment against the corn laws, a form of economic protecƟonism, was due in part to the percepƟon that
the laws were a restricƟon on trade and an instance of unnecessary governmental intervenƟon.
26The posiƟon taken by the Austrian School on Įxed economic laws contradicted the German Historical School of the
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mechanism to allow spontaneous organizaƟon of economic life of autonomous individuals (Jones
2012, p. 49).
Mises is probably best described as a free-market libertarian with a pure ideological posiƟon.
Mises' book, Bureaucracy, a short polemic contrasƟng the bureaucraƟc mode of management and
a proĮt-making system (Mises 2007 [1944]). He saw bureaucracy as unaccountable and removed
from people’s real needs and wants. Mises claimed that the main concern of a bureaucracy is to
comply with rules and regulaƟons and the resulƟng rules-oriented incenƟve structure produces
distorted outcomes.
Trends toward collecƟvism had deeper roots in the nineteenth century, but conƟnued in the early
twenƟeth century United States with increments of government control, planning and
naƟonalisaƟon of business. It was thought by Mises that pressures on public sector managers and
bureaucrats were always to increase expenditures to improve public services and thus caused
bureaucrats to seek more funds and resources, limited only by rules and regulaƟons. This was seen
by neoliberals as invariably a bad thing despite increasing demands for public services for the
welfare of the general populaƟon and for businesses to expand and grow. Mises deĮned
bureaucracy as a mode of thinking and organizaƟon necessary to the relaƟonships implied by public
service management. The diīerence between incenƟves of public sector and private, proĮt-making
sectors is that the laƩer puts a high premium on improvement, while the former is driven by
rule-following (Jones 2012, pp. 53–54).
late 1800s whose social science professors saw regularity in economic phenomena as heterodox. To claim that there was
regularity in the workings of the economy would mean that governments were not all powerful and that governments
would have to acknowledge that there was, so to speak, a higher, but staƟc power than that of the historical collecƟve
represented by the poliƟcal class. The German Historical School was inŇuenced by Darwin's theory of evoluƟon and
argued against the atomism and deducƟvism of neoclassical economics with a holisƟc approach that connected the
economy to the socio-poliƟcal and cultural environment of the society. The eventual dominance of Austrian economic
theory as neoliberalism has signiĮcant implicaƟons for the legal theory of the corporaƟon and ulƟmately for corporate
moral responsibility.
21
In Mises' view, the rule of law must govern the free market and a small public service, but must also
include careful legislaƟve proscripƟon of powers of government. Mises’ criƟque suggested the
problem with bureaucracy was the enƟre poliƟcal system(Jones 2012, p. 55). It restricted individual
freedom of autonomy and assigned more tasks to government. The culprit is not the bureaucrat
but the poliƟcal system.
The New Deal in the US was thought to be a quasi-consƟtuƟonal disguise for dictatorship. Growing
government interference with business was problemaƟc. Mises argued for a strict separaƟon
between business driven by proĮt moƟves and public service governed by democraƟc
accountability. Mises did not believe it possible to mix market mechanisms and public tasks. He did
believe that the role of the state should shrink and markets would deliver the services people
demanded. Neoliberalism for Mises, however, was a theory that did not entrench the interests of
parƟcular classes or ideas, but rather the market liberated the individual to experiment and thus
improve his or her fortunes (Jones 2012, p. 56). The market was a fundamentally democraƟc arena
for Mises; unsuccessful business would be subject to market discipline, resulƟng in greater
eĸciency and eīecƟve delivery of socio-economic goods and services. Mises was the most
uncriƟcal of markets of the neoliberals, a responsive hub around which consumers reigned
supreme. It was for Mises and the neoliberals always beƩer to have private markets deliver public
goods. The unresolved problem was that markets were not self-regulaƟng except in the sense that
crises cleared out the weakest players but could not provide predictable stability (Jones 2012,
p. 57). The problem of markets not self-correcƟng was not only theoreƟcal. In response to growing
economic instability, in Cambridge John Maynard Keynes argued for counter-cyclical spending by
government as a way to answer the problem of severe, repeated economic contracƟons. There
were nineteenth century Įnancial panics in the years 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, and the
Long Depression of 1873-96 that included the panics of 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1896. In the
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twenƟeth century there were panics in 1901, 1907, 1920-21, and 1929 (Skrabec 2015).
Hayek, a student of Mises, took up the quesƟon of planning versus prices and argued in opposiƟon
to Keynes for the price mechanism as a method unmatched by any central planners’ eīorts, no
maƩer how expert the planner might be. Following the Wall Street collapse of 1929 the argument
in favor of central planning gained considerable credibility and Keynes’ work rose to a prominent
posiƟon by promising to end recessions.
Neoliberal theory as it was explicated by Hayek forms a focal concern in this chapter. The three
points of Hayek's thought on which I will brieŇy concentrate below are (1) his ideas about individual
absoluƟsm in which the individual is primary, (2) the need for a minimal state to prevent
propagaƟon of what these thinkers perceived to be its tyrannical tendencies, and (3) Hayek's
predisposiƟon that even in a radically minimalized state there must be room for a legal apparatus to
protect private property and insure compeƟƟon among market parƟcipants.27 While his
best-known neoliberal colleagues Popper and Mises were instrumental in the development of
neoliberal thought, Hayek is the focal Įgure here because he was the most inŇuenƟal in both
mobilizing the body of thought from abstract concepts into a movement, organizing the movement
and developing its potenƟal as an apparatus for policy-making.
At the core of the neoliberal ideology of radical individualism and minimal government there is a
similarity of Įrst principles shared by Popper and Hayek. As with Popper, Hayek believes in a Įrst
principle that that the importance of the individual is of primary concern. As a second Įrst principle
Hayek is convinced that conceptualizaƟon of the world is unreliable and of limited value.28 This is
misleading however, because Hayek infers from the Įrst principles not merely a primary, but an
27Hayek's concernswith legal issues form a legal-economic niche that has an enabling capacity for individual autonomy.
The provisions Hayek makes for legislaƟon, and for the rule of law are addressed below.
28ConceptualizaƟon is deĮned as a general and abstract understanding of human communal existence(Gupta 2002,
p. 3).
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absoluƟst understanding of individualism. This for Hayek is a maƩer of faith. And while Popper did
not enƟrely reject collecƟvism Hayek considers any conceptualizaƟon of the collecƟve — an
abstract understanding of the whole social community — to be irraƟonal. With respect to social
ends, Hayek cannot completely deny that social and poliƟcal processes are collecƟve, but he sees
this as a coincidence of individual aims and those, in his view, remain individual in all circumstances.
Therefore acƟon taken in common is possible only where individual people agree on the ends, but
these are cooperaƟve ventures in which they treat the cooperaƟve eīort as a means to their own
individual ends (Hayek 2001). The second Įrst principle concerns the limited and faulty concepƟons
about the social order of which individuals are capable. Because individuals are so limited in the
scope and scale of their understanding Hayek thinks it is impossible for them to apprehend the
needs of the whole of society. It is for this reason that Hayek narrowly limits conceptualizing about
social values and human ends to the values of individuals that only parƟally represent the social
whole. This is where Popper and Hayek diīer signiĮcantly, and it reveals Hayek as the more
extreme of the two thinkers. Popper acknowledges that conceiving an understanding of society is
an unavoidable — even if error-ridden — eīort that people will make, while Hayek wants to enƟrely
avoid the dangers of overreaching by trying to comprehend the whole of society and holding false
and misleading concepƟons about insƟtuƟons and universal social values.
Freedom, for Hayek, is a reŇecƟon of his posiƟon on individualism. There is only one conceptual
stance for Hayek, which is the absoluƟsm of the individual and that means that the individual must
be free of coercion of any kind from any other individual or group. What Hayek appears to argue is
that to be free, atomized individuals should be shielded from outside inŇuences whether from
other individuals or from the collecƟve.
From 1945 to 1980
Following the catastrophe of WWII, by the middle-1940s Hayek was intent to create and organize a
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neoliberal policy program and poliƟcal strategy to challenge collecƟvism issuing from Nazi and
Soviet totalitarianism, the New Deal in the US, and UK social democracy. Roosevelt's New Deal and
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom both emerged in 1944. Hayek and other neoliberals at the Ɵme saw
only the threat of socialism, collecƟvism and totalitarianism in these government programs. As
WWII ended Hayek capitalized on The Road to Serfdom, published in 1944, intending to build a
society of scholars to defend the core tenets of freedom through a neoliberal internaƟonal based
on individualism. Hayek understood that ideas become policy slowly; thus, through a transatlanƟc
network neoliberalism had to focus on and change the minds of intellectuals as opinion-leaders to
ensure that free markets would prevail (Hayek 1949). This was accompanied by the formaƟon of a
transatlanƟc network made up of think tanks, businessmen, journalists, and poliƟcians to
propagate the message of free markets as the best strategy for poliƟcal ends. This acƟvity occurred
separately from the academic work of the economists involved in the project (Jones 2012, pp. 4–5).
AŌer 1945, Hayek and then Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago Įrst helped to create, and
then to synthesize, a neoliberal policy program and poliƟcal strategy. In 1947, Hayek brought a
disparate group of intellectuals together in Switzerland to discuss how liberalism could be defended
in the face of the challenge of “collecƟvism” — an all-encompassing term that included Nazi and
Soviet totalitarianism, New Deal liberalism, and BriƟsh social democracy.29
At the middle of the twenƟeth century center and center-leŌ poliƟcal and economic ideas
dominated, but by the end of the twenƟeth century market fundamentalism was in a nearly
unassailable posiƟon unƟl the global Įnancial crisis of 2008 (Jones 2012, pp. 22–23).
From 1980 to 2008
29This was the formaƟon of the Mount Pelerin Society, named for the locaƟon in Switzerland where the meeƟng was
held. It was here that Hayek put into moƟon his plans for a transatlanƟc body made up of groups from Europe and the
United States to counter what Hayek percieved as a growing threat from supporters of collecƟvism in the form of social
planning, government interference in business, and socialism (Jones 2012, pp. 73–84), (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009).
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In the period from 1980 the neoliberal movement became more policy-oriented in pracƟcal poliƟcal
terms. In 1979 Margaret Thatcher, as prime minister in the United Kingdom, and Ronald Reagan,
inaugurated in 1980 as President of the United States, brought neoliberal theory into their
respecƟve governments and implemented policies with an emphasis on free markets, an animus for
social democracy and against the economic and poliƟcal values of the New Deal. In the United
States Ronald Reagan put together an unlikely coaliƟon made up of working-class Democrats and
large corporate interests that has had extensive and persistent poliƟcal ramiĮcaƟons.30 The social
and economic upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s had created an opportunity neoliberals seized upon
to roll back public conĮdence in government eĸciency and moral authority and to assert the
primacy of individualist absoluƟsm and market fundamentalism. Consequently, neoliberalism
gained a nearly unchallenged superiority as a socio-economic paradigm in the period of the
Reagan-Thatcher years and then unƟl 2008 despite the realiƟes of deindustrializaƟon, out-sourcing,
oī-shoring, and the deskilling of the labor force since the 1960s (Braverman 1998[1974]).31 Then,
aŌer the GFC, challenges began to rise to quesƟon the unqualiĮed claims that neoliberal theory
made about market eĸciency, and the poliƟcal policies that it enabled.
The GFC of 2008 was the result of regulatory deĮciencies (among other failures) in the advanced
economies that allowed risk behavior to run ahead of the capacity to contain the damage and harm
resulƟng from the acute manifestaƟon of the crisis. The result was that Įnancial sector
corporaƟons did not shoulder the burden of moral responsibility for their acƟons leading to the
GFC. The widespread percepƟon of the public was that those who caused and then beneĮƩed from
the risk behavior did not suīer from the consequences which were not merely economic, but social
30Eight years aŌer the GFC (and its consequences) this coaliƟon led to an outbreak of authoritarian populism reacƟng
against the crisis, the bail-out of the Įnancial sector, and the imposiƟon of austerity in both the US and the UK.
31Braverman’s interest in what was happening to work and to labor, although not speciĮcally about neoliberalism
(which was not a coinage in use at the Ɵme he wrote), can be traced back to eīorts to exonerate capitalism for a variety
of socio-economic ills and details the systemaƟc degradaƟon of work in the period.
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and personal. In many cases Įnancial sector principals beneĮƩed from not only conƟnued
employment, but bonuses and bailouts for which the public was made to pay while global
economic acƟvity was signiĮcantly damaged. This caused deep and lasƟng resentment because the
damages were perceived to be unfair along several dimensions, unjust with respect to the remedies
and exploitaƟve of the publics' vulnerabliity to paying to save the Įnancial system. Thus, neither
was there no (or very liƩle) moral responsibility taken by the banks and other Įnancial insƟtuƟons,
nor were there substanƟal legal, social or other forms of responsibility for the crisis despite its very
high cost in both economic and non-economic terms.
Hayek on Spontaneous Order v. Planned Order
The quesƟon of whether Hayek's thought is a social theory or one of economics lingers in debates
about where Hayek's moƟvaƟng concerns lie, with society or with economics. And the answer to
this raises deeper quesƟons about his sense of the importance of order. If it is a social theory is this
as a consequence of his concern with economic order or with social order itself? Where does his
concern with spontaneous order lie?32
One of Hayek's central concerns is the nature and signiĮcance of spontaneous order. Hayek was
interested in the quesƟon of spontaneous order as the philosophical underpinning of his criƟque of
planned socio-economic orders by centralized collecƟve states. His interest seems also to reveal a
deep interest in social quesƟons and theory in comparison to the emphasis that is typically put on
Hayek's economic prescripƟons. More speciĮcally, what Hayek was dealing with is how a
spontaneous social order in nature can be explained and whether order can be undesigned. That is,
32In an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Friedrich Hayek”, David Schmidtz addresses Hayek's concern
with the origin of order in the natural world (Schmidtz 2017). Hayek rejected the idea that there had to be a designer for
there to be order in nature or in society. Instead Hayek argued that social theory begins with the observaƟon of ordered
structures but that those structures resulted from the undesigned acƟon of many individuals. The informaƟon necessary
for commerce that is found in prices enables a spontaneous order to emerge from the bargaining process and in turn,
from the spontaneous order there is the appearance of communiƟes as markets are formed. CooperaƟve undertakings
of individual acƟon in markets, trading and commerce are at the root of social order for Hayek.
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do we need to explain order in nature by the concept of a designer, if predicƟon is not possible in
either natural selecƟon or in social and cultural evoluƟon. Hayek, consistent with his rejecƟon of
economic planning also rejected designer arguments as fallacious in both nature and in society. Just
as unforeseen and unplanned evoluƟon can explain the emergence of order in nature, so is it
equally arguable that the operaƟons of a spontaneous, unplanned market system can explain the
emergence of socio-economic order. The quesƟon is centered on a comparison of spontaneous
order with planned order and if socio-economic orders diīer with respect to consequent
aīordances of freedom and individual autonomy. When markets emerge as part of cooperaƟve
ventures, the market process, based on partnerships formed for mutual beneĮt will result in
communiƟes. In an idealized Hayekian concepƟon then, communiƟes tend to be spontaneous
orders as they are formed by the market process rather than by an authority. Thus is the claim
made that a spontaneous social order based on the price mechanism is superior to a planned
system. And this takes us back to individualism as market parƟcipants respond to prices and follow
their individual preferences and decisions. It also takes us back to the insistence that there be as
liƩle government interference in the workings of markets as possible, leaving the market
parƟcipants to sort things out through taking and rejecƟng prices, but without central planners
pretending to have beƩer informaƟon than that provided by price signals.
The spontaneous system, according to Hayek's thought, has its own logic that no planner can
change. Put simply, price signals economize on informaƟon. This helps to explain why price signals
are so important in Hayek's thought. Price signals do what nothing else can — they enable people
to form mutual expectaƟons, and thereby to buy and sell in markets. The claim is thereby
substanƟated that a spontaneously generated, individualisƟc socio-economic order based on the
funcƟoning of the price mechanism in markets makes everyone beƩer oī. For Hayek, when
informaƟon is not only widely dispersed, but is also impossible to acquire because it is either
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inaccessible or does not exist at all, what people are willing to pay eīecƟvely represents that
informaƟon through prices (Schmidtz 2017, p. 10) and (Hayek 1945). This aggregate informaƟon is
something no central planner can Įnd or use to solve the problem of socio-economic planning
according to the theory.33
What has happened to the concept of price signals in the period of Įnancial capitalism and
parƟcularly in the global Įnancial crisis makes Hayek's thinking problemaƟc for assignments of
corporate moral responsibility. Prices represent background informaƟon in one variable (there is
only one thing people who are trading need to know, not many things). Can we compare the
spontaneous order that is idealized by Hayek with the actual order (and its consequences) that is
represented by Įnancial capitalism? Hayek and other neoliberals assert that planned orders are by
necessity inferior to those that are spontaneously generated by individuals trading in free markets
that operate on the basis of prices as the determinate factor in revealing values and preferences.
But how does Hayek's conceptualizaƟon hold up against the historical record? Has the spontaneous
order that Hayek anƟcipated failed to emerge, or has something else happened? What did we do
(how did we manage) before price signals were available to guide human behavior and organize the
social order? And is the problem with the prices themselves or with a rigid applicaƟon of the
concept of minimal government as a poliƟcal philosophy? Do planned economic orders always rank
more highly than others in their threat to human freedom and liberty, or is there a possibility of
some opƟmal balance between markets and the need for regulaƟon and intervenƟon to prevent
crises? Looking at Hayek's work on planned economies and their speciĮc disuƟliƟes – on what does
he concentrate as the worst deĮciencies?
33This seems unlikely to remain true for the long term with the advent of machine learning and data aggregaƟon on
a massive scale. The assumpƟon that price mechanisms in free markets will retain opƟmal market price-seƫng perfor-
mance that is superior to othermethodologies is challenged by recent work inmachine learningwhere price opƟmizaƟon
and dynamic price-seƫng are not only computaƟonally feasible, but are displacing convenƟonal methods of price dis-
covery. This has been happening in equity markets, insurance and consumer purchasing paƩerns for some Ɵme. See,
for only one example of price dispersion, (Bodoh-Creed, Boehnke, and Hickman 2019).
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What appears to be clear is that markets do not invariably work as eĸciently and eīecƟvely as
Hayek and other neoliberals have theorized. And because they do not, the frequent failures of
markets that result in crashes and crises raise the most serious quesƟons about the theory itself,
especially when in the face of a severe market failure government is forced to step in to rescue the
system from collapse. But even in less extreme cases of markets failing to deliver on the neoliberal
promise, when the normaƟve expectaƟons of ciƟzens and consumers are violated and there is no
disciplinary response (as that would violate the terms of neoliberal theory about government
intervenƟon), then moral quesƟons arise about the fairness and jusƟce of the theory not just as a
collecƟon of ideas but as pracƟcal, pragmaƟc policies.
The Problems of and with Neoliberalism
While the basic argument of neoliberalism appears to be about economics, neoliberalism is in
reality poliƟcal, and is not an exclusively economic approach to the quesƟons of individualism, free
markets and precluding the growth and power of the state. This results from the actuality that the
poliƟcal economy of capitalism, especially Įnancial capitalism, is not exclusively an economic policy
exercise. It’s poliƟcal in the sense that it asserts the theoreƟcal necessity of free-markets to
promote a corporaƟst ideology of negaƟve freedom from government interference and for the
smallest possible state to reduce the state's capacity to regulate and interfere. The role of the state
is minimized in neoliberal theory and ideology to merely insure property rights and protecƟon for
corporate interests through the police power of the state and military power to protect trade and
access to resources. RealisƟcally, neoliberalism is thoroughly poliƟcal because it is a convergence of
economic and poliƟcal interests, policies and resources. It claims that solely through the operaƟons
of markets free from government interference and the working of the price mechanism in
compeƟƟve markets that individual liberty and freedom can be preserved. But markets are not and
cannot be free in a pure economic sense. To operate eīecƟvely and eĸciently markets must
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regulate and be regulated. This need for regulaƟon by a superordinate body and a legal framework
for the proper funcƟoning of markets introduces a poliƟcal aspect to the economic claims of
neoliberal theory (Schmidtz 2017, pp. 13–14). Neoliberalism cannot be, aŌer all, a purely economic
pracƟce in real life. Although these two principal aspects of the theory should be considered
separately, in reality the aspects of neoliberalism related to its economic theory and neoliberalism
as a social and poliƟcal theory cannot be enƟrely separated one from the other.
Economic Aspects of Neoliberalism
The economic assumpƟons about human nature and the defects of the neoliberal argument are
revealed in several contradicƟons at the core of neoliberal thought. An underlying economic
problem with neoliberal theory is the simple reality that not everything that is of value can be
determined by the funcƟoning of the price mechanism in a market operaƟon. There are quesƟons
and problems of social, cultural, poliƟcal and economic life that do not yield to the economism of
price mechanisms in markets, and markets cannot answer the diĸcult, broader concerns of values
and moral judgements. But even on its own terms neoliberalism does not conform to its own claims
and this is evident in Ɵmes of economic crisis.
Another contradicƟon of neoliberalism is that it can be criƟcized as a form of "bait and switch";
Įrmly held in the theory there is a promise to ciƟzens and consumers that real compeƟƟon will be
assured among large global market parƟcipants, and the state will not intervene to save those
whose risk-taking turned out badly. But in the event of an economic crisis, where the systemic
negaƟve consequences are declared to be "too great" and the global risk-takers are genuinely at
risk, then the promise of non-intervenƟon is unfulĮlled and an intervenƟon is deemed appropriate
on the grounds that the system must be saved. Hence, the rhetoric is about compeƟƟve neoliberal
capitalism, but in reality it is state intervenƟonist socialism for corporaƟons in trouble (Blyth 2013,
p. 73), (Tooze 2018, IntroducƟon) . This contradicƟon has been all too evident in the aŌermath of
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the GFC.
What describes the environment in which neoliberal Įnancial capitalism exists today? It is not an
environment of naƟons as islands that describes the relaƟons among and between economies and
socieƟes. The contemporary reality is of a Ɵghtly interwoven global network of corporate interests
operaƟng as Įnancial insƟtuƟons. Following, Popper, Mises, Hayek and Milton Friedman, the
neoliberal objecƟve of liberaƟng capital from the obsolete laws and unnecessary regulaƟon is
achieved by corporaƟons, and parƟcularly by those in the Įnancial sector able to funcƟon beyond
the boundaries of the individual naƟon-state has proven to be a recipe for intervenƟon when the
inevitable crises erupt.
Corporate monopoly power is an outcome of the inability of the state’s funcƟons of regulaƟon and
legislaƟon that the market sphere will operate as it is theorized in neoliberalism. Monopolies by
deĮniƟon prevent compeƟƟon. Yet, in neoliberal theory compeƟƟon is necessary for innovaƟon in
goods and services and that leads to economic growth, or so the theory claims.34
PoliƟcal Aspects of Neoliberalism
Early neoliberal theorists (these theorists included the pre-war Europeans and post-WWII followers)
saw the threat of collecƟvism as central to their anxieƟes. At the core of the perceived poliƟcal
threat is the centralizing tendency of strong-state liberal-democraƟc regimes that caused
neoliberals to assert the need for a non-intervenƟonist minimal state. Centralized state power and
interference could only lead, in their view, to the least desirable outcome — an inevitable
totalitarian state. This raises the quesƟon of what it is speciĮcally about liberal democracy that
34That this is not always true is a commonplace. To cite only one of many instances, DARPA (the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency of the US Department of Defense) is a counter-example. As a government agency and without
compeƟƟon DARPA developed the conceptual basis for ARPANET which was a prototype communicaƟons network that
led directly to the internet. DARPA also developed the communicaƟons protocols that comprise the digital infrastructure
of the internet. This government-sponsored project became a public good that has changed the world. The same is true
of much basic research in science, medicine and other Įelds where government supported academic work conƟnues to
provide innovaƟons and new discoveries.
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worries neoliberals and it appears that centralizaƟon itself is suĸcient to raise their fears. But there
is also the fear that under a Rawlsian deĮniƟon of liberal democracy — a fair system of cooperaƟon
between free and equal individuals – the state that is necessary for insuring the rights, fairness,
freedom and equality of those individuals would evolve over Ɵme into a strong state and at least
impair, if not negate, those same virtues of rights, fairness, freedom and equality (Rawls 1993),
(Rawls 1999, pp. 446–448).
What is at work here is a conŇict between two needs. One is for people, as ciƟzens, to set aside
their self-interestedness and acknowledge the demands of the common good on the one hand. But
on the other hand, the concepts of individual liberty and freedom from collecƟvism that are
promoted by neoliberalism depend on not sacriĮcing self-interest in the interest of the collecƟve, or
so the neoliberals claimed. This fundamental conŇict describes the ancient poliƟcal problem I
described in the early porƟon of this chapter — the need for the sacriĮce of self-interest for the
good of the collecƟve and the intractable collision of that need with human selĮshness. What is
notable is the relaƟvely recent neoliberal stance on this quesƟon: that neoliberal theory demands
that individual self-interest invariably take precedence over collecƟve interests. This aspect of
poliƟcal neoliberalism has potenƟal to negaƟvely eīect economic prosperity and individual
well-being, and in contemporary twenty-Įrst century economic condiƟons this potenƟal is manifest
in neoliberal policy outcomes. These outcomes include slow economic growth due to a lack of
investment, stagnant or falling incomes due to wage suppression and anƟ-union eīorts, declining
public health due to shrinking of the welfare state and public investment in educaƟon, health and
medical research and more.35 Yet if there were to be no restraint on free enterprise, or inadequate
and deĮcient regulaƟon of markets and market actors then, based on the historical record, not only
is socio-economic crisis certain to follow as can be seen in the historical record of boom-and-bust
35For example, recent empirical evidence shows that on crucial measures of public health the US is doing poorly; see
(Dyer 2018) on falling life expectancy, among othermeasures inwhich the US falls behind everywestern European naƟon.
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economic cycles, but recurrent poliƟcal crisis as well. To avoid poliƟcal crisis, the neoliberal posiƟon
must acknowledge and understand the community’s need for stable predictability through
regulaƟon and an appropriate applicaƟon of the rule of law.
ContradicƟons, Faulty AssumpƟons and Other DeĮciencies of Neoliberal Theory
How markets work and what they can and cannot do is based on neoliberal assumpƟons that
markets are superior to planned socieƟes. In neoliberal theory markets can always and opƟmally
adjudicate between rivalrous values and ideas about the best way to live, individual preferences and
the aims of contemporary society. A second assumpƟon of the theory is that individuals are always
the best judges of their own well-being and choices. But this assumes that an individual will judge
only on behalf of that individual, and not with respect to the collecƟve, because it is through supply
and demand that operaƟon of the price mechanism in markets will best determine collecƟve values.
In a more economically technical approach to the provision of public goods neoliberals say that the
pricing mechanism will distribute economic outputs with opƟmal eĸciency and thereby send the
right signals about what should be produced. This process indicates with some precision where
investment capital should be allocated. Prices do not indicate with precision, or indeed indicate at
all, however, for the provision of public goods. Yet it is clear that for a properly funcƟoning society
public goods are essenƟal. It is only necessary to think of examples such as clean water and
provision of services of natural monopolies — uƟliƟes and public safety services are among the
many prominent examples.
Financial stability and predictability are also among the most important of public goods because
these furnish the foundaƟon for collecƟve economic life and individual well-being. It is important to
remember that the public good of training and all levels of educaƟon as well as the public capital of
infrastructure decisively contribute to overall economic producƟvity. ProducƟvity in the private
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sector of the economy remains the result of eīecƟve and eĸcient provision of public goods and
investment in public resources. However, the price mechanism does not allocate capital eīecƟvely
and eĸciently to public goods and services, because this requires poliƟcal decision-making and
policy pracƟce to deliver investment to essenƟal producƟvity needs. By insisƟng on both shrinking
the state to a bare minimum set of funcƟons and permiƫng only markets to allocate capital then
the provision of essenƟal public goods is no longer possible to the degree required by a complex
twenty-Įrst century socio-economic system. Simply relying on price cannot yield the appropriate
allocaƟon of capital because absent an adequate poliƟcal allocaƟon process the required pool of
public capital will be deĮcient. An enlightened poliƟcal process to allocate overall capital between
private and public uses — cognizant of public and producƟvity needs — is obligatory.
Neoliberalism and the Law
A principal quesƟon of this chapter asks how has the law made corporaƟons less suscepƟble to
charges of responsibility. Typically, the direct argument against holding corporaƟons morally
responsible relies on neoliberal principles of limited government and non-intervenƟonism. But
there is another indirect but eīecƟve form of opposiƟon that works through the legal system to
assign only legal responsibility to individuals for harms and injuries that they cause as agents. This
legal posture makes it diĸcult to raise quesƟons about what corporaƟons, not convenƟonally
thought of as agents, ought to do or not do with respect to social, economic or moral duƟes and
obligaƟons.
It is commonly thought that corporaƟons have goƩen into diĸculty with charges of moral
responsibiliƟes when individuals of the organizaƟon take unwarranted risks and are unwilling to
accept responsibility for what they have done. But it can also be argued that inculcaƟng individual
risk aversion isn't the soluƟon to the problem of aberrant corporate behavior. When corporaƟons
get into trouble for their destrucƟve conduct, the diīusion of responsibility within an organizaƟon
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makes it diĸcult to assign responsibility to the appropriate, culpable individuals. Legally it is also
diĸcult to successfully bring charges against them.36.
There are several other problems with assigning responsibility that need to be considered. One is
that the low visibility of those responsible (for decision-making within corporaƟons) to those
aīected by corporate acƟon makes the decision-makers less idenƟĮable and thereby less
vulnerable. By both physical distance and by social distance in a highly unequal society the oĸcers
and directors can remain largely invisible to the vicƟms of corporate acƟon. In a more nearly
(socially) equal circumstance the more immediate proximity of corporate execuƟves, oĸcers and
board members to those harmed can make those corporate individuals visibly idenƟĮable and
thereby curtail harmful acƟon. Another way that those who should be culpable for corporate acƟon
escape from scruƟny is that others who are lower down the in the corporate hierarchy do the dirty
work that results in injury and harm. Those higher up in the corporate hierarchy remain out of
reach legally and morally. Also, the normalizing of aberrant corporate behavior over Ɵme has
played a signiĮcant role in lowering collecƟve standards of conduct. This promotes a more
generalized societal shiŌ from what is normaƟve and generally acceptable to that which is merely
legal and this shiŌ has changed the standard of judgment for what can be admiƩed and accepted.
When the only standard of normaƟve acceptability is what is legally permissible and economically
proĮtable then the inability of large corporaƟons to admit errors for fear of a negaƟve impact on
share price becomes a perverted form of economic raƟonalism. And in an environment of extreme
economic raƟonalism, individual raƟonal agents are all there is and all that count. In such
circumstances a corporate culture of concealment emerges to protect the guilty and so, not only is
there risk aversion, but consequences aversion; those individuals responsible for policy decisions
and management losses are not aŋicted by exposure to blame and censure.
36This aspect of culpability is covered in more detail Chapter 5-Responsibility
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DeregulaƟon, consolidaƟon and removal of legal constraints creates a shield against corporate
responsibility. ConsolidaƟon is another way of describing monopoly, near-monopoly or duopoly;
things can be done in those circumstances that cannot in a genuinely compeƟƟve environment.
CorporaƟons are not democraƟc organizaƟons; they are totalitarian in the sense that all power
Ňows from the centralized top down, exactly what the neoliberals were concerned to prevent. To
the extent that corporaƟons have taken on governance roles in the poliƟcal sphere neoliberalism
has exchanged one form of totalitarianism (the state), with another (the corporaƟon). And there is
no need for enlightened corporate self-interest if there is no one with power below in the hierarchy
to direct challenges to those above.
Neoliberalism and Corporate Moral Responsibility
In Chapter 1 I said that I would argue for holding corporaƟons responsible based on their status as
non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems, but sƟll consider them to be members of the moral community.
There are condiƟons that are imposed by their incorporaƟon, and their corporate chartering
requirements, as well as civil law, that hold corporaƟons legally responsible and treat the
wrong-doing of corporaƟons as the responsibility of the individual oĸcers and board members, as
well as of individual employees. Again, I have said that I am arguing that corporaƟons considered as
unitary enƟƟes are members of the moral community and can – on the grounds of conversability
and other aƩributes of non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems – be held morally responsible. We are not
obliged in law or normaƟvely to restrict responsibility exclusively to individuals as natural persons.
But neoliberalism, as the dominant socio-economic theory of our Ɵme, has an absoluƟst focus on
individuals. By doing this, it implicitly gives certain protecƟons to corporaƟons.37 However, it is also
on corporaƟons and not only individuals where assignments of responsibility of all kinds (legal,
37It is diĸcult to prosecute and achieve meaningful legal judgments in cases of alleged corporate wrong-doing. But in
cases where individuals of a corporaƟon are charged, corporaƟons frequently pay themonetary Įnes and other penalƟes
of their oĸcers who are found guilty and will oŌen indemnify them for losses. The point here is that even if we restrict
responsibility to its legal form, weaknesses and inadequacies are apparent.
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social, and moral) should be focused because corporaƟons are overwhelmingly the dominant
organizaƟonal form of the twenƟeth and twenty-Įrst centuries. Through this dominant posiƟon
corporaƟons arguably have not only unprecedented amounts of economic and poliƟcal inŇuence
and control in contemporary global capitalism, but also unprecedented capacity to do wide-spread,
long-lasƟng social and economic harm.
The desirability of a minimal state in Hayek's theory concludes in two consequences for corporate
responsibility. One consequence is that the concept of the minimal state encourages legal
restricƟons on (or prohibiƟon of) regulaƟon of corporaƟons, and this hands-oī posture largely puts
corporaƟons out of reach as legally culpable unitary enƟƟes. The second consequence is that
despite their status as legal ĮcƟons enjoying a variety of personhood rights corporaƟons are
considered to be only a collecƟon of agreements among contracƟng individuals.38 This perspecƟve
of the corporaƟon as a collecƟon of agreements among contracƟng individuals is known as the
nexus-of-contracts theory.39 Hayek's thinking about legal frameworks is derived from his concern
with a minimal state, but to further address this here puts the story about Hayek’s theory ahead of
an understanding of where his thought developed from and how it was shaped by earlier neoliberal
thinkers.
There is a connecƟon between neoliberalism as a theory and our concern with corporate moral
responsibility, and that concern centers on a contradicƟon. The socio-economic reality of everyday
life as it is experienced by ordinary people suggests that the contradicƟon lies in something other
than just the obvious mis-match of eighteenth century, classical liberal thought on which
neoliberalism is based on the one hand and the global corporate socio-economic order in which we
now live and work on the other hand. The contradicƟon is that claims about the economic eĸency
38The concepts and complicaƟons of legal ĮcƟons, ĮcƟonal enƟƟes and personhood are the subject of Chapter 3 below.
The issues of legal ĮcƟons are developed and dealt with there in detail.
39Nexus-of-contracts theory is deĮned and explained in Chapter 3 Personhood.
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of neoliberalism and claims about its poliƟcal legiƟmacy do not seem harmonious. Neoliberalism,
as I have described above, emerged as part of a reacƟon by European scholars and economists
against the rise of totalitarian states that they had seen do so much damage in the interwar and
world war period (1918- 1945). As it was further developed at several universiƟes in the United
States, most prominently at the University of Chicago where Milton Friedman was its best-known
proponent, neoliberalism took a turn that hardened its opposiƟonal character. It was during this
stage of development that neoliberalism found its strongest expression in opposiƟon to the New
Deal and to the welfare state, as well as promoƟng privaƟzaƟon of public assets and deregulaƟon of
industry and the private sector. As I have indicated, it was not only against socialist and totalitarian
regimes that the neoliberals aimed their aƩack, but it was in opposiƟon to the state itself as they
sought to minimize the role and size of government overall. Since 2008 in the aŌermath of the GFC,
and in the decade-long period of austerity that has followed the acute phase of the crisis, social and
economic inequality has increased dramaƟcally. Yet poliƟcal opposiƟon to any challenge to
neoliberal theory and policy has only strengthened.
Conclusion — How Neoliberalism Makes Corporate Moral Responsibility Necessary
Neoliberalism has been a successful theory and policy iniƟaƟve. Its success can be measured by the
extent to which it has become the standard story of how the socio-economic order works. Since its
early beginnings in the 1920s and 1930s, neoliberalism has achieved its success through a
well-developed networked organizaƟon, through corporate funding sources, and through the
culƟvaƟon of contacts inside academia as well as an outside web of quasi-independent research
and policy insƟtuƟons. The results have been a dominant world-view based in economic theory
that has been translated into poliƟcal policy across much of the world. In this chapter I have argued
against neoliberal theory and the policy pracƟces that have been implemented following its tenets
on the grounds that it is contradictory, based on faulty assumpƟons and leads to net economic and
39
social outcomes that are as problemaƟc as those it purports to defend against. The quesƟon
remains — how does neoliberalism make corporate moral responsibility necessary?
The Įrst, central tenet of neoliberalism is individual absoluƟsm. In the legal realm, the neoliberal
concept of individualism is assimilated via the legal concept of personhood, enabling corporaƟons
to acquire rights, yet unlike natural persons, corporaƟons can evade responsibiliƟes. This is taken
up in Chapter 3 on personhood. A second tenet of neoliberal theory is a minimal state. An
adequately robust regulatory regime is unlikely in a minimal state, but not impossible. However, as
it has been implemented under neoliberal “light touch” regulaƟon, this policy has resulted in a
weak environment for corporate oversight and public protecƟon. The combinaƟon of powerful
corporaƟons with few regulatory checks, means that legal sancƟons, while they exist, are an
insuĸcient check on corporate wrong-doing. Thus, we need corporate moral (and not only legal
and social) responsibility to Įll the gap between corporate acƟon and its consequences. Neoliberal
thought has also shaped and constrained the philosophical debate about responsibility. In a similar
manner, the dominance of individual absoluƟsm has meant that philosophical arguments have
sought to make corporaƟons accountable as if they were (or could be redeĮned as) individual moral
agents with intenƟons, not fully grappling with the implicaƟons of responsibiliƟes of unitary
corporate enƟƟes. This results in the need for a theory of speciĮc corporate (not only individual)
moral responsibility. These philosophical points are developed in Chapters 4 and 5 that follow on
intenƟon and responsibility.
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CHAPTER 3-PERSONHOOD
IntroducƟon
In the United States on 11 August 2011 the Republican candidate for the party nominaƟon, MiƩ
Romney, addressed a crowd at the Iowa State Fair. In speaking of the problems of growth and cost
of US enƟtlement programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and others) he stated that he was against raising
taxes on individuals to meet the increased costs of these programs. A person (or several persons) in
the crowd shouted “CorporaƟons! CorporaƟons!” The shouters were expressing their preference
for raising taxes on corporaƟons for the necessary monies to support these programs. In response
to this heckling Romney said: “CorporaƟons are people, my friend...”. CriƟcs in the crowd,
demurring, shouted back that corporaƟons are not persons. Romney retorted: “Of course they are.
Everything corporaƟons earn ulƟmately goes to people. Where do you think it goes?” The hecklers
rejected his asserƟon by shouƟng that the money goes in corporate pockets (Elliot 2011).
Going any more deeply into the sharply polarised muddle of American poliƟcs may risk engaging in
that dialogue of the deaf, a term by which US poliƟcal discourse is now frequently described. Yet
there seem to be serious philosophical misapprehensions on both Romney's and the hecklers' parts
in this contenƟous episode, and they illuminate a central problem of this study. There is a challenge
of bringing to what I will call the personhood puzzle some balance between the issues of the
metaphysics of corporaƟons (are they persons?) and the normaƟve implicaƟons of treaƟng them as
persons.
Romney based his rejecƟon of taxing corporaƟons on his implicit percepƟon of the metaphysics of
corporaƟons, that is, he understood (at some level) that corporate persons are individuals and
taxpayers, just as natural persons are individuals and taxpayers. Romney's posiƟon was that no
individual should be burdened with addiƟonal levies to pay for growth in enƟtlement programs.
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Romney, although obviously confusing the personhood of the corporaƟon with those natural
persons into whose pockets corporate earnings go, was resƟng his argument on the ontological
character of corporaƟons. Thus, he exhibited a view that their essenƟal nature is the ground on
which he could refuse to condone taxing them. Further, it appeared that Romney held that once
the metaphysical status of corporaƟons as individuals is accepted, then the outcomes of their acts
are acceptable too. Romney's metaphysical view stands in sharp contrast to the posiƟon of the
hecklers.
The hecklers were more concerned with the retenƟon of corporate earnings in corporate pockets
which they perceive as against the public interest and thus the problem becomes one of normaƟve
ethics. That is, the hecklers' primary concern was with the course of light touch corporate taxaƟon
policy formulaƟon leading to outcomes for which they blame the granƟng of legal personhood to
corporaƟons.
Romney was not hearing the discontent of the hecklers' concerns with social pracƟces and
socio-economic outcomes that the hecklers perceive as unjust and unfair. Denying that
corporaƟons are people in the same metaphysical sense as natural persons, the hecklers were
expressing their concern with the right and wrong outcomes of corporate acts and how those
outcomes trumped the ontological status of the corporaƟon. But the hecklers' stance seems not to
recognise the long historical reality and socio-economic uƟlity of legal personhood that provides
corporaƟons with personality.
In contrast to what we may infer of Romney's stance, the hecklers were rejecƟng the noƟon that
outcomes of corporate acts are necessarily socially beneĮcial. It appears also to be possible that a
signiĮcant number in the Iowa crowd did not care very much about the ontological status of
corporaƟons as people, or even as technically legal persons, as long as they don't act contrary to
the public interest. In all too many instances they apparently don't see the public interest being
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served by corporaƟons. Indeed, the crowd may view the acts of corporaƟons as increasingly
inimical to the public interest, as violaƟons of human rights, as contrary to a common sense of
fairness, as a distorƟon of democraƟc processes, and so on.
This is a growing diĸculty for liberal democracy and leads us again toward the arena of legal
personhood per se. It raises the issue in this dialogue between metaphysics and normaƟve ethics of
whether (1) the eĸcacy of legal personhood (corporate personality) can be properly understood in
the context of basic legiƟmacy demands of liberal democracy and (2) if we can answer the quesƟon
of whom are corporaƟons designed to serve: employees, shareholders or society at large?
In Chapter 1 I asked if it might be possible to make an argument that would hold Įnancial sector
corporaƟons morally responsible for the consequences of their acƟons. Here in Chapter 3 I will
examine the central idea of personhood. Personhood is the concept that makes it possible for a
corporaƟon to claim, hold and exercise civil and consƟtuƟonal rights. To more fully understand how
corporaƟons have been granted and exercise those rights we begin with their status as parƟcular
kinds of persons. It is on the basis of that status as parƟcular kinds of persons that they are thought
to be eligible to have rights at all. Yet even as we clarify the personhood issue, a puzzle remains.
Why do corporaƟons enjoy the accumulaƟon of rights and privileges that come with personhood,
but, under the currently dominant contemporary legal theory of the corporaƟon, are they not
understood as disƟnct, fully-Ňedged members of the moral community and thus suscepƟble to
ascripƟons of moral responsibility?
I Įrst present a brief history of the concept of legal personhood. Following that I then describe
deĮciencies of jurisprudenƟal interpretaƟon and applicaƟon of personhood with respect to legal
remedies for the problem of corporate moral responsibility. Important quesƟons about diĸculƟes
assigning moral responsibility to corporaƟons as rights-bearing persons arise here. Finally, I will
discuss alternaƟves to personhood-based responsibility and quesƟons of whether agents and
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agency are required for corporate moral responsibility.
The GFC is an illustraƟon of Įnancial sector corporaƟons using personhood to exercise power and
escape responsibility. A major part of the explanaƟon for this is found in the concept of corporate
personhood for it is through their possession of legal personhood that Įnancial sector corporaƟons
have accumulated and exercised the power necessary to successfully claim rights yet avoid being
held morally responsible for what they have done. The role of corporate personhood in the GFC is
vitally important because confusion about the legal concept of personhood is one of the central
means by which Įnancial sector corporaƟons have been able to exercise power without suīering
the moral consequences when their pracƟces result in widespread harm and injury.
I will show that there is a chain of relaƟonships starƟng with corporate legal personhood to their
acquisiƟon and exercise of property and liberty rights and Įnally with their avoiding or evading
responsibility. Those property and civil rights gained by corporaƟons have resulted in their
conƟnuing accumulaƟon of poliƟcal power, something that aīords them the capacity to inŇuence
and manipulate regulaƟon and legislaƟon through lobbying and Įnancing of poliƟcal campaigns.
CorporaƟons have captured regulatory mechanisms through free speech rights that give them
extraordinary power to lobby, inŇuence legislaƟon and contribute Įnancially to the elecƟon
campaigns of poliƟcal candidates and incumbents. Free speech rights and other liberty rights
gained through personhood give them great advantages over ordinary individual ciƟzens whose
resources are no match for those of corporaƟons in the poliƟcal process, especially with respect to
inŇuencing the composiƟon and eīecƟveness of regulaƟon, oversight and sancƟoning of wrongful
corporate behaviour, parƟcularly in the Įnancial sector.
The History of Legal Personhood
In what follows I will Įrst present a literalist explanaƟon of the consequences of theories of
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corporaƟons in historical sequence; this is the “what happened and when did it happen” view of
legal personhood. AŌer that I will move to a structuralist view—why did certain things happen and
what followed from that? The shiŌ to the structuralist interpretaƟon is intended to help understand
what happened but in a historical context. I want to focus on why these changes took place and
follow the consequences in each instance and with each shiŌ. Finally, I brieŇy present a third move
from the legal theory and into the philosophical concept of personhood as an abstract concept.
One of the principal quesƟons of this chapter is to ask whether the concept of legal personhood can
help us to understand how moral responsibility might be ascribed to commercial corporaƟons.
Does this concern with corporate personhood contain a fundamental quesƟon? To answer this, I
begin with the history of the concept of legal personhood. I will describe how personhood has had
a signiĮcant inŇuence on judicial decision-making in recent (mostly US) legal history and why
personhood plays a crucial role in allowing corporaƟons to avoid ascripƟons of moral
responsibility.40 I am taking this approach because it is in the realm of the law that we Įnd a
connecƟon between the relaƟvely recent grant of legal corporate personhood to Įnancial sector
Įrms in parƟcular and the capacity of those Įrms to eīecƟvely shield themselves from appropriate
regulaƟon of their pracƟces, meaningful sancƟon for their wrongdoing and authenƟc forms of
responsibility for the consequences of their acƟon as they funcƟon in the world. The moral and
normaƟve implicaƟons that follow from the legal history of theories of the Įrm are where my
emphasis will concentrate, but to do that I Įrst need to set the groundwork for development of the
legal theories of the Įrm that play an important role in what seems to be immunity from legal,
economic, social and especially moral responsibility for Įnancial sector corporaƟons.41
40Debates about personhood and the nature of corporaƟons are prevalent throughout Anglo-American law. Although
this chapter employs examples mainly from the history of US legal theory, the concerns aƩached to personhood are co-
extensive across the Anglo-American sphere. It would be diĸcult to argue that the consequences of the treatment of
corporaƟons in US law and judicial decision-making are not felt globally.
41There is a vast journalisƟc literature about successful avoidance and evasion of responsibility for the GFC by Įnancial
sector corporaƟons and their principals. For example, see Jed S. Rakoī (United States District Judge for the Southern
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TradiƟonally it is the quesƟon of what corporaƟons are, what is their nature and what purposes
they have that has occupied the thoughts of those concerned with the consequences of corporate
acƟon. The approach I am taking looks Įrst at how theories of the corporaƟon have developed and
changed over the past 150 years, i.e., the course of understanding of their nature and purposes. It
is not necessary to reach deeply into ancient and medieval thought about personhood to
understand suĸciently the contemporary problem with corporate personhood in the context of
these theories. But this earlier thought does indicate the origin of the concept and how it informs
and shapes contemporary legal theory and social pracƟce, and more importantly, how we get to the
normaƟve consequences for the Įrms and those who enjoy and suīer from their acƟons today. In
this historical overview I rely on an arƟcle by David Millon(Millon 1990, p. 1033). Rather than
geƫng bogged down in an extensive historical survey I present a condensaƟon of Millon’s summary
of recent corporate law. Millon’s arƟcle covers only the last 150 years in US legal history of theories
of corporaƟons. Millon’s history is important because it allows us to understand the basis of central
issues in modern corporate law with respect to personhood, corporaƟons, their enƟty status and
how they have developed.
From their early formaƟon as obligaƟon-bearing enƟƟes corporaƟons have evolved to an extent
that they are among our most inŇuenƟal and powerful social insƟtuƟons, challenging states and all
other forms of social organizaƟon for dominance (Krannich 2005, pp. 64–65). The features of
limited liability for parƟcipants in the corporaƟon, their inŇuence within the markets where they
trade, as well as their capacity to funcƟon as engines of capital accumulaƟon, put corporaƟons
among our most highly developed and important socio-economic insƟtuƟons. The use of fungible
equity shares for ownership, and relaƟonships as parƟes to binding contracts puts them at, or very
close to, the center of all human acƟviƟes, economic and otherwise. While the development of
District of New York) (Rakoī 2014).
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corporate insƟtuƟons and acƟviƟes is not a new historical phenomenon, its roots go much deeper
than is commonly thought.
In our Ɵme, corporate acƟviƟes rest on the abstract concept of personhood, but it is an ancient
concept having its foundaƟon in the Roman societas publicanorum (“society of publicans”) daƟng
back to the ĮŌh century BCE. Publicans were leaseholders funcƟoning as contractors to fulĮl a wide
variety of business acƟviƟes on behalf of the government of the Roman Republic including services,
supplies, property and revenue collecƟon. It is from these leaseholder groups that the abstract
concept of personhood derives. Thus, the reality is that the history of corporaƟons did not begin in
the seventeenth century as is commonly aƩributed to legal grants by the state to the East India
Company (a joint-stock English company), or with the French and Dutch companies of the same
period, but two thousand years earlier.
Three common and fundamental features of corporaƟons are especially salient to a proper
understanding as we trace the history of corporate personhood. One is that their existence is not
aīected by the departure of individual parƟcipants; this enhances organizaƟonal stability. Second,
corporaƟons can be represented by designated members, so there is one body or central
representaƟve through which all acƟviƟes occur; the corporaƟon thereby becomes the bearer of all
obligaƟons. Third, there is separaƟon of ownership and management. This separaƟon makes
geƫng Įnancial and human capital easier, but it does not involve management in the provision of
capital. Fungibility (transferability) of share ownership reduces the problem of misaligned
incenƟves between managers and shareholders. Ownership is fungible through the buying and
selling of shares of stock in the enƟty (Malmendier 2005, p. 31). However salient they may be to a
proper understanding of their development since their early emergence in the history of corporate
groups, these features do not add up to corporate personality.
During the period of the Roman Republic, a societas, formed by a group for a common purpose, had
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four criteria: contribuƟons of the partners to the enterprise, a common interest, an aim for the
business and the intenƟon or will to form the societas. A societas as a form of organizaƟon did not
create a disƟnct personality. In contrast to what was needed at the Ɵme by the Republic and, in
comparison to modern corporaƟons, a societas appears seriously deĮcient. For example, proĮts
and losses were shared equally among the parƟcipants and liability was not limited. However, the
Roman Republic, due to its need for corporate organizaƟons to carry on the acƟviƟes of the
Republic, acknowledged as necessary the development of special rules to give to societas
publicanori a kind of corporate standing, and it is a standing that would be recognized today
(Malmendier 2009). This standing includes permanence of the enƟty aŌer the death of its
founders, the right of representaƟon, and shareholder ownership through fungible shares, the
three features I menƟoned above.
There is an important disƟncƟon to be noted between societas and societas publicani. The societas
did not consƟtute discrete persons, but the concessionary special rules provided by the Republic,
and which applied only to the societas publicani, gave them the equivalent personality of what we
would today recognize as a corporaƟon. This status included permanence, the right of
representaƟon and the capacity for ownership through shareholding, but most importantly, it
established the concept of personhood.
Companies of publicans are recorded by Livy in Ab Urbe Condita in 216 BCE. There was rapid
growth in the lease system aŌer Rome’s victory in the Punic Wars (ended 146 BCE). Leases were
taken over by equites, the class of knights (one of the property-based classes of ancient Rome,
ranking below the senatorial class) already the majority of publicanai. These reached their peak of
poliƟcal and economic power in the last decades of the Roman Republic. As the Republic declined
legal reforms restricted the acƟviƟes of the equites and without government support the societas
publicanorum fell into insigniĮcance.
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It is evident that important tasks were given to the publicani and this indicates that as corporate
persons they and the contracƟng system were well-developed and reliable during the Roman
Republic (Malmendier 2005, pp. 32–33). This and the regime of special rules established the
concept of corporate personhood based on the features of permanence, representaƟon and
limited-liability shareholder ownership as well as the capacity for making binding contracts,
engaging in legal acƟons, and collecƟve decision-making on behalf of the interests and aims of the
enƟty as a whole.
While this descripƟon may seem clear enough with respect to the establishment of corporate
personality, it is only the beginning of the ambiguity, confusion and opaqueness about the concept
of personhood and its applicaƟon to corporaƟons that has led to the problems we face today as we
contend with corporaƟons in philosophy and jurisprudence. Disputes about the understanding of,
and conŇicts of interpretaƟon about legal personality, and hence the nature and purpose of
corporaƟons, have persisted over the centuries. In two review arƟcles from The Journal of Roman
Studies David Daube engages in detail the history of legal personality expounded by P.W. Duī in his
Personality in Roman Private Law (Duī 1938), (Daube 1943), (Daube 1944).
Daube notes that Duī shows Roman law never had a technical term for ‘legal person’ or for ‘legal
personality’, but that it was true that in the ByzanƟne period the term persona might be interpreted
as an enƟty qualiĮed “’to conduct a lawsuit’” (Daube 1943, p. 87). According to Daube, Duī
concludes that a modern lawyer might learn very liƩle from the Romans about the concept of legal
personality. In the four modern German theories of corporate groups cited by Duī there is liƩle
support for a deĮniƟve statement of jurisƟc personhood precisely because the Romans had no such
doctrine.42 During the classical period of the Roman Republic a concession from the state was
42The four German legal theories of the corporaƟon are: Savigny’s FicƟonism, in which non-human enƟƟes have per-
sonality only if the law contrives the enƟty juridically to be a ĮcƟƟous person; Gierke’s Realism in which organized groups
form real persons; Ihering’s Symbolism, which holds that any enƟty other than a person cannot have personality; Brinz’s
Purpose Theory, in which the property of a corporaƟon is dedicated to a speciĮc purpose, but no enƟty can have per-
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necessary to create a corporaƟon, but this was not because the Republic adhered to a ĮcƟon theory
of the Įrm, rather, it was a means by which control of enƟƟes operaƟng in and on behalf of the
Republic could be maintained.
The result of Duī’s scholarship reveals that although the foundaƟon of this abstract legal theory is a
meagre thing, the Roman lawyers made good use of it. “…[T]here is, thus Mr. Duī ends up, a moral
to be drawn from this very lack of a system: the moral that ‘in a peaceful and law-abiding
community a well-trained, intelligent and pracƟcal race of lawyers can build a very strong and
eīecƟve structure of legal rules and legal administraƟon on a very slender foundaƟon of abstract
legal theory’” (Duī 1938, p. 236). Daube concludes that Duī is correct in arguing that legal
personality cannot be properly traced back to the Romans via any of the modern doctrines. Despite
the lack of a technical term to designate a legal person or by which corporate personality might be
idenƟĮed it appears that the evidence shows a funcƟonal corporate person in the form of the
societas pubicanum, but not a literal deĮniƟon in Roman law supporƟng a technical speciĮcaƟon of
legal personhood. In light of these conŇicƟng posiƟons I will assert that the consequence of Roman
pracƟce provides a pracƟcal form of personhood that conforms to the claim that Republican
corporate enƟƟes had the funcƟonal equivalence of corporate personality.
The Early Medieval Period
Current debates about personhood in Anglo-American law can be traced through the period
between the ancient thought and pracƟce of the Roman Republic into the present. One aim in this
chapter is to reveal the sustained thread of development of the personhood concept that reaches
back to the ancients and connects to our present problems. It is tempƟng to further illuminate
some of the countless quesƟons that are raised by developments in the medieval period because
sonality if it is not human, yet the property of the corporaƟon is not the possession of any one person (Daube 1944,
p. 132).
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they are central to understanding the myriad twists and turns taken in its extensive legal, social and
poliƟcal thought and literature. However, here my focus must be constrained to the much narrower
range of legal and philosophical issues. From the ancient Roman conceptualizaƟon of personhood,
the next signiĮcant legal shiŌ is found in the early medieval legal history of England.
From the period of dominance enjoyed by the Church a transiƟon occurred in Europe and England.
There was extensive development of trade, sea-faring exploraƟon, commerce and the
socio-economic expansion throughout the Middle Ages. As states began to grow and commercial
acƟviƟes increased during the 12th and 13th centuries and onward, economic life became more
secularized and urbanized. The integrated roles of the Church and the state were separated as they
contended for power in the period when the state began to assert itself as increasingly
independent of Rome and the power of the Church. The inŇuence of spiritual authoriƟes waned
during this period and the Church began, albeit slowly, to lose its grip on poliƟcal power. The head
of the Church of Rome could no longer Įll what might be a long temporal gap between the loss of a
head of state and a Church-sancƟoned crowning of the next monarch. Secular authoriƟes needed a
way to ensure the smooth funcƟoning of state acƟviƟes during the interregnum between when
heads of states died and were replaced.
As the exclusive power of crowning of kings slipped away from the Church and the secular power of
the state rose, the requirement of conƟnuity and permanency became a more tangible legal and
poliƟcal necessity. In the early period prior to the 13th century the conŇict between the state as a
rising power and the waning of the dominance of the Church drove the legal and poliƟcal quesƟon
of royal personhood toward a construcƟon of the King and his body as separate and disƟnguishable.
Changes in the economic, commercial and social life of countries demanded a new pracƟce to
secure the permanency of state funcƟons required by those changes. In the Ɵme around the 13th
century the Crown was not a “ĮcƟƟous person”, but an organic whole. It did not exist as a thing
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separate and disƟnct from its members, and so the state did not exist as a “superior” being. It may
have been “bodiĮed”, but it was not discretely “personiĮed” (Kantorowicz 1957, p. 270). While the
state might be thought of as a “corpus”, and hence a sense might be gained of the King’s two
bodies, it is not a “persona”, and thus not the king’s two persons (Kantorowicz 1957, p. 271).
During this Ɵme of conŇict between the empire (the Crown) and the papacy and between rising
secular powers and declining inŇuence of the spiritual powers another transformaƟon was also
occurring, but on a much larger scale. A historical change in humanity’s relaƟon to Ɵme, in which
something that had been stable—the idea that Ɵme was a Įnite span between the CreaƟon and a
Last Day at the end of Ɵme—became something unstable, a sense that Ɵme was inĮnite. By the end
of the Middle Ages Western thought was transformed through the emergence of the idea that
inĮnite Ɵme could allow the possibility of unlimited progress. In this radically transformed world
there were pracƟcal needs of kingdoms, communiƟes and public insƟtuƟons for conƟnuity over
Ɵme as well as the perpetuity of the Crown’s need to meet its budgetary requirements. These
requirements—budgets, taxaƟon and other government pracƟces produced a need for a legal
ĮcƟon to accommodate an endless conƟnuity of the body poliƟc. In this was the making of an
immortal ĮcƟon, the state in perpetuity, but with a mortal head, the king (Kantorowicz 1957,
pp. 274–275), (Kantorowicz 1957, pp. 284–291). It also became apparent that the relaƟonship
between the person and the oĸce of the head of state, the two roles in the one person of the
human king, needed supplementaƟon by a legal ĮcƟon of the King as the representaƟve of the
Crown to provide the necessary stability. But at the same Ɵme, Kingship itself began to disintegrate
as the ĮcƟon of the Crown began to be replaced by the corporate body of the people.
The King then became a corporate ĮcƟon such that the death of the king would not compromise
the conƟnuity of the state. This provided a soluƟon to the reality that the king’s corporeal body
may die, but the state must conƟnue. The soluƟon was to be found in a ĮcƟon that the King could
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represent the ever-lasƟng state, but the king sƟll be acknowledged as a transient mortal being. This
provided the conƟnuity necessary for a polity-centered rulership (Kantorowicz 1957, p. 272). Again,
the essenƟal issue was that the death of a king would render the body corporate (the state)
incapable of acƟon due to its incompleteness in the event of the king’s demise.43 This then, is an
early version of corporate personhood in medieval England when the legal ĮcƟon of the crown is
construed as a “corporaƟon sole.” Establishing the role of the king as a separate enƟty disƟnct from
the mortal individual who wore the crown disƟnguished the perpetual royal enƟty from the
temporal person. And as the perpetual royal enƟty had begun to deteriorate, this established a
corporate person with conƟnuity and an essenƟal character that was independent of the human
occupant in the role and thus the King was unrelated to that of the king, its temporary inhabitant.
The Late Medieval Period
The legal and poliƟcal concerns in the early English medieval period are conceptually and poliƟcally
disƟnct from those of the later period. In the later medieval period of the 14th and 15th centuries
the ideas about medieval legal personhood resulted from the jurisdicƟonal pluralism characterisƟc
of England at the Ɵme. In this period, there were conŇicts between the royal legal courts and those
of the Church with respect to personhood. The resulƟng deĮniƟons of personhood centered
around the formaƟon of legal persons from a variety of selves as those selves were deĮned by the
pracƟces of the many diīerent courts in which cases might be heard. In turn, the pracƟces of the
courts produced a kind of person, just as that person produced the law. In pracƟcal terms,
personhood was related not only to social class, that is, the courts to which individuals of diīerent
classes had access deĮned personhood diīerently, but also how the courts handled and deĮned
both the acƟons and those who brought them to be adjudicated. For example, in common law
jurisdicƟons acƟons brought over real property produced certain kinds of outcomes and set
43A comprehensive treatment of this issue is found in Chapter VI, ”On ConƟnuity and CorporaƟons” and Chapter VII,
“The King Never Dies” in Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval PoliƟcal Theology.
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precedents that were inŇuenƟal for canon law courts in which the state of the parƟcipants’ souls
and other spiritual and theological maƩers were at issue. Conversely, the ecclesiasƟcal courts and
their deliberaƟons about maƩers of faith, conscience and morality had an eīect on the common
law and the courts that heard those cases.
What emerges from these jurisdicƟonal conŇicts is personhood in two aspects: an inner aspect
having to do with the aīect, soul, morality and reasoning and an outer aspect having to do with the
physical body and property. In this second, outer sense, property became an addiƟon to, or
elaboraƟon of personhood (Boboc 2015, pp. 12–13). This aspect of the outer form of personhood
becomes important to corporate, arƟĮcial personhood in the early modern period that followed. It
is in this late medieval period of conŇict among jurisdicƟons that the deĮniƟon of the personhood
of legal enƟƟes determined whether a natural person had standing to bring a speciĮc cause of
acƟon to a court. From this array of English courts no coherent body of law on legal persons issued.
Although clearly legal persons were a subset of social persons it bears emphasizing that in medieval
law, persons had legal standing based on how they were perceived as social beings by their
community. This was a reputaƟonal maƩer, and by belonging to both a social and a legal category,
plainƟīs and defendants were treated accordingly by the courts. In this way the law of persons
both determined and was determined by social personhood.
During the middle ages life for most people was marked by feudal aƩachments, characterized by
duty and debt to their community, their family and to the Church. Following the ReformaƟon, the
ensuing profound transformaƟon of spiritual and secular relaƟons brought an individualisƟc turn
and a diīerent paƩern of relaƟonships in which personhood and idenƟty became rooted in
individual conscience and subjecƟve intenƟon. This fundamental change in the social, economic
and poliƟcal order was instrumental in creaƟng the modern autonomous legal subject. Of course,
there were gradaƟons of personhood as I have indicated above with regard to social evaluaƟons of
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persons by the community. But I have also indicated that there are gradaƟons of legal personhood
ranging from the King’s persona, to feudal subjects Ɵed to land and the social hierarchy to the
sovereign autonomous individual that emerged following the ReformaƟon. These
conceptualizaƟons of personhood are transformed once more in the early modern period of English
law as the legal ĮcƟon concept is applied to the corporaƟon. By extension, personhood was
extended from natural persons to arƟĮcial persons for economic reasons having to do with the
further development of commercial society and global acƟviƟes of naƟon-states. It is from the early
modern period of English law that the concept of the arƟĮcial person leads to the autonomous legal
ĮcƟons that are so contenƟous today. From concepts of persons as a way of deĮning social and
economic roles there is a trajectory of legal development to ideas of persons as a method of
ordering social relaƟons, not with the stability of the middle ages, but now with the instability and
arƟĮciality of legal personhood.
The Early Modern English Period
I have tried in the material above to describe how the early medieval period can be characterized
with respect to personhood as a conŇict between the Church and emerging secular states separate
and disƟnct from Rome and their need for conƟnuity, and establishment of a personiĮed body
poliƟc. The second, late medieval period, can be characterized as a conŇict among legal
jurisdicƟons for deĮning the relaƟonship between the state and the developing concept of inner
and outer personhood. In the context of jurisdicƟonal pluralism in England persons were variously
deĮned based on their social class posiƟon, reputaƟon and the nature of the courts before which
their cases were heard. The succeeding period in England, the early modern, can then further be
characterized as a conŇict between ideas about whether the law was to be seen as an arƟĮcial
construct, as something autonomous and having to do with property and other rights and liƩle or
nothing to do with morality, or whether the law was inherently woven together with moral and
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ethical concerns of right and wrong (Boboc 2015, p. 13). This set the condiƟons for further conŇict
during this period between the state and the legal instruments that granted certain rights and
privileges to arƟĮcial persons to undertake projects ostensibly aimed at furthering the common
good. It was a “…protean concept of the legal personhood formulated at a Ɵme when the English
legal culture went through a criƟcal period, developing from a nascent, someƟmes-experimental
legal system into the sprawling, vigorous early modern legal culture that would provide the
foundaƟon for English colonialism in the NewWorld.” (Boboc 2015, p. 4).
In the 18th century when we encounter the beginnings of modern corporaƟons that we recognize
today the law in England was Įrst comprehensively described by William Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Blackstone 1765). Blackstone explained that corporaƟons
were legal persons, arƟĮcial in nature, and created “for the advancement of religion, of learning,
and of commerce” (Blackstone 1765, p. 127). The aim of the law in Blackstone’s view was for the
state to create arƟĮcial persons and grant them rights to facilitate the formaƟon of parƟcular kinds
of groups to accomplish ends with speciĮc social uƟlity. Later in the 18th century, Stewart Kyd, the
author of the Įrst treaƟse on corporate law in English, deĮned corporaƟons as collecƟons of
individuals formed as one arƟĮcial body but capable of a perpetual existence, with the capacity of
acƟng as if it were an individual. These enƟƟes could own property, be parƟes to contracts
incurring legal obligaƟons, and have standing to bring and be vulnerable to legal acƟons as well as
enjoy privileges and protecƟons, and exercise an array of poliƟcal rights, according to the powers
speciĮcally granted by the state (Kyd 1793). Later in the 18th century in the United States an
understanding of a corporaƟon as an arƟĮcial legal person was already aĸrmed by the founders. In
Federalist Eight (of the Federalist Papers) Alexander Hamilton’s Opinion on the ConsƟtuƟonality of a
NaƟonal Bank declared that to “…erect a corporaƟon is to subsƟtute a legal or arƟĮcial to a natural
person” (Hamilton 1791, pp. 97–106).
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Similarly, in a case stemming from a contract dispute over whether the charter of Dartmouth
College could be changed by the state of New Hampshire to make it a public insƟtuƟon, the
Supreme Court of the US ruled (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518, 1819) that although
the King of England had granted a charter to its trustees in 1791 making the college private there
were limits on the powers of the state to change contracts. Chief JusƟce John Marshall described in
the majority opinion that a corporaƟon as “an arƟĮcial being, invisible, intangible, and exisƟng only
in contemplaƟon of law” had rights that the state must respect.
These two cases illustrate that as state-created ĮcƟons corporaƟons already had by this Ɵme
standing as jurisƟc persons that was well-established. Enabled by this status, the word “person,”
applied to corporaƟons in a legal context was uncontroversial. The DicƟonary Act of 1871 passed by
the Congress of the US set the rules for interpretaƟon of federal laws, and by these rules Title 1 of
the United States Code, (12 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)) states explicitly that “unless the context indicates
otherwise” the “words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporaƟons, companies, associaƟons, Įrms,
partnerships, socieƟes, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals” (Barnet 2014). Yet the
confusion and indeterminate nature of corporaƟons as persons persists. In US law, there is a trail of
interpretaƟon that reveals this persistent lack of clarity and consensus about the nature, purpose
and social pracƟces of corporaƟons.
US Legal Theories of the CorporaƟon
In this chapter I have been tracing the way that the concept of personhood has been conceived in
the law over Ɵme. My aim is to understand how corporaƟons, through being deĮned as parƟcular
kinds of legal things, have gained rights and yet managed to escape meaningful assignments of
moral responsibility. What I want to show is that this results from a contemporary legal theory in
which corporaƟons are said to be the very things that cannot be assigned responsibility. According
to this deĮniƟon of them as abstracƟons, i.e., as legally constructed ĮcƟons, and yet even as they
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bear legal rights and duƟes, corporaƟons must not, it is held, be mistakenly conceived of as
members of the moral community. According to the dominant legal theory of the corporaƟon, they
cannot be held to be real or natural persons and thus capable of bearing responsibility,
notwithstanding their possession and accumulaƟon of rights. A brief review of the succession of
legal theories of the corporaƟon, as those theories have developed in the US, will help to reveal
how this has happened.
For this review, I return to the arƟcle by David Millon (Millon 1990). There are four parts to Millon’s
essay: an introducƟon seƫng the basic quesƟon of the nature of a corporaƟon and how theories of
the corporaƟon have developed and changed over the past 150 years. This is followed by a survey
of the four principal theories of corporaƟons, then a statement of the signiĮcance of each theory
and Įnally, a short discussion of the private-public nature of corporate law and how we might
address public interest in corporate acƟon that does not depend on the enƟty/aggregate,
natural/arƟĮcial nature of corporaƟons. I will follow Millon’s format because it addresses the
essenƟal conceptual issues and is succinctly stated.
According to Millon there are two dimensions to our understanding of what a corporaƟon is: there
is one disƟncƟon between the corporaƟon as an enƟty, conceived as something that has a real
existence separate from its consƟtuent shareholders and other parƟcipants, and the corporaƟon
conceived as an aggregate of natural individuals. In the aggregate concepƟon, the corporaƟon does
not have a separate existence, except that it exists legally, that is, in name only. The second
disƟncƟon is that between the corporaƟon as an arƟĮcial creaƟon of the state and the corporaƟon
as a natural product of private iniƟaƟve (Millon 1990, p. 201). These disƟncƟons that have been
combined in diīerent ways at diīerent stages of development of corporate law in the 150 years are
of concern to Millon.
Theories of the CorporaƟon in American Legal History in the 19th Century
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There are three periods of development of the theory of corporaƟons in the 19th century. In the
early 19th century legal aƩributes of incorporaƟon as arƟĮcial enƟƟes created by the state
encouraged conceiving of the corporaƟon as an enƟty exisƟng separately from its shareholders and
other parƟcipants. With respect to the body created by law, the corporaƟon could be viewed as a
legal person with a separate existence from the aggregaƟon of shareholders owning and controlling
it (Millon 1990, p. 206). The corporate enƟty was considered arƟĮcial because it owed its existence
to the posiƟve law of the state rather than the private iniƟaƟve of individuals. In the period during
the middle of the 19th century each instance of incorporaƟon required a separate act of a
legislature. This legislaƟve procedure was replaced in the laƩer part of the century with laws of
general incorporaƟon. This standardized the incorporaƟon process with rouƟnized Įling procedures
and regulaƟons, but the grant of charter by the state reinforced the arƟĮcial nature of the
corporaƟon as a creature of the state. It made explicit that a corporaƟon was chartered to pursue a
declared public purpose or the general welfare.
In contrast, incorporaƟon for the pursuit of private goals by corporaƟons and their investors created
suspicion and hosƟlity not only because it connoted special privilege but also because their
Įnancial and other resources threatened the economic balance of power between corporaƟons
and the rest of society. Hence, during this period there was a regulatory eīort with respect to the
relaƟonship between the corporaƟon and the rest of society.
Despite this regulaƟon, the public percepƟon of grants of incorporaƟon was one of poliƟcal
favouriƟsm because they appeared to oīer opportuniƟes to corporaƟons for accumulaƟon of
economic and Įnancial resources no other enƟty could gather and could be used for further
narrow, self-interested corporate poliƟcal purposes and against the public interest. The response in
the laƩer half of the 19th century to these percepƟons was to provide another method of
incorporaƟon through procedurally simpler and more general laws that eliminated the approval of
59
the legislature for grants of corporate status.
In the last third of the 19th century there was a change to general incorporaƟon statutes. General
incorporaƟon laws not only oīered easily available means for incorporaƟon but were thought to
prevent monopolies through compeƟƟon among many corporaƟons compeƟng in the same
markets, as well as imposing regulaƟons on their purpose and powers. These measures were
accompanied by seƫng limits on both capitalizaƟon and the lifespan of the Įrm. By the last years of
the 19th century US state legislatures further liŌed restricƟons on corporate ownership of stock in
other companies. This allowed holding companies to emerge, as well as eliminaƟng capitalizaƟon
limitaƟons. US courts in the period of the 19th century progressively diminished the grant or
concession theory of corporate power whereby corporaƟons could exercise only the speciĮc
powers granted to them by the state under the arƟĮcial theory of the Įrm. The consequence was
that corporaƟons grew to a much greater size and power than had previously been possible (Millon
1990, p. 208).
The primary public policy jusƟĮcaƟon for incorporaƟon throughout the 19th century was realizing
the uƟlity of a “socially useful instrument of economic growth” (Millon 1990, p. 207). Constraints on
corporate power and limitaƟons to their deĮned purpose were indicaƟons of the enduring distrust
of corporaƟons. The legal doctrine of ultra vires, a legal principle that disallowed a corporaƟon from
entering contracts not speciĮcally deĮned in its charter, was a way for the state to prevent
shareholders from expanding the powers of a corporaƟon beyond those explicitly granted by the
state. States also prevented corporaƟons from acƟng as holding companies, in which they owned
the stock of other companies in a parent-subsidiary role (Millon 1990, p. 209). The safeguards of
state regulaƟon reŇected the idea of the corporaƟon as a state-created arƟĮcial enƟty and the
state’s role in managing the relaƟonship between corporaƟons and protecƟon of the public good.
The end of the 19th century saw the natural enƟty theory become dominant and displace the
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arƟĮcial theory of the corporaƟon. During most of the 19th century the corporaƟon had been an
arƟĮcial enƟty in legal discourse. The natural enƟty theory perceived corporaƟons as disƟnct things
created by the state for speciĮc purposes, and not merely as aggregates of individuals. In this form
there was an emphasis on the consƟtuƟve role by the state of the corporaƟon. Through their
creaƟon by the state as a maƩer of corporate law there was an implied jusƟĮcaƟon of a public
rather than a private law approach to the legal status of the corporaƟon. This also imposed
state-sancƟoned regulaƟons on corporaƟons as a safeguard that signiĮcant public concerns were
not neglected.
By the end of this century there was also a decline in the use of chartering by authority of the state
and a rise of the aggregate theory, i.e., corporaƟons conceived of as aggregaƟons of private
individuals analogous to partnerships. Theorists pursued an anƟ-regulatory concepƟon of
corporate law to protect Įnancial interests of shareholders from restricƟons on property rights. At
this stage the aggregate theory did not prevail, but the idea of corporaƟons as a natural creaƟon of
private iniƟaƟve and market forces replaced the idea of corporaƟons as arƟĮcial state creaƟons
given concessionary grants. Natural enƟty theory was then interpreted to imply the same private
law, anƟ-regulatory shareholder-centered view of the aggregate theorists. This legiƟmated big
business in the early 20th century.
To summarize, the 19th century in the US was marked by three disƟnct periods of the corporate
form. In the early part of the 19th century corporaƟons were created as legal persons by the state
as arƟĮcial enƟƟes with speciĮed aims and obligaƟons. They were disƟnct enƟƟes regulated by the
state. In the middle of the 19th century legislatures created every corporaƟon as a separate and
disƟnct enƟty with a public purpose, but the cumbersomeness of the process and realiƟes of rapid
economic growth dictated a faster facilitaƟon of incorporaƟon. The arƟĮciality of the corporaƟon
was reinforced by the nature of its creaƟon through state charters. At the end of the 19th century
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faster and easier incorporaƟon facilitated economic development and a transiƟon began from the
state chartering of corporaƟons to another theoreƟcal posiƟon, that of the natural enƟty.
Theories of the CorporaƟon in American Legal History in the 20th Century
In the early years of the 20th century the arƟĮcial enƟty theory gave way to a new idea. A new
concepƟon of the corporaƟon as a product of private, individual iniƟaƟve with the powers of its
individual consƟtuent shareholders caused a re-evaluaƟon of the relaƟonship between the state
and the corporaƟon, as well as that between the corporaƟon and its shareholders. This led to the
triumph of the natural enƟty theory (Millon 1990, p. 211).
Understood as natural enƟƟes, corporaƟons were no longer seen as suscepƟble to regulatory
eīorts by states as they once were. They were now perceived as consƟtuted of private individual
shareholders and subject to market forces capable of constraining them from excessive use of their
concentrated economic power. PrevenƟng corporate dominaƟon of economic and poliƟcal life
through market forces appeared as a raƟonal pracƟcality. In this natural enƟty scenario there was
an absorpƟon of corporate persons into a conceptual equivalent of natural persons. However, the
dominance of natural enƟty theory in the early part of the 20th century proved to be temporary.
A few years aŌer the stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression in the early
1930s, the next theoreƟcal development saw proponents of shareholder interests shiŌ from
consideraƟon of the Įrm as a separate, disƟnct natural enƟty resembling a natural person toward a
concept of the corporaƟon as an aggregate, conceived in partnership terms. This took the idea of
the Įrm further away from Įrst the arƟĮcial, and then the natural enƟty bases of corporate
existence to one grounded solely in the property rights of the shareholders. This shiŌ marked a
departure from the mysƟcal “legal person” concepƟon of the corporaƟon to the actual human
beings that composed it and whose property rights were at stake. In conjuncƟon with the
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unprecedented growth in the size and power of corporaƟons and the very signiĮcant problems of
the Great Depression, quesƟons arose about whether assignments of corporate ciƟzenship and
social responsibility had potenƟal to deal with the causaƟve roles corporaƟons were perceived to
play in economic, Įnancial and social issues. The answer to the possibility of corporate ciƟzenship
claims was provided by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in their book, The Modern CorporaƟon and
Private Property, that had a great and lasƟng inŇuence (Berle and Means 1991 (1968)). In this
volume Berle and Means argued that corporaƟons must pursue the maximizaƟon of shareholder
value which reŇected the widespread share ownership in corporaƟons and led as well to delegaƟon
of management responsibility to a small group of professional managers. There was a consequence
to the divergence of the interests of managers and owners: a separaƟon of management interests
(their own enhanced power) from shareholder interests (maximum shareholder value). But there is
an inherent accountability problem—how could shareholders be assured that management would
act in shareholders’ interests? Berle and Means saw management’s role as one of acƟng as trustees
for shareholders (Millon 1990, p. 222). They concluded that the property and trust idea would
compel the managers to act for the beneĮt of the shareholders as trustees. In this theory
management is prohibited from acƟviƟes that are not aimed at maximizing shareholder value. The
emergent problem of separable management interests and shareholder interests became the
central issue in corporate law. The view of Berle and Means was of the corporaƟon as an aggregate,
not as a disƟnct enƟty, hence there is no person and no personhood to be addressed with respect
to issue of responsibility for corporate acƟon. Instead, there are only the shareholders and
management to whom to look for relevant actors in corporate acƟon and its consequences.
Furthermore, the concept of shareholder primacy rejected any noƟon of management’s power to
engage in socially responsive acƟviƟes. While the shareholder primacy theory rejected corporate
social responsibility it also rejected legal regulaƟon as unjusƟĮable (Millon 1990, p. 223). Thus,
shareholder primacy as an aggregate corporate theory is a private law conceptualizaƟon. Since this
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Ɵme, shareholder primacy has been dominant in corporate law and as the orthodox theory it is the
standard response to corporate social responsibility arguments.
In the last transiƟon to what is someƟmes referred to as the “new economic theory”, the
nexus-of-contracts model emerged in the late 20th century (circa 1980) based on neoclassical
economic theory. A corporaƟon, in this nexus-of-contracts theory, is understood as an aggregate, as
shareholder-centered and subject to private corporate law, but not subject to government
regulaƟon. The principal theorist of nexus-of-contracts is Ronald Coase (Coase 1937). The central
idea is that Įrms exist because intra-Įrm transacƟon costs are lower than would be the case if the
same acƟviƟes were coordinated through the market. Coase focused on the actors rather than
reiĮcaƟon of the Įrm as a parƟcular kind of enƟty. Some nexus-of-contracts theorists diīer from
Coase because they reject the concept of shareholders as owners and see them as simply a supplier
of inputs (capital). 44 Shareholder rights are determined by relaƟons among contracts. Thus, a
corporaƟon is nothing more than the sum of contracts among input suppliers to the corporaƟon
and cannot be an enƟty in its own right. There is such a thing as the corporaƟon, but there is no
person-enƟty. The corporaƟon exists in name only as a legal representaƟon of the interests of the
parƟcipants. This brings us to the present day. The signiĮcance of the theories of the corporaƟon I
have sketched is that historically they have played two roles: (1) legiƟmizaƟon of the law of
corporaƟons and how that law interprets corporate acƟviƟes, and (2) as determinant with respect
to the normaƟve implicaƟons that follow from corporate acƟon and social pracƟces.
The law is said to legiƟmate a certain kind of treatment of corporate acƟvity and the consequences
that follow from that acƟvity. However, it is not possible to give a simple and straighƞorward
account of the legiƟmaƟng aspects of corporate theory because the history of the development of
legal theory of corporaƟons does not reveal a simple and direct relaƟonship between corporate
44The literature extending and criƟquing Coase’s work is extensive. See, for example, Jensen andMeckling (1976), and
Eisenberg (1998).
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theory, legal rules and social responses. The normaƟve implicaƟons that derive from corporate
legal theory have their genesis in the posiƟve asserƟons made about what corporaƟons are. These
asserƟons are the product of legal doctrine, the rules by which judicial decisions are made, and Įnd
expression in corporate theory. The relaƟonship is complex and dynamic. As the economy and the
corporate form interact over Ɵme and each one inŇuences the other developmentally, corporate
doctrine and theory evolve to meet changes in pracƟcal acƟvity. The same holds true for the
relaƟonship between corporate theory and social pracƟce. If the corporaƟon is asserted as an
aggregate enƟty, then an anƟ-regulatory, private law approach follows with respect to corporate
acƟon, treaƟng it as nothing more than the consƟtuent parƟcipants of which it is formed. If the
corporaƟon is asserted to be an arƟĮcial enƟty, then as a creature of the state the corporaƟon is
considered to be subject to state regulaƟon within a public law framework and as something
separate and disƟnct from its parƟcipants. However, the degree to which normaƟve determinaƟons
about the nature, purpose and funcƟons of corporaƟons follow from the posiƟve descripƟons in
corporate theory is contested. In broad outline, the sketches here provide a suĸcient grounding to
understand the source of legiƟmacy for normaƟve interpretaƟons of corporate acƟon under these
two principal theoreƟcal views. There is also a fundamental indeterminacy of legal theory. It stems
from the communal understanding that is the source of its objecƟvity and by that account is
historicist with respect to determinaƟon of the theory’s meaning. This makes any theory or legal
concept suscepƟble to revisionism anyƟme an interpreƟve community Įnds it appropriate. The
only constraints on this revisionism are the community’s own beliefs rather than a transcendental
ahistorical source for its determinate quality. At its root, a theory of the corporaƟon is determined
by the interpreƟve community, something that changes and adapts to historical development and
to the socio-economic and poliƟcal context in which corporaƟons operate. Because the normaƟve
implicaƟons of a corporate legal theory follow the interpretaƟon of the community, as theories fall
into and out of favour, so do the consequences of corporate acƟon and its consequences.
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Acceptability of any given theory of the corporaƟon is contestable as are its normaƟve implicaƟons
(Millon 1990, p. 248). Legal theories are not determinant in the sense of mandaƟng only one
normaƟve interpretaƟon. This aƩribute makes the acceptability of any theory contestable.
In this chapter I am making a connecƟon between legal theories of corporaƟons, and the concept of
personhood inherent (or not) in those theories. Millon’s focus is on theories of corporaƟons, not
personhood itself. My focus is on personhood, the connecƟon of that concept with theories of the
Įrm and the normaƟve issues that follow from the applicaƟon of those theories in pracƟcal
contexts. The theories and how they are developed and argued by academics can usefully be
contrasted to how those theories Įnd applicaƟon in the courts and the normaƟve consequences of
the judgements that are handed down from the bench. Academic theories and judicial
interpretaƟons may be very diīerent and judges may reject, strictly employ, or mix theories
together even in the same opinion they write on a case before them.45 This reŇects uncertainty.
Among legal pracƟƟoners the uncertainty is not just about the theories themselves, but about the
implicaƟons of interpreƟng and deciding about the nature, purposes and pracƟces of corporaƟons.
Not only can diīerent theories yield diīerent moral implicaƟons about what corporaƟons are, what
they are for and their social pracƟces, but diīerent interpretaƟons of a single theory can produce
diīerent judicial outcomes. In an individual case there may be an issue of adjudicaƟng among
various theories as well as adjudicaƟng about a parƟcular theory. Rather than taking sides about
issues of the nature of the corporaƟon, personhood of jurisƟc enƟƟes, and the normaƟve
implicaƟons of choosing one theory over another, judges driven by theoreƟcal and pracƟcal
uncertainty may choose not to use a theory at all. There is good reason for them to do this, but this
has obvious consequences for the possibility of holding corporaƟons responsible for what they do.
45Avi-Yonah cites a case decided by the Supreme Court (Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43 69-70 (1906)) in which all three
theories of the corporaƟon were employed. The case involved the Fourth and FiŌh Amendments and took a real enƟty
posiƟon on the corporate enƟty itself, an arƟĮcial enƟty posture to jusƟfy regulaƟon by the state and an aggregate stance
on corporate Fourth Amendments rights (Avi-Yonah 2017, pp. 32–33).
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Indeterminacy of Corporate Law with Respect to Corporate Theory
In judicial decision-making there is the need for a congruence between legal theory and legal
doctrine as well as jusƟĮcaƟon for the choice of one legal theory over another. The correspondence
between a speciĮc legal theory and the pracƟcaliƟes of doctrine, i.e., the applicaƟon to concrete
cases, is confounded by diĸculƟes in selecƟng among the theories that might apply to a case.
Depending on a number of variables, a case can be addressed by more than one theory and there is
no consensus about which theory ought to be preferred. Consequently, judges are reluctant to
embrace parƟcular theories in individual cases. In the currently dominant theory of the Įrm, which
sees shareholders as owners with property rights in a Įrm, there may sƟll be judicial doubts about
the correct Įt between a theory and the parƟculars of a speciĮc case. In such cases the court will
intenƟonally leave undecided quesƟons about an appropriate theory to apply due to a lack of
clarity about the implicaƟons as well as the congruence between theory and the case at issue (Gold
2012, pp. 1089–1091).
The Business Judgement Rule
When courts are uncertain they avoid deciding on a theory and rely on other methods. The business
judgement rule oīers a way to avoid declaraƟve statements and also avoids taking a posiƟon on
personhood when courts are confronted with having to make decisions in concrete cases. The rule
is that it is “a presumpƟon that in making a business decision the directors of a corporaƟon acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the acƟon taken was in the best
interests of the company” (Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).46 Using the business
judgement rule permits the courts to conƟnue to funcƟon in spite of not working through a full
theorizaƟon of the problems of cases. This means for the courts that uncertainty and indeterminacy
have a real and pracƟcal uƟlity. This is important considering that courts have to contend with how
46As cited by Gold (2012, 1093).
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legal theories of corporaƟons might apply to diīerent types of corporaƟons, diīerent moments in
economic history, the state of development of a corporaƟon, vagueness in the law, diīering social
norms and jurisdicƟonal diīerences (Gold 2012, p. 1096). It is simply too Ɵme-consuming and far
too expensive for courts to wait for debate and the evoluƟon of theory to resolve cases.
Ambiguity Regarding Directors’ Fiduciary BeneĮciaries
To whom are Įduciary duƟes owed by the directors of a Įrm? At Įrst glance this appears to be
more of a quesƟon of corporate governance than a philosophical issue, but the answer to the
quesƟon aims directly at corporate social pracƟces and the normaƟve demands that corporaƟons
raise by what they do. This revolves around the quesƟon of whom do the directors seek to beneĮt,
and theories of the corporaƟon are in deep disagreement about the answer to this quesƟon. This is
a fundamental quesƟon in corporate law, and courts may choose either the shareholders, the
corporaƟon itself or both as beneĮciaries. Yet in actual pracƟce these choices can create conŇicts.
The result is an indeterminate standard. For example, under a nexus-of-contracts theory the board
of directors as beneĮciaries have primacy over the shareholders whose exercise of power is limited
to selling their shares if they disagree with the pracƟces of the Įrm. On the other hand, the
shareholders may sƟll make a claim under the maximizaƟon of shareholder value doctrine as
residual claimants in cases of disputes. What is evident is that the quesƟon of Įduciary
beneĮciaries is quite unclear, but it is a maƩer of great concern to society at large because the issue
of the outcome of corporate acƟon and the resulƟng beneĮts and harms is general, and not just a
maƩer of law, legal theory or judicial decision-making (Gold 2012, pp. 1096–1101).
Indeterminacy about Įduciary beneĮciaries as it is portrayed above ignores an essenƟal quesƟon of
the purpose of a corporaƟon and whether it is for the public good and public ends, or only for the
shareholders or the directors themselves. And on the other side of the issue, but unaddressed, are
the vicƟms of harmful corporate acƟons and whether directors carry a Įduciary duty to insure there
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is no harm, injury, impairment or intenƟonal damage in the course of pursuing corporate business.
Indecision and ambiguity, rather than being seen as peripheral to moral quesƟons are central, and
lead to problems with interpretaƟons of personhood, the nature of corporaƟons and assignments
of responsibility, thus these are an integral part of this study. How can we interpret indeterminacy
and its relaƟonship to responsibility? It seems clear that the duty of the court is to do no harm
when it is uncertain about making a decision in a case. This is a maƩer of simple judicial prudence.
No decision should be made that allows intenƟonal damage or harmful corporate acƟon to
conƟnue. Avoiding harm ought to be foremost in judicial decisions. But indeterminacy can have
posiƟve properƟes and be a means to good ends as well. For one thing, it limits judicial mistakes in
applying theories of the corporaƟon and the entailment of normaƟve judgements. For another,
indeterminacy puts the burden of moral judgements about corporate acƟon on the corporaƟons
who, knowing that the courts may not adhere to a parƟcular theory, must then themselves engage
with the normaƟve implicaƟons and the risks of what they would do. AddiƟonally, for the
corporaƟons operaƟng in Ňuid and demanding markets there is greater Ňexibility to adapt and
change and for the courts to take into account those changing condiƟons when deciding on cases.
Corporate Purpose Clauses
Legislatures typically leave some laƟtude for the arƟcles of incorporaƟon of a Įrm to include a
corporate purpose clause. This sets the aims and goals of the company and can imply the Įduciary
and other duƟes that the Įrm will bear. The evidence of court decisions indicates that in US law the
absence of a purpose clause implies that directors owe a duty to both the shareholders and the
corporaƟon. Under the nexus-of-contracts theory, which is a derivaƟve of aggregate theory, and
absent an express acknowledgement of the corporaƟon serving public aims, this leaves room for
Ňexibility for the company to vary its purpose as condiƟons change and for court interpretaƟon on a
case-by-case basis. The implicaƟons for normaƟve judgements of a nexus-of-contracts Įrm are
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clear: the corporaƟon under this theoreƟcal scheme is conceived as a private law creaƟon and is
largely free of regulaƟon compared to arƟĮcial enƟƟes. It has no disƟnctly deĮned public service
obligaƟon. Any eīort to pursue or achieve public purposes are inimical to the sole purpose for
which the Įrm was formed—to beneĮt its directors and shareholders.
NormaƟve ImplicaƟons of Legal Theories of the CorporaƟon
I have suggested above that there are normaƟve implicaƟons in the use of theories of the
corporaƟon in judicial decision-making. There are three periods of Ɵme, three theories of
corporaƟons and four transformaƟons through which they have gone. These are woven together to
reveal a conceptual and historical paƩern of normaƟve consideraƟons. The Ɵme periods are the
Ancient, the Medieval and the Modern. The theories are ArƟĮcial EnƟty, Real (Natural) EnƟty and
Aggregate.47 The transformaƟons are (1) the development of the corporaƟon as a legal person, (2)
the shiŌ from corporaƟons as non-proĮt to proĮt, (3) the move from closely-held to widely-held
ownership and (4) from naƟonal to mulƟnaƟonal corporaƟons (Avi-Yonah 2017, pp. 17–18). A brief
review of their principal characterisƟcs will help to compare and contrast the implicaƟons of each
theory for the normaƟve consequences.
Under a theory of the corporaƟon as an arƟĮcial person personhood is deĮned and limited by the
terms of the state charter by which the corporaƟon is created and its duƟes are as speciĮed in the
charter. There is a separate and disƟnct enƟty created by a state charter. The quesƟon of whether it
is a private or public law enƟty depends on the intent of the charter. If the ends of the corporaƟon
as stated in the charter are aimed at public goods then it is a public law creaƟon. RegulaƟon is in
direct accord with the state charter and deĮnes what is normaƟvely expected of the corporaƟon
with respect to social pracƟces.
47There is a technical debate about whether there is a separate, fourth theory—Nexus-of-Contracts. I treat Nexus-of-
Contracts as a derivaƟve of Aggregate theory developed in the very recent modern period, but not as an enƟrely disƟnct
theoreƟcal posiƟon.
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Under a natural enƟty theory, there is a disƟnct and separate enƟty as if it is a natural person with
those duƟes that aƩach to that status. The law of real enƟƟes has evolved over Ɵme from what
originally was public law toward private law, but it depends in a speciĮc case on the nature and
purposes of its formaƟon and whether those purposes are intenƟonally private, as they now
generally are. Real enƟƟes, as natural things like persons, and once understood to be vulnerable to
state-sancƟoned regulaƟon, are now subject to market forces that would presumably correct any
tendencies toward excessive market power or economic and poliƟcal dominaƟon. The normaƟve
implicaƟons of a natural (real) enƟty are those of a natural individual and their social pracƟces are
expected to conform to community, legal and other norms.
Aggregate theory (and also as conceived within a Nexus-of-Contracts model) describes a web of
relaƟonships among contracƟng parƟes, but there is no separate and disƟnct enƟty beyond the
name represenƟng the interests of the parƟcipants. In other words, any legal, moral and social
issues look through the corporate creaƟon to the individuals of which it is formed. This is a
reducƟonist construct. In its current form the primary duty of an aggregate Įrm is to maximize
shareholder value (or to beneĮt the directors). These are private law creaƟons; state regulaƟon is
minimized and they have normaƟve obligaƟons exclusively to the shareholders (or directors). Any
public or other socially responsive corporate pracƟces other than shareholder primacy can be
viewed as a form of theŌ injuring the owner-parƟcipants.
Three Problems of Legal Personhood for Corporate Moral Responsibility
There are three disƟnct problems with the dominant theory of the corporaƟon as it is applied in the
United States. There a problem of symmetry between the ease with which corporaƟons can
exercise a growing list of rights compared to the diĸculƟes of holding corporaƟons responsible for
their acƟons, and moreover the rights themselves deserve greater scruƟny. The rights accumulated
by corporaƟons and the unalienable rights of human beings are not the same. CorporaƟons under
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the US ConsƟtuƟon cannot have the same rights as natural persons because under an aggregate
theory of the corporaƟon it is not part of their nature as non-enƟty ĮcƟons. While it may be the
case that corporaƟons can have an array of property rights enabling them to conduct business, only
natural persons can have the liberty rights guaranteed under the ConsƟtuƟon of the US. It is a
category mistake to give corporate persons the rights of natural persons because they are diīerent
kinds of things.
The second problem of corporate persons is closely Ɵed to the Įrst. It is their indeterminate
treatment in US law either as persons with respect to property and liberty rights, or as non-enƟty
ĮcƟons with respect to responsibility under the currently dominant aggregate theory of the Įrm.
This asymmetry is incoherent and avoids seƩling the metaphysical quesƟon of the ontology of
corporaƟons. As I have explained above, the indeterminacy of unseƩled corporate theory provides
the posiƟve aƩributes of Ňexibility for the courts and adaptability for corporaƟons, but it does so at
the cost of two normaƟve issues: one is the inability to consistently and predictably hold
corporaƟons accountable for their acƟons. This is leading to a pervasive public sense that the
possession and exercise of liberty rights by corporaƟons fundamentally violates norms of the moral
community. This sense of normaƟve violaƟon is ampliĮed by the percepƟon that corporaƟons are
allowed the unregulated exercise of rights in ways that harm and impair the commonweal without
jusƟĮcaƟon. The other and related normaƟve implicaƟon is a growing loss of trust by the public
that there is jusƟce and fairness in the treatment of corporaƟons as bearers of both property and
liberty rights. There is a remaining third problem with greater signiĮcance than those of legal rights
and treatment before the law, however.
It has been claimed that the legal foundaƟon of the concept of corporate personhood is built on an
apparent fraud that was perpetrated in the late 19th century (Winkler 2018, p. 190). To explain how
this happened we must go back into the history of corporate personhood in the United States which
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reaches back to the period immediately following the Civil War. At the Ɵme, President Lincoln wrote
in a leƩer to Colonel William F. Elkins:
We may congratulate ourselves that this cruel war is nearing its end. It has cost a vast
amount of treasure and blood. The best blood of the Ňower of American youth has
been freely oīered upon our country's altar that the naƟon might live. It has indeed
been a trying hour for the Republic; but I see in the near future a crisis approaching
that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country.
As a result of the war, corporaƟons have been enthroned and an era of corrupƟon in
high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong
its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people unƟl all wealth is aggregated in a
few hands and the Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more anxiety than ever
before, even in the midst of war. God grant that my suspicions may prove groundless
(Hartmann 2003).
A court case soon signaled the realizaƟon of Lincoln’s fears. The case was brought before the
Supreme Court of the United States in a dispute over who would have jurisdicƟon in assessing
taxable value of fence posts along the Southern PaciĮc Railway right-of-way, the state assessor or
the county assessor. While the case appears to be numbingly mundane, the implicaƟons were and
remain extraordinary. This is due to the reporter for the Supreme Court having made a change in
the language of the headnote.48
…in wriƟng up the case's headnote - a commentary that has no precedenƟal status -
the Court's reporter, a former railroad president named J.C. BancroŌ Davis, opened the
headnote with the sentence: "The defendant CorporaƟons are persons within the
intent of the clause in secƟon 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the ConsƟtuƟon of
the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdicƟon the
equal protecƟon of the laws.49
48“Before a case is published in a reporter, an editor atWest reads the case and selects the important issues of law. For
eachmajor issue, the editor thenwrites a short descripƟon called a headnote. These headnotes are typically found at the
beginning of each opinion and help the reader quickly determine the issue(s) discussed in the case.” This descripƟon for
Digests, Headnotes, and Key Numbers Research Guide by Jorge Juarez is found at the web site of Georgetown University
Law Library: hƩp://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/srch.php?q=headnote&t=010.
49Emphasis of the word persons is mine.
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It is especially important to note that the Court had not so ruled on the nature and status of
corporaƟons.
…a handwriƩen note from Chief JusƟce Waite to reporter Davis that now is held in the
NaƟonal Archives said: "we avoided meeƟng the ConsƟtuƟonal quesƟon in the
decision." And nowhere in the decision itself does the Court say corporaƟons are
persons (Hartmann 2019).
In the case itself, (Santa Clara County v. Southern PaciĮc Railroad Company 118 U.S. 394 (1886)),
the court reporter J. C. BancroŌ Davis added a headnote.50 In it he wrote: “One of the points made
and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that 'corporaƟons are
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the ConsƟtuƟon of the United
States.'” Before argument, U. S. Supreme Court Chief JusƟce Waite announced: “The court does
not wish to hear argument on the quesƟon whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the ConsƟtuƟon, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdicƟon the equal
protecƟon of the laws, applies to these corporaƟons. We (the members of the Supreme Court) are
all of the opinion that it does.”51 It is oŌen claimed that through this statement supporƟng the
applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment and without oral argument corporaƟons were
arrogated to personhood.
It is crucial to understand where this opinion originated. In a case before the Supreme Court in
1938, JusƟce Black oīered a dissenƟng opinion saying: “Neither the history nor the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment jusƟĮes the belief that corporaƟons are to be included within its
protecƟon. The historical purpose was clearly set forth when Įrst considered by this Court in the
Slaughter House Cases.” (ConnecƟcut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85,86
50J.C. BancroŌ Davis was a former president of the Newburgh and New York Railway Company.
51Chief JusƟce Waite’s remark is widely quoted (and misquoted) in relevant sites on the internet. An authoritaƟve,
accurate source is: hƩp://www.tourolaw.edu/patch/santa/
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(decided 31 January 1938)). JusƟce Miller gave the opinion in The Slaughter House Cases in 1873
seƫng out a general and comprehensive interpretaƟon of the Fourteenth Amendment (McLaughlin
1940, p. 45). It was an elementary principal that the 14th Amendment, among the three
amendments to the ConsƟtuƟon issuing from the Civil War, was intended to protect former slaves.
There is a problem with the claim that it was the headnote in Santa Clara that precipitated the grant
of personhood to corporaƟons. Winkler argues that in the Santa Clara case it was a fraudulent
representaƟon of the wording of the 14th Amendment by Roscoe Conkling, a former US Senator,
then an aƩorney, who was the last living member of the framing commiƩee of the 14th
Amendment, that facilitated the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of personhood for
corporaƟons (Winkler 2018, p. 190). Conkling argued that the 14th Amendment is not limited to
natural persons and corporaƟons should enjoy equal protecƟon under the provisions of the 14th
Amendment. In 1882, he produced the Journal of the commiƩee and purported to show that the
Joint Congressional CommiƩee that draŌed the 14th Amendment vacillated between using
“ciƟzen” and “person” and the draŌers chose “person” speciĮcally to cover corporaƟons. It is
Conkling’s provision of this evidence and its fraudulent employment in support of corporate
personhood that is inculpatory for Conkling, or so the claim is made. Winkler says that contrary to
Conkling’s claim, there is no evidence that the wording ever went through this process, and that
there was no intent to protect corporaƟons with 14th Amendment provision.
Winkler’s case is weaker on the persuasiveness of Conkling’s argument before the Court than he
suggests. But the evidence that Conkling’s misrepresentaƟon of the intenƟons of the framers of the
14th Amendment led to 14th Amendment protecƟon for corporaƟons is another maƩer. Andrew
McLaughlin, in an arƟcle from 1940 takes great pains to show that the historical record of Conkling’s
interpretaƟon of the Journal does not support an interpretaƟon that the commiƩee intended to
protect corporaƟons with the 14th Amendment. McLaughlin cites speciĮc evidence to show that
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Conkling did not claim that the commiƩee intenƟonally provided for the protecƟon of corporaƟons
(McLaughlin 1940, p. 55). “Whatever criƟcism can be made of Conkling’s handling of the Journal,
he did not dare to go so far as to say that the commiƩee deliberately and consciously intended to
provide for the protecƟon of corporaƟons” (McLaughlin 1940, p. 55). Another aƩorney, S. W.
Sanderson, who also presented a brief in the Santa Clara case is stronger on the legal argument
because in his brief Sanderson oīered an extensive treatment of eighteen pages on the quesƟon of
the right of a corporaƟon to be considered a person (McLaughlin 1940, p. 57).
What is central in this is that McLaughlin’s work shows that there was already established a Įrm
legal posiƟon that corporaƟons had personhood status prior to the Santa Clara decision in 1886.
And it also suggests strongly that there was not a sudden shiŌ in judicial opinion giving rights to
corporaƟons in the US legal environment and that Conkling’s remarks to the Court were not
decisive in swaying the judges’ stance on either the philosophical or the pracƟcal quesƟons about
corporaƟons as legal persons. McLaughlin goes to some lengths to describe how JusƟce Field, who
was on the Circuit Court in 1882 when the case was decided at that level, quoted JusƟce Marshall.
Marshall in the Dartmouth College case (1819) had recognized the contract rights of private
corporaƟons and their status as arƟĮcial beings. Two conclusions cannot be avoided. One is that
the personhood status of corporaƟons came as no surprise to the Court by the Ɵme the Santa Clara
arguments were presented (McLaughlin 1940, p. 54). The other is that regardless of how persuasive
Conkling might have been in his argument, or to what degree he misrepresented the intenƟons of
the framers of the 14th Amendment, he made an argument before the Court that corporaƟons
were indeed already widely held to be legal persons and this had been the case for some Ɵme prior
to the hearing on the Santa Clara case.
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the concept of personhood and the consequences of various
76
legal theories of the corporaƟon. My aim has been not to deĮne a theory of personhood, but to
further understand changes in legal theorizing of personhood, how that has developed over Ɵme
and the normaƟve signiĮcance of each theory of the corporaƟon. In the ancient and medieval
periods there is a story that can be pieced together of this abstracƟon of the corporate person that
has led to our modern state of confusion about the nature, purpose and social pracƟces of
corporaƟons. If we are to order the social relaƟons between corporaƟons and society in a way that
is coherent and just, then the variety of legal claims that are made must be understood in some way
that escapes endless arguments in metaphysics about what corporaƟons are (Radin 1932, p. 643).52
I propose that there is pracƟcal potenƟal to do that by looking at corporaƟons as intenƟonal
systems.
It is not personhood that is the essenƟal problem. I have described how personhood endows
corporaƟons with posiƟve aƩributes and enables them to accomplish important social goals. The
problem is that the accumulaƟon of both property and liberty rights give corporaƟons certain rights
and the exercise of those rights is leading to corporate pracƟces and outcomes that jeopardize
economic and Įnancial stability, among other public goods. Furthermore, the economic and
poliƟcal leverage that accrues to corporaƟons with liberty rights gives them concentrated power to
inŇuence and manipulate democraƟc poliƟcal processes in unprecedented ways. LegislaƟon,
regulaƟon and taxaƟon pracƟces that favour corporaƟons can be seen to threaten the trust
relaƟonship between corporaƟons and the rest of society as well as the trust relaƟonship between
government and ciƟzens. In the next chapter I will address the possibiliƟes and problems of
intenƟon by Įrst looking at individual intenƟon and then at collecƟve intenƟon to establish how
that might be done. Before turning to that a review of what this chapter has covered it will help to
connect what I have idenƟĮed as the essenƟal element of personhood to collecƟve intenƟon.
52Max Radin oīers a thorough discussion of the everlasƟng debate about personhood andwhether it serves any useful
purpose, but points to the importance of the ĮcƟon of personhood for corporate persons as legal ĮcƟons.
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The principal problem I am concerned with is that personhood bestows on a corporaƟon an
accumulated possession and exercise of rights as a person, but without its having the metaphysical
status of a real (natural) person and the moral obligaƟons that aƩach to that status. Some claim a
corporaƟon cannot bear moral responsibility because it does not have standing in the moral
community, whatever the scale and scope of harm it may do. Defenders of this claim hold that
moral responsibility cannot be ascribed to a non-enƟty legal ĮcƟon, but only to a speciĮc kind of
metaphysical agent, speciĮcally a natural person. It is natural, not legal personhood that confers
agency and it is agency that confers standing in the moral community. This claim focuses on what
corporaƟons are, rather than what they do. I am taking another view. I argue that if morally
signiĮcant enƟƟes are created by moral agents, and if they are addressable as members of the
moral community because they are raƟonally conversable, even if we consider them not as natural
agents, but as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems, then they can bear moral responsibility for the
consequences of their acƟons. It is my contenƟon that it is predominantly what corporaƟons
intenƟonally do and the consequences that invokes quesƟons of corporate moral responsibility.53
The concept of determinism (and indeterminism) is crucial to understanding how corporaƟons can
enjoy personhood for rights while at the same Ɵme have non-enƟty status regarding responsibility.
These concepts have both posiƟve and negaƟve aspects. The confusion in judicial decision-making
is visible in majority opinions handed down from the bench. It reveals that there is a kind of
convenience in the absence of a determining consensus on the quesƟon of the theory of the Įrm. It
allows judges to avoid taking a posiƟon on the nature, purpose and normaƟve implicaƟons of
corporaƟons involved in cases that come before the courts. On the posiƟve side, indeterminism
allows for compeƟƟon among new ideas and innovaƟon in developing corporate strategies and
pracƟces. The dominance of aggregate corporate theory as a nexus-of-contracts permits a
53UnintenƟonal acts and their consequences, as well as intenƟonal acts and their unintended consequences are, of
course, also of crucial importance in quesƟons of moral responsibility. I will address these in Chapter 5.
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disjuncture between treaƟng corporaƟons as legal persons and thus as non-enƟty ĮcƟons on the
one hand and as nearly invulnerable to legal responsibility (and moral responsibility as well) on the
other hand. The capacity of a corporaƟon to act on its own behalf through collecƟvely intending to
accomplish certain aims as an enƟty is the subject of Chapter 4. The idea of intenƟon must be
understood Įrst and then collecƟve intenƟon as a separate and disƟnct concept will be compared
to individual intenƟon to clarify how this makes corporaƟons morally signiĮcant and thus
suscepƟble to assignments of corporate moral responsibility.
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CHAPTER 4-COLLECTIVE INTENTION
IntroducƟon
I begin with an example to illustrate the complexiƟes of corporate collecƟve intenƟon. This instance
is a recent and egregious case of abuse of corporate power and disservice to customers and
outright abuse. It serves to illuminate not only the complexiƟes of collecƟve intenƟon, but the
relaƟonships among the concepts of corporaƟons as collecƟviƟes, individual contrasted with
collecƟve intenƟon, and deĮciencies in how we theorize about the concepts as well as pracƟcal
policy and other responses to corporate acƟon.
In September 2016, Wells Fargo and Company (WFC), an internaƟonal banking and Įnancial
services holding company headquartered in San Francisco, California, was Įned $185 million by the
Consumer Financial ProtecƟon Bureau of the United States for fraudulently creaƟng over 1.5 million
checking and savings accounts and issuing 500,000 credit cards. These accounts and credit
instruments were never authorized by WFC customers and in many cases were unknown to the
customers unƟl aŌer the fraud was exposed. The scandal that followed was caused by an
incenƟve-compensaƟon scheme for WFC employees to constantly create new accounts. WFC
employees were under unrelenƟng and intense pressure to comply with the scheme to meet
impossible sales targets. This WFC scandal resembles the compensaƟon systems that led to the
mortgage crisis early in the 2000s, which in turn precipitated the global Įnancial crisis of 2008. The
systemic issuance of credit instruments at WFC without customer approval or even their knowledge
demonstrates that insƟtuƟonal pressure to comply with an intenƟonally designed system of
incenƟves led not only to illegal account creaƟon, but also to signiĮcant Įnancial harm to customers
whose credit raƟngs were damaged or were subject to wrongful collecƟons eīorts for debts
erroneously brought against their accounts. The CEO of WFC claimed the problem was that the
sales fraud stemmed from a limited number of rogue employees. The head of the department in
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WFC that perpetrated the fraud made the same claim. 5,300 employees were dismissed in the
incident. In the ensuing public furor, the CEO denied that WFC, the corporaƟon, was responsible,
instead blaming rogue employees for incorrectly following WFC corporate policies, pracƟces and
procedures.54
Are we confronted with an insoluble problem concerning wrongful corporate acƟon? The problem
is this: these groups oŌen seem to be immune from moral responsibility when their acƟons
produce harmful consequences. Although it is neither easy nor guaranteed of success, it is possible
to hold corporaƟons legally and socially responsible for what they do.55 But there is no widely
agreed philosophical grounding for ascripƟon of corporate moral responsibility. The concept of
collecƟvely intenƟonal unitary corporaƟons as morally responsible agents does not enjoy a
consensus in philosophy or jurisprudence. Despite prolonged debate about their status as agents, it
has not been possible to reach agreement about either the nature of corporaƟons or whether they
can intend to do things. There is no philosophical agreement that is adequate to jusƟfy the
assignment of moral responsibility to them as agents. Some argue that corporaƟons are collecƟve
group-agent enƟƟes because as unitary agents they can have intenƟons. Others argue this it is not
possible to treat collecƟves such as corporaƟons as fundamental features of reality and that they
must reduce to their consƟtuent individual agents, because only individuals are capable of having
intenƟons. Because there is no conclusive agreement on the nature of these groups and their
intenƟonal capacity, a philosophically coherent grounding of assignments of moral responsibility
54Unsurprisingly, media coverage of the Wells Fargo case has been extensive. See these examples (Corkery 2016a),
(Corkery 2016a), and (Gray 2016). Despite monetary Įnes and other sancƟons, no senior execuƟves have suīered sig-
niĮcant sancƟons in this case. It may be fairly said that the Įnes have been treated merely as a cost of doing business
(Henning 2018).
55In response to the most recent (2018) Įne by Federal regulators, Wells Fargo has been held legally responsible, but
observers suggest that a penalty of $1 billion will apparently have liƩle eīect. “The large Įne is hardly crippling for Wells
Fargo, however, which has more than $1 trillion in assets. The bank reported Friday that although the penalty drove
down Įrst-quarter proĮts by $800 million, it neƩed $4.7 billion. ‘While the size of this Įne is higher than anƟcipated, it is
expected to be easily absorbed by quarterly earnings,’ Fitch RaƟngs said in a statement last week when the bank iniƟally
signalled it could face a $1 billion Įne.” (Merle 2018).
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remains out of reach. Central to the disagreement is whether corporaƟons can meet the
requirements to be moral agents like human beings and thus, through their status as agents, they
can be normaƟvely addressable as members of the moral community.
Philosophical debates about the nature of corporaƟons as group agents, their ontological and moral
status, and their capacity to bear rights and responsibiliƟes have progressed for many decades, but
without reaching any workable resoluƟon. Yet, even as the real-world risks and harms from
corporaƟons, especially in their mulƟnaƟonal form, have grown prodigiously in size and
socio-economic impact over those decades, there has been liƩle contribuƟon from the debates to
deĮniƟvely answer these pracƟcal quesƟons. This enduring problem is especially acute with respect
to Įnancial sector mulƟnaƟonal corporaƟons (MNCs). Debates about corporate ontology and
responsibility conƟnue while repeated threats, risks and crises from Įnancial sector corporaƟons
have grown to global proporƟons, and now imperil the world Įnancial system and consequently the
global community.
I think that there is a way out of this impasse. In this chapter I explore whether corporaƟons as
collecƟvely intenƟonal enƟƟes can meet condiƟons required for agency, and if they cannot,
whether there might sƟll be a way to Įnd them morally responsible. I argue that by treaƟng
corporaƟons not as agents, but as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems, they become suscepƟble to
moral address and thereby as members of the moral community they can be held morally
responsible. This provides a method of bringing not just assignments of legal and social
responsibility against their harmful eīects but the weight of moral judgements as well.
This chapter is in several parts, outlined as follows. In the Įrst part of this chapter I will brieŇy look
at individual intenƟon. Then I will compare individual intenƟon and collecƟve intenƟon and discuss
collecƟve intenƟon as the principal subject of the chapter. The second part of the chapter idenƟĮes
(1) the main issue of the relaƟonship between collecƟve intenƟon and moral responsibility, and (2)
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presents an argument about the characterisƟcs of non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems as a potenƟal
method for ascribing moral responsibility to corporaƟons despite a lack of consensus about their
ontological status, their agency and their moral status.
The focus in this chapter is on collecƟve intenƟon of corporate enƟƟes, not the nature of the
corporaƟons themselves. That has been dealt with in Chapter 2. The focal concern with collecƟve
intenƟon is whether this concept provides a plausible way for corporaƟons to be understood as
morally responsible, but as intenƟonal systems rather than metaphysical agents. The
argument—greatly condensed—of this part is that (1) philosophical insights about collecƟve
intenƟons can help us to understand both how to interpret the reasons corporaƟons give for their
acƟons and how they have moral standing and are thereby morally culpable for what they do.
However, (2) those philosophical insights cannot be found exclusively through the concept of
individual intenƟon. With the concept of collecƟve intenƟonal systems, I will argue that we have a
pragmaƟc alternaƟve.
I will argue speciĮcally that the prevailing theory of intenƟonal agents is not adequate to address
collecƟve intenƟon of corporaƟons as agents or to cope with the global consequences of corporate
acƟon. Neither the concept of collecƟve intenƟon nor individual intenƟon can provide adequate
insights or appropriate reacƟons and remedies for agenƟal corporate acƟon. The standard story of
collecƟve intenƟon relies on an agent having a state of mind, but corporaƟons don't have states of
mind because they are mindless; they don't have minds as individuals do. Because corporaƟons
don't have minds and because the concept of individual intenƟon will not apply to things without
minds, there is no applicability of the standard story of intenƟon to corporaƟons and their acƟons.
CorporaƟons as collecƟve intenƟonal systems are real and have real eīects in the world consequent
to their acƟons. When corporaƟons as collecƟve intenƟonal systems take a course of acƟon they
can be held responsible for the eīects of what they do, rather than for the kinds of things they are.
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By joining a concept of speciĮcally collecƟve intenƟon to (but as disƟnct from) the intenƟonal
acƟons of individual agents we can more fully understand and respond to corporate agenƟal acƟon.
I claim that that we are capable of defending and preserving the common good against the harmful
outcomes of intenƟonal acts through our reŇecƟon on corporate collecƟve intenƟons. When we
react to those corporate acƟons it is expressive of our humanity. These expressions are concerns
about how we as human beings react to intenƟonal collecƟve acƟons that cause harm not only to
individuals and the community at large, but also and most importantly, damage to the essenƟal
element of trust. These two issues, reacƟons and trust, will be dealt with later in Chapter
5-Responsibility. Again, what is under scruƟny in this chapter is collecƟve intenƟon and how it can
be pracƟcally understood to address moral responsibility for corporate acƟon. To realize a pracƟcal
understanding, it is essenƟal to examine how a corporaƟon might be interpreted as an intenƟonal
system. I am following Daniel DenneƩ’s thought on this interpretaƟon from two arƟcles (DenneƩ
1971) (DenneƩ 1981b).
Individual IntenƟon
Ordinarily, it is the concept of the person to which we refer when we consider the chain of moral
responsibility and accountability starƟng with wrongful acƟon from individual persons, then looking
to their status as agents, and then to their moral standing in a moral community and Įnally their
suscepƟbility to moral judgements to assign moral responsibility. The most fundamental concept,
that of the natural person, is the Įrst link on which the other concepts depend as we trace the
chain from one end to the other. However, it is immediately apparent that the commonly agreed
understanding of personhood is complicated by legal and philosophical deĮniƟons of persons, some
of which are familiar and some of which seem very unlikely, such as groups and organizaƟons, as I
have explained in Chapter 3. What is important here is that personhood is the starƟng point and yet
it is not a concept that is clearly understood or that has a commonly agreed deĮniƟon as Chapter 3
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has illustrated. What it is that counts objecƟvely as a person is highly contenƟous, and Daniel
DenneƩ concludes that there are grounds for doubƟng the concept of personhood enƟrely, saying
there are no objecƟve, non-normaƟve grounds by which we can tell if we are persons (DenneƩ
1981b). DenneƩ is concerned about incoherence with respect to the concept of persons because
he fears diĸculƟes if there is more than one applicable concept of persons. He recognizes that
there are two noƟons of a person—the metaphysical and the moral. The metaphysical person is an
agent that is intelligent, conscious and feeling. The moral person is accountable and has both rights
and responsibiliƟes; it is a person as an end-in-itself. The quesƟon that this raises for DenneƩ is
whether the metaphysical person is a necessary but not suĸcient condiƟon for being a moral
person. For DenneƩ, being raƟonal, in the sense of being a metaphysical person that acts for his or
her own good or advantage (or the good of each person cooperaƟng in the case of a collecƟve)56
allows intenƟonality, and also allows being an object of a parƟcular stance taken towards him or
herself. This makes one a person in a normaƟve sense. Furthermore, the stance taken toward a
person must be reciprocated by that person to qualify for personhood. I.e., the object deĮned by
applicaƟon of the normaƟve stance as a person must be capable of reciprocaƟng the stance
(DenneƩ 1981b, p. 270).
If we cannot easily and clearly agree what is meant by a person as such, it may be possible to
approach an understanding by contrasƟng and comparing them to enƟƟes not commonly
considered to be persons but deĮned as such in the law, e.g., groups and collecƟviƟes. Thus, by
examining disƟncƟons between personal subjects and collecƟve subjects we can disƟnguish the
essenƟal characterisƟcs of personhood. We might begin by asking: what are the fundamental
requirements for a collecƟve subject to meet an agreed standard as a person? Is it a maƩer of
having percepƟon and memory and the capacity to form the appropriate degrees of belief and
56See: Rawls (Lectures on the History of PoliƟcal Philosophy 2007, 54 ī.) from which this noƟon of raƟonality is taken.
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desire for a collecƟve subject to be a person? (Peƫt 2002, p. 458). Mutual awareness in forming a
complex web of awareness held among the individuals in a collecƟve of subjects is necessary for a
collecƟvity to become an intenƟonal subject.57 According to Peƫt, this does not guarantee raƟonal
unity, which is necessary to count as a raƟonal subject. What is required, for Peƫt, is that collecƟve
subjects be capable of two things: they must be capable of possessing intenƟonal states, and they
must perform acƟons that correspond to those intenƟons. And there is a third essenƟal element,
the ability to avow those states and acƟons and claim them as their own (Peƫt 2002, p. 461). The
uniĮcaƟon of intenƟonal states and acƟons in a raƟonal way is what jusƟĮes and qualiĮes personal
subjects as more than merely intenƟonal subjects. And if, having qualiĮed as persons, they fail to
raƟonally demonstrate a uniĮcaƟon of intenƟon and acƟon, then they can be held responsible for
that failure.
By following this line of thought Peƫt might be charged with aƩribuƟng to a collecƟvity an
ontological status independent of the individuals by which it is comprised, and of assigning to it a
property that properly belongs to its consƟtuent individuals. He defends the qualiĮcaƟon of
personal collecƟve subjects by arguing that those collecƟve judgements and intenƟons do depend
on individuals and cannot vary independently of those individuals and by this it is not made “an
ontologically emergent realm” (Peƫt 2002, 460). But Peƫt does assert that he “...shall take as
persons those intenƟonal agents who can avow their intenƟonal states and the acƟons they
perform” (Peƫt 2002, p. 461). Extending the argument to integrated groups—and based on his
assumpƟon above that intenƟonal agents who make and can be held to avowals can be deĮned as
persons—then integrated groups are insƟtuƟonal persons and operate under a discipline of reason
to be accountable for failing the test of raƟonal unity of their states and acƟons.
57See: Gilbert (On Social Facts 1992) , Searle (The ConstrucƟon of Social Reality 1996), Tuomela (The Importance of
Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social NoƟons 1995), Bratman (Faces of IntenƟon: Selected Essays on IntenƟon and
Agency 1999) as cited by Peƫt, 2002.
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In an essay by Margaret Gilbert, which focuses on backward-looking moral responsibility, i.e.,
having to do with causaƟon, she is concerned with how blame (judgement) might be assigned to a
collecƟvity, which she deĮnes as a plural subject—a populaƟon of people who are party to a given
joint commitment (Gilbert 1992, pp. 64–95). Gilbert contrasts forward-looking moral responsibility
which has to do with obligaƟon. The joint commitment is a commitment of the will produced by
personal decisions and intenƟons of either the personal (individual) or the joint kind, i.e., of two or
more people, but in the laƩer case all of them intend to do something as a single body. Joint
commitment then, links people in a unifying way such that it is appropriate to say that they “...have
created something new”, something that is more than a mere aggregate (Gilbert 1992, p. 102).
It may be that we will have to accept the ambiguity that seems inherent in the concept of
personhood. Indeed, John Rawls uses the term persons in just that ambiguous way: A word about
the term ‘person.’ This expression is to be construed variously depending on the circumstances. On
some occasions it will mean human individuals, but in others it may refer to naƟons, provinces,
business Įrms, churches, teams, and so on. The principles of jusƟce apply to conŇicƟng claims
made by persons of all of these separate kinds. There is, perhaps, a certain logical priority to the
case of human individuals: it may be possible to analyze the acƟons of so-called arƟĮcial persons as
logical construcƟons of the acƟons of human persons, and it is plausible to maintain that the worth
of insƟtuƟons is derived solely from the beneĮts they bring to human individuals. Nevertheless, an
analysis of jusƟce should not begin by making either of these assumpƟons, or by restricƟng itself to
the case of human persons; and it can gain considerably from not doing so. As I shall use the term
“person,” then, it will be ambiguous in the manner indicated (Rawls 1999, pp. 193–194).
CollecƟve IntenƟon Broadly Considered
QuesƟons about the moral behavior of collecƟviƟes seem to be a constant in modern life. Almost
daily we are confronted by media reports of acts of wrong-doing on the part of various social
87
insƟtuƟons such as corporaƟons, governments, schools and other collecƟviƟes. Accompanying
these incidents are equally serious quesƟons about what responsibility should be aƩached to those
who commit such acts and how to make accountable insƟtuƟons and enƟƟes that engage in
systemaƟcally wrongful behavior. However, we are confronted only rarely with examples that are so
shocking in their moral signiĮcance that they change our moral and ethical perspecƟve on the social
world. Two examples of catastrophic acts of collecƟve intenƟon and failures of collecƟve moral
responsibility are Auschwitz and Birkenau, the infamous death camps, and the strategy of area
bombing of Dresden and its civilian populaƟon. The physical and conceptual architecture of
insƟtuƟonal moral failure leaves an indelible impression not only by the intenƟons that are inherent
in the buildings of Auschwitz, in the enclosed spaces they contain and in the purposes to which
those spaces were put, but especially by Birkenau and its technologies of exterminaƟon at an
industrial scale. These reveal the results of collecƟve intenƟons that consƟtute some of the most
controversial moral quesƟons of the modern era about the nature of intenƟons of insƟtuƟonal
collecƟviƟes and joint social acƟon.
AlternaƟve Views of CollecƟve IntenƟon
In the philosophical literature there is a long and conƟnuing debate about the concept of agency
and the nature of intenƟonality. And the current debate on individual and collecƟve agency seems
to be enjoying a resurgence as a topic in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. This debate
covers a wide range of concepts such as shared intenƟons, shared responsibility and collecƟve
responsibility, we-mode and I-mode intenƟonality, corporate moral agency, joint acƟon as well as
others and is quite acƟve. But on further analysis, it is also a debate that has apparently gone
stagnant. While the debate appears to thrive in scholarly journals, paradoxically, based on the
number of publicaƟons and the complexity of the arguments, it is characterized by very liƩle linear
progress in resolving the quesƟon of when or even if intenƟonality and thus agency can be
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legiƟmately aƩributed to collecƟve enƟƟes. This maƩers because the consequences of the acƟons
of collecƟve insƟtuƟons have obvious signiĮcance and we have no widely agreed conceptual
framework with which to coherently deal with the problems that collecƟves present to the social
order. Why is concern with collecƟve intenƟon becoming of such interest at this parƟcular point in
history? It may be in large part because globalizaƟon is rapidly changing the material base of
everyday life. And we do not have a legacy of proven concepts, a historical experience or a
comprehensive database that allows us to prepare for and successfully manage the simultaneous
impact of trans-naƟonal insƟtuƟonal agents, economic recessions, disrupƟons to the energy supply
and climate change on a global basis. Contemporary economic, technological and natural
transformaƟons are compelling us to criƟcally analyze insƟtuƟonal behavior, acƟon and agents and
to understand those transformaƟons as being as important to us now as those of individuals were
in the period of industrializaƟon. This essay will explore the status of the philosophical debate
about the concept and nature of collecƟve agents by concentraƟng on the central concept of
intenƟonality. SpeciĮcally, it will address the intenƟons of agents as they are expressed in their
acƟons and omissions and consider the philosophical consequences that aƩach to joint social
acƟons that ensue. The debate centers on two forms of intenƟonality, “we-mode” and “I-mode.”'
It is important to recognize if only to brieŇy menƟon that there are substanƟve, criƟcal, alternaƟve
views on collecƟve intenƟonality. A reason to menƟon these is to further contextualize the
contending points of view and suggest that the posiƟons of we-mode theorists, especially Searle
and I-mode theorists, parƟcularly Bratman, are central to the current debate. There are quite
diīerent and speciĮc interpretaƟons of intenƟonality, for example, Raimo Tuomela (1995), (2006)
Seumas Miller (2006), Margaret Gilbert (1992), (2006) David Velleman (1997), Deborah Tollefsen
(2004), (2015) and the emerging work of experimental philosophers whose concern is with recent
discoveries in neuroscience. These are of signiĮcant interest as criƟques of the Searle-Bratman
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debate and for further research study. The core idea to be emphasized here however is that
we-mode intenƟonality as it is argued by Searle and I-mode intenƟonality as interpreted by
Bratman are the principal interpretaƟons and stand implacably opposed in this debate. Later in this
chapter I will give a more detailed treatment of John Searle's work, which will be examined and
criƟcally compared to that of Michael Bratman as to how the collecƟve intenƟonality debate is
centered in the philosophy of language.
CollecƟve IntenƟon, States of Mind and Courses of AcƟon
This secƟon of the chapter begins an exploraƟon of collecƟve intenƟon as it is understood through
two contending conceptualizaƟons. The failure of the Searle and Bratman debate to yield an
adequate answer to quesƟons of moral responsibiliƟes of collecƟve enƟƟes lies with their ulƟmate
reliance on individual concepts of intenƟon. In both cases it is a state of mind of the individual
intenders that underpins the posiƟons taken by both Searle and Bratman with respect to collecƟve
intenƟon.
The two points of view that I disƟnguish as State-of-Mind and Course-of-AcƟon. A State-of-Mind
perspecƟve requires that the nature of a collecƟve agent suĸciently conform analogously to that of
an individual, natural agent to permit a legiƟmate ascripƟon of responsibility. In a Course-of-AcƟon
view ascripƟon of responsibility is concerned not with the nature of the agent, but what course of
acƟon the agent plans and executes and the consequences of that acƟon.
However, there is the possibility of an ambiguity that must be resolved before going further. The
potenƟal ambiguity is whether the argument in this chapter is moving away enƟrely from a concern
with intenƟon in the case of collecƟve agents or if the argument conƟnues to deal with intenƟon
directly, but not intenƟon that is based on a state-of-mind concepƟon. This thesis addresses the
concept of collecƟve intenƟon, but not intenƟon as the result of a state-of-mind of a metaphysical
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corporate agent. There are complex and unresolved debates about the possibiliƟes of metaphysical
persons having a state-of-mind as a characterisƟc that could make them liable to ascripƟons of
moral responsibility, but the seemingly unresolvable diĸculƟes in the state-of-mind approach and
the severity of the problems issuing from corporate acƟon moƟvate my search for an alternaƟve.
The concept of intenƟon, far from being discarded in this discussion is approached from another
perspecƟve necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the collecƟve agent involved in corporate
acƟon.
In this part of the chapter I address the concept of collecƟve intenƟon in detail, how it is deĮned
and how it is understood by theorists with respect to corporate agents. I claim it is necessary to
examine the state-of-mind concept due to its deĮciencies. It is the enduring but unresolved debate
about how collecƟve intenƟon is theorized and its failure to produce acƟonable philosophical
insights despite urgently needed remedies to protect the community and the common good from
harmful or predatory corporate acƟon. It is important to note that the instances of protecƟon and
remedy I refer to result from corporate acƟons that result in harm or damage directly, i.e., to a
singular individual producing a sensaƟon of pain, as well as a sense of wrongful acƟon with a
shared, vicarious, but not necessarily unanimous feeling of having been wronged among the
members of a community as the result of some intenƟonal corporate acƟon.
I said above that there are two conceptualizaƟons of collecƟve intenƟon: one holding that intenƟon
issues from a state-of-mind of the agent, the other that intenƟon is revealed in what is described as
a course of acƟon taken by the agent. These two posiƟons are heavily contested and each raises
serious issues about their meaning and applicaƟon.
To reiterate: to suĸciently understand the debate about collecƟve intenƟon the discussion
addresses how collecƟve intenƟon is variously understood. The domain of examinaƟon in this
porƟon of the chapter is collecƟve intenƟon of group agents.
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There is a hard problem confronƟng our eīorts to understand the reality of corporate collecƟve
enƟƟes. The hard problem is that those enƟƟes as legal persons are metaphysical. If they can be
held morally responsible by what means might that be done? I am arguing that it cannot be
through their agency, by their status as agents. This thesis discusses the metaphysical aspects of
collecƟve enƟƟes, but it emphasizes the duƟes they bear as the grounds for ascripƟons of moral
responsibility.
My aim here is to set out in what ways the debate about collecƟve intenƟon is inadequate and how
it is deĮcient in yielding a suĸcient grasp of relaƟonships to or remedies for essenƟal
socio-economic problems (instability, ignorance and insecurity) resulƟng from failures to meet
corporate obligaƟons relaƟng to intenƟonal acƟon.
CollecƟve IntenƟon as State-of-Mind and Course-of-AcƟon
There is a long-standing debate between reducƟonists whose arguments hold that corporaƟons as
consƟtuted legal enƟƟes ulƟmately must reduce to the individuals that comprise them because
those individuals do indeed possess the requisite states-of-mind for moral responsibility.
Understood as natural persons, there are few quesƟons about the metaphysics of individuals as
agents. Individuals are real and are capable of states-of-mind, barring the excepƟons of
physiological pathology, cogniƟve underdevelopment or other forms of impairment that excuse
them or exclude them from the moral community and thus from moral responsibility. In contrast,
collecƟve agents as legal but arƟĮcial persons are metaphysical creaƟons, and the claim that they
can have states-of-mind remains a maƩer of contenƟon. The Ɵmely arrival of a deĮniƟve answer to
the quesƟon of whether a collecƟve enƟty can have a state-of-mind and thus seƩle the issue of
assignment of moral responsibility is unlikely, even as demands sharpen for remedies to malevolent
corporate intenƟonal acƟon. But, as I have said, the undeniable reality is that corporaƟons
themselves are real legal, economic and social phenomena and as such have the capacity for real
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eīects in the real world. There is a disƟncƟon that must be made here between two possibiliƟes in
understanding and dealing with corporaƟons. One possibility is to treat any corporaƟon conceived
as a conceptual legal construct as a simplisƟc reducƟon to individual human beings. That, however,
does not take account of the realiƟes of corporate acƟon, organizaƟon and enablement as disƟnct
from its members. For example, no one individual can build a commercial jet airplane. Boeing or
Airbus as a unitary enƟty can, by oīering the structure and faciliƟes and resources that enable a
coherent organizaƟon of individuals to do this, and this includes Boeing or Airbus in the producƟon
of the results. But the producƟon of such an artefact is not accomplished only by individuals. The
second possibility in our understanding of corporaƟons is, when things go wrong, the invariable
reducƟon of assignments of responsibility to individuals. Assigning responsibility to individuals that
comprise a corporaƟon is an assignment that excludes the corporaƟon itself from culpability. For
example, it is patently implausible to hold solely responsible the soŌware engineers that produced
the algorithms and compiled code that allowed Volkswagen to cheat on tesƟng for nitrogen oxide
emissions. Again, the disƟncƟon to be noted here is between acknowledgement of the
organizaƟonal and enabling role of the corporaƟon in the producƟon process and the legiƟmate
targets for assignment of praise or blame for the results of that acƟvity.
Acknowledging this reality of the existence of corporaƟons as unitary enƟƟes in their own right
demands that we provide an accounƟng for the intenƟons involved in their corporate acƟviƟes
given both the consequences of those acƟviƟes and the nature of the corporate enƟty. Thus, there
is a speciĮc kind of intenƟon involved when corporaƟons take intenƟonal acƟon, but those
intenƟons are not founded on their possessing a state-of-mind. The kind of intenƟon that is under
scruƟny here results from the adopƟon by the enƟty of a course of acƟon.
Whether we can Įnd a form of intenƟon based in state-of-mind that suits corporaƟons plausibly
and eīecƟvely is one of two principal quesƟons. The core of this quesƟon is whether a
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state-of-mind is essenƟally the same and is philosophically convincing for both individuals and for
jurisƟc persons. But to answer this it would be necessary to exhausƟvely examine the balance of
arguments between the metaphysical aspects of enƟƟes as creaƟons of law and those enƟƟes that
are natural persons. There are two disƟnct problems in answering this quesƟon. One problem is
that the dispute seems insoluble. Revealing the full extent of the insolubility confronts us with
engaging intractable problems in philosophy of mind, acƟon theory and moral theory. The second is
that from the standpoint of applied normaƟve ethics an unlimited debate is increasingly
unaīordable given the threat posed by Įnancial sector agents (among others) and their capacity for
destabilizaƟon and damage to the global commons.
The other principal quesƟon is whether we can Įnd a form of intenƟon based in course-of-acƟon
that suits corporaƟons plausibly and eīecƟvely. If we reject the metaphysical approach on both the
grounds that the urgency of, say, Įnancial sector threats as structural problems demands an
eīecƟve and Ɵmely response, and on the grounds that a possible soluƟon is available in lieu of
resolving the metaphysical quesƟons about state-of-mind of collecƟve agents, then it may be
possible to engage with the immediacies of real world issues. This would be a soluƟon that relies
not on the Ňat uƟlitarianism of simply holding corporaƟons responsible. It would let the chips fall
where they may with respect to the complaints that blame would fall on innocents (employees,
families and communiƟes), but hold whole corporaƟons liable for the misdeeds of blameworthy
individuals (rogue traders, etc.). A potenƟal soluƟon, I suggest, lies in our reacƟon of having a
shared sense of wrong when non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems intenƟonally act anormaƟvely. This is
a middle way between Ňat uƟlitarianism as one alternaƟve and metaphysics of responsible agents
as another. It recognizes our humanity, and our natural individual human and social reacƟon to
having been wronged with deliberate intent. But it also disƟnguishes between acƟon that is
intenƟonally harmful, overtly selĮsh, or reckless and that which is unintenƟonal.
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As I have indicated, there are two diīerent principal philosophical views of intenƟons. One view is
collecƟve intenƟon based on a mental state. This is deĮned as if for individual human beings and
has cogniƟve and moƟvaƟonal components. This view of collecƟve intenƟon is mysterious and
complex because it relies on a state of mind that moƟvates collecƟve acƟon with goal-directedness
and is characterized as an “acƟon-like” state, but the collecƟve is not a human being. It is a
disposiƟonal aƫtude with causal power to produce acƟon. The properƟes aƩributed to mental
state collecƟve intenƟon appear to apply as if to individuals, but it is not clear how they apply to a
collecƟve as a unitary thing, including jurisƟc persons as legal ĮcƟons. IntenƟons, in this view, have
the power to produce acƟon, but the process is subject to a mysterious transformaƟon from a
cogniƟve state of belief and desire to possession of a collecƟve intenƟon through to an intenƟonal
acƟon taken by the enƟty. There is a residue of uncertainty with respect to ascripƟons of
responsibility when this is applied to group agents holisƟcally because it is not clear from where a
group agent derives its beliefs and desires except in the minds of its consƟtuent individuals.
The second view is that the adopƟon of a course of acƟon is suĸcient to ground intenƟon. Unlike
state-of-mind theory, course-of-acƟon does not rely on mysterious disposiƟons and
transformaƟons. CollecƟves can as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems, just as with individuals, share
the adopƟon of a course of acƟon and be addressed with praise and blame for the consequences.
State-of-Mind
State-of-Mind theory conceives of intenƟon as a mental state (a state of mind) of an agent and a
majority of theorists take intenƟons to be mental states. IntenƟon contributes to the determinaƟon
of (i.e., deciding upon) what is (intenƟonally) done by an agent so we can say that intenƟon is the
determinaƟon of what agents do. Agents are said by State-of-Mind theorists to do two things—they
intend, and they act with an intenƟon. In other words, an agent could have an intenƟon, yet not
intenƟonally act on the intenƟon that she has, so they could be considered as separable in this way.
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A Įrst quesƟon to ask is if intenƟon is characterized necessarily by a state of mind possessed by an
agent. In 1957 Anscombe argued against the idea that an agent’s acƟons had something to do with
a state of mind (Anscombe 1963). Anscombe eīecƟvely challenged the idea that an intenƟon as a
state of mind preceded an acƟon, but she did not provide a deĮniƟve answer to make sense of
precisely what an intenƟon is. Donald Davidson oīered a deŇaƟonary analysis of state-of-mind
theory; so-called because his analysis reduced the inŇated state of thinking that intenƟons had to
be full-blown mental states. Davidson, however, conceded that pure intenƟon would make acƟon
unnecessary. Mental states, invoked by agents to jusƟfy acƟon, are claimed to be physical states
causing the acƟon. Reasons given by an agent must explain the agent’s acƟons, or else they cannot
be causal; reasons jusƟfy agenƟal acƟon (Davidson 1963).
The prevailing view in contemporary philosophy remains that intenƟon is characterized by a state of
mind yet the debate about the nature of that state has failed to yield either of two outcomes. It
does not, aŌer inexhausƟble discussion, move us very much closer to a deĮniƟve answer to the
nature of intenƟon. More importantly, it does not provide much help in determining if, based on
whether they can possess a state of mind, there is a way to assign responsibility to collecƟves. Does
intenƟon require that mental states have certain properƟes to be sources of power? IntenƟon
cannot, according to state-of-mind theory, be merely goal-oriented, possess a plan component or
contain an aƫtude. IntenƟon, according to the theory, must also be “acƟon-like”, have conaƟve
components (expressive of aƩempted acƟon), and be an execuƟve state that actually moƟvates
acƟon. These deĮniƟons don’t characterize what we call intenƟons. Mental states must also be
acƟonable, have the power to moƟvate and to play a causal role between deliberaƟon (reasoning,
belief, desire) and acƟon. This conceptualizaƟon inserts intenƟon between reasoning (belief, desire)
of the agent and the acƟon. CorporaƟons are a reality. They exist as metaphysical persons, and it is
not yet clear how a metaphysical corporate person might possess a state of mind that would saƟsfy
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the demands of state-of-mind theory.
Searle—Realism and CollecƟve IntenƟon
In The ConstrucƟon of Social Reality (1996) John Searle aƩempts to solve a puzzle about the nature
of social reality. He construes this puzzle-solving eīort as a working through of the ontology of facts.
The soluƟon for Searle's puzzle of social reality is found in resolving how the most fundamental of
objecƟve facts, the physical or “brute facts”, those that exist independently of human thought, can
be socially composed into a structure of insƟtuƟonal facts resulƟng in social reality.
Basic to Searle's argument is that objecƟve facts exist and his argument, which is at boƩom a
defense of Realism, is aimed at answering AnƟ-Realist arguments about the nature of reality. It is
not necessary to fully examine the Realist -- AnƟ-Realist debate here to isolate and examine the
noƟon of collecƟve intenƟon as Searle understands it. But it is important to understand why
Searle's work is predominant in consideraƟon of collecƟve intenƟon at all. Because Searle is
aƩempƟng to explain how social facts happen and the social reality that results from them, he
devotes considerable aƩenƟon to the process and producƟon of social reality in this work.58 Social
reality occurs as a consequence of the assignment of roles and funcƟons to tangible objects, the
subsequent sharing by groups of people of intenƟons that they hold in common, and by their
adherence to rules by which objects are understood, apprehended and used.
Searle's ConstrucƟon of Social Reality is a modernist document in the sense that he asserts that
there are objecƟve facts. As a realist he holds that there is a real world of objecƟve facts whether
there are humans around to recognize this or not. He is also post-modern in the sense that he
conceives of knowledge as concerned with facts that are socially constructed. ObjecƟve facts fall
into two categories: brute facts that exist independently of what humans think about them, and
58More than half of Searle's The ConstrucƟon of Social Reality addresses this problem. The last porƟon of the book is
Searle's argument defending Realism against AnƟ-Realists.
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social facts that depend for their existence on the thinking of human beings. Furthermore, while
language is necessarily employed to state the facts, those facts as we state them can be separated
from and recognized as disƟnct from our statements. Language then is a social fact as well.
Social facts are the more general of the two socially constructed types of reality for Searle. The
other type is that of insƟtuƟonal facts. Both social and insƟtuƟonal facts are generated by human
beings through their pracƟces and aƫtudes and it is Searle's intenƟon to explain how social and
insƟtuƟonal facts come into existence. Social reality is the product of human acƟon that assigns
funcƟons or roles to physical objects, through agreements among groups of people to share a
common intenƟon about those objects and through agreements among groups to conform to rules
by which they will treat those objects in similar ways. Social construcƟons then, are realiƟes, and
they consist in objecƟve facts. It is important to note that social reality and physical reality do not
exist enƟrely independently of each other, because social facts rest upon brute physical facts
(Searle 1996, p. 35). There is a hierarchy of facts in which a superstructure of insƟtuƟonal facts
exists over a substructure of physical facts (Searle 1996, p. 35) (Fig. 5.1). Social facts are more
general than insƟtuƟonal facts, which are more speciĮc and involve human insƟtuƟons. While for
Searle social facts are any facts that involve collecƟve intenƟon, it is important to note that we can
disƟnguish between social facts through their diīerenƟal dependencies. Social facts depend on
collecƟve intenƟon, but not upon formal human insƟtuƟons. InsƟtuƟonal facts depend on both,
according to Searle. Searle's conceptualizaƟon of collecƟve intenƟonality demands explanaƟon to
fully understand implicaƟons of the claims he makes. Searle says that social and insƟtuƟonal facts
are created through human construcƟon. And again, under the assumpƟon that human beings are
social, it may be as Searle claims that human beings construct their social reality and can thereby
enter into certain agreements that will establish and sustain social and insƟtuƟonal facts. Yet this
does not fully explain either the speciĮc nature of the agreements or the nature of the collecƟve
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intenƟonality upon which his explanaƟon depends.
InsƟtuƟonal facts are central to Searle's argument so further exploraƟon of these is warranted here.
These are facts only because people agree on them. People believe these facts to be real as in the
case of money, i.e., a valid form of exchange is agreed to. PostulaƟng and explaining collecƟve
intenƟonality is a Įrst step in solving the puzzle of how insƟtuƟonal facts can be created from brute
facts and can become objecƟve facts rather than subjecƟve facts. By deriving intenƟon from a
collecƟvely agreed aim we can think of this as foundaƟonal because it is not reducible to individual,
Įrst-person intenƟon. The second step is locaƟng social and insƟtuƟonal facts inside a system of
consƟtuƟve rules (Searle 1996, p. 43). Without consƟtuƟve rules social and insƟtuƟonal facts
cannot exist. These rules take the form of: “X counts as Y in context C” according to Searle's
formulaƟon. We agree collecƟvely to such formulaƟons and thus create social and insƟtuƟonal
facts. These consƟtuƟve rules are related to insƟtuƟonal rules because through them we impose a
deĮniƟon or a status to which a funcƟon is aƩached beyond the brute physical funcƟons that can
be aƩached to physical objects. The collecƟve agreement (or at least acceptance) imposes both the
status and the funcƟon that accompanies the status. This demands as well that the status and
funcƟon be of the sort that actually can be collecƟvely agreed. And this must be sustained over
Ɵme or the funcƟon will fail. Money, for example, must enjoy a sustained agreement to be
funcƟonal as a mode of valid exchange. In summary, collecƟve intenƟon assigns a new status to
some phenomenon. The formulaƟon of the assignment is “X counts as Y in C.” Those who
parƟcipate in the agreement do not have to be consciously aware of the agreement to make use of
this kind of assignment. Because we grow up in cultures taking insƟtuƟons for granted it is part of
our background culturally (Searle 1996, pp. 46–48). Thus, we do not have to be fully conscious of
the speciĮc collecƟve intenƟon to parƟcipate in accessing the funcƟons of social and insƟtuƟonal
facts, following Searle's formulaƟon. The imposiƟon of status funcƟons on objects becomes a
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general policy and the formula acquires normaƟve status and thus becomes a consƟtuƟve rule.
CollecƟve agreement about assignment of a status is consƟtuƟve of having the status, and having
the status is essenƟal to performance of the funcƟon assigned to the status. The Y term must assign
some new status that the enƟƟes named by the X term do not already have. The new status
requires collecƟve intenƟonality -- it is both necessary and suĸcient to create and sustain it (Searle
1996, p. 51). The role of language is crucial to this process. In the Y expression of Searle's formula,
the label or name aƩached to the insƟtuƟonal fact created is consƟtuƟve of the fact. It is, then,
linguisƟcally constructed. Summarizing, social and insƟtuƟonal facts can be understood as
intenƟons of individuals, but these are not constrained to be exclusively Įrst-person intenƟons,
intenƟons of those enƟƟes that possess a mind and consciousness. Rather, individuals have
“we-intenƟons” that are primiƟves and do not reduce to intenƟons of Įrst-person, conscious
enƟƟes. It is interesƟng to note however, that Searle's conceptualizaƟon recognizes that there are
individual intenƟons and these are primiƟves with respect to the acts of individuals. He claims
likewise that there are collecƟve intenƟons and that these too are primiƟves, irreducible to
individual Įrst-person consciousness. There is an unresolved puzzle then about why Searle is so
concerned to understand collecƟve intenƟonality in terms of individual intenƟonality if they exist as
discrete primiƟve forms.
Searle's formulaƟon has these key points: collecƟve intenƟon, consƟtuƟve rules, and status
funcƟons. The most important and contenƟous of these is collecƟve intenƟon. This key element
solves the conŇict between irreducibility of collecƟve intenƟonality to singular (Įrst-person)
intenƟon on the one hand, and on the other hand the requirements of methodological
individualism which seems to require that we reduce collecƟve intenƟonality to individual
intenƟonality. Methodological individualism can be brieŇy described here as an aƩempt to describe
laws that are both necessary and general. It is an extension of the evoluƟon of scienƟĮc method in
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the physical sciences into the social sciences upon which Searle is leaning as he tries to deduce
necessary outcomes from thought experiments and assumpƟons about certain condiƟons being
true as he thinks through this puzzle (Fitzpatrick 2003).
Searle and State-of-Mind
The role of collecƟve intenƟon in collecƟve or joint acƟon is central to understanding why Searle
gives so much aƩenƟon to the creaƟon of social facts. Searle is suggesƟng that the parƟcipants in a
collecƟve intenƟon must all think or intend in terms of “we-intend.” That is, there is an essenƟal
character to collecƟve acƟon that rests in the awareness in the individual mind of each parƟcipant
of a “we-intenƟon.” It may be more strongly stated as the case that the “we-intenƟon” must be in
the mulƟple heads of those who consƟtute the “we.” This “we-intenƟon” is characterized by the
fact that it can be disƟnguished from the “I-intend” awareness that reduces to Įrst-person
conscious minds. Searle is moving beyond strictly personal noƟons of intenƟon. He characterizes
collecƟve intenƟon such that we are required to recognize it as unique; it is a reality of real social
insƟtuƟons. It is a social reality formed by the acƟons of persons acƟng in groups and in light of the
fact that an individual holds an intenƟon concerning a collecƟve's acƟvity. This phenomenon of
sharing is essenƟally the awareness of the parƟcipants of a “we-intenƟon.” While the strength of
this argument makes Searle's formulaƟon central to we-mode collecƟve intenƟonality he does not
fully address the nature of collecƟve, or joint acƟon.59 This is a serious short-coming in Searle's
posiƟon as it leaves incomplete his understanding of the role of groups taking acƟon based on
“we-intenƟons.” Yet consider the example of collecƟve acƟon that Searle oīers to diīerenƟate
collecƟve behavior from simple, summaƟve individual behavior. As a way of indicaƟng through
idenƟcal physical acƟons how diīerent simple summaƟve behavior is to collecƟve behavior we may
59Searle consistently uses the term “collecƟve acƟon” to describe acts of groups. Bratman persists in using “joint
acƟon” to describe the same phenomena. Following the many other writers in this debate, I will use the terms inter-
changeably.
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infer a more sophisƟcated treatment of collecƟve acƟon than Searle's criƟcs concede.
Searle asks us to imagine a group of people siƫng in a park who run to and converge on a common
shelter to escape a sudden rain. They do so without evidence of any consciously collecƟve
behavior; each is acƟng independently of the others. Then he asks that we imagine a group who
run to a common point in the same park but as part of a ballet performance. Externally the running
behavior is the same, but internally the cases are disƟnct. In the former case the “I-intend”
behavior is without reference to others; in the laƩer case the “I-intend” behavior is derivaƟve from
a “we-intend” behavior and references the others in the ballet company. In this second case, there
is a dimension of cooperaƟon, a psychological mode in which the acƟon is intended and makes
reference to other parƟcipants in the collecƟve acƟon (Searle 1990, p. 408).
These are “we-intenƟons,” and Searle accounts for these by reference to a concept of a set of
capaciƟes individuals have to sense that the other in a collecƟve acƟon is a potenƟal parƟcipant, a
co-operator in the sense of being a potenƟal member of the collecƟve acƟon. Thus, there is a
presupposiƟon at work in which capaciƟes in the background emerge to enable psychological states
that are intenƟonal states of mind. For Searle, cooperaƟon is part of the background, but he thus
cannot explain cooperaƟon in intenƟonal terms. The intenƟonal state of mind is not part of the
background; it is in the foreground of collecƟve acƟon. But the background by which Searle
explains the enablement of psychological states is a set of capaciƟes -- these are pre-intenƟons and
provide the condiƟons or establish the potenƟal for intenƟonal states.
Bratman—Joint Social AcƟon and IntenƟon
In contrast to Searle's noƟon of collecƟve intenƟonality it is instrucƟve to turn to Michael Bratman's
perspecƟve, as it is a view of intenƟon that does not go beyond that of the conscious Įrst-person
individual. In further contrast to Searle, however, Bratman directly addresses the maƩer of joint
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acƟon, which helps us to understand not only collecƟve acƟon but more of what is at the core of
this debate. By comparing Bratman's work on collecƟve intenƟon to Searle, and exploring what
Bratman means by joint social acƟon, we may gain a more complete picture of the diīerences
between these theories and the perspecƟves they oīer. 60
Bratman's suggests that “our” intenƟon is a complex or a web of individually held personal
intenƟons, and he uses the phrase “shared intenƟon” to denote an intenƟon that is diīerent from
the statement “each of us intends to (take some acƟon).” At the risk of over-simplifying Bratman's
posiƟon can be described brieŇy. Bratman holds that two or more people share an intenƟon when
(1) each of them intends (to perform an act) by virtue of the acƟvity of each of them, and (2) each
of them intends (to perform that act) by virtue of the individual intenƟon held by each of them that
(the act be accomplished). Using Bratman's example to illustrate the point, to paint a house each
parƟcipant would have to intend to paint the house by virtue of the acƟvity of each parƟcipant and
each parƟcipant would have to intend to paint the house by virtue of the intenƟon of each of them
that the house be successfully painted. (3) There is a further requirement that it be common
knowledge among all the parƟcipants that these are the exisƟng condiƟons of knowledge and
intenƟon.61 It is worth noƟng here that the intenƟons are individually held and Bratman is
assuming an overall agreement with respect to intenƟon among the parƟcipants. In Bratman's case
then, it is the coordinated, shared I-intenƟons that is the essenƟal aspect of the joint acƟon, in
comparison to Searle who requires each of the parƟcipants to have in his or her head the same
we-intenƟon. Further, Searle relies on the background capaciƟes of the parƟcipants to achieve a
requisite psychological state while Bratman relies on the commitment of each to a coordinated,
cooperaƟve joint acƟon.
Bratman argues that those who share an intenƟon might Įnd it necessary to negoƟate within the
60(Baier 1997)provides a more extensive treatment of the diīerences and similariƟes in the Searle-Bratman posiƟons.
61Bratman is using common knowledge in a non-technical, unexamined way here (Bratman 1993).
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parameters of that intenƟon due to individual diīerences about the intenƟons. If, then, there are
those who have parƟcular intenƟons that do not conform to that which is agreed as the aim of the
collecƟvity, then negoƟaƟng and bargaining may be required. In cases like this, where imperfect
alignment of intenƟons occurs, each of the parƟcipants may review their intenƟons and reconsider
his or her commitment. This may threaten the overall aim to act jointly or constrain individuals in
such ways so they avoid threatening the joint acƟon.
Bratman's argument regarding shared intenƟons has three main features worth iteraƟng very
brieŇy in consideraƟon of the essenƟal of interdependence among the individual intenƟons of the
parƟcipants. The crucial aspect of cooperaƟon in joint acƟons has the following features: There
must be a commitment to the joint acƟvity despite individual parƟcipants possibly having diīerent
reasons for parƟcipaƟng. There must be interdependence among the parƟcipants in the form of
mutual responsiveness; this is reŇexivity of intenƟons. And there must be a minimum of
cooperaƟve stability over Ɵme as well as the potenƟal for reciprocal assistance while engaged in the
joint acƟon. Seƫng aside the asymmetry of the commitment requirement in which joint acƟvity
demands a commitment but solitary acƟon does not demand a similar symmetrical commitment,
Bratman seems to derive his conceptual concerns with collecƟve intenƟons from those individual
intenƟons rather than treat the collecƟve enƟty as a primiƟve social fact in its own right. Thus, we
have the puzzling situaƟon of both Searle and Bratman dealing with individual intenƟons that have
to be explained in terms of collecƟve intenƟons and collecƟve intenƟons that have to be explained
in terms of the individual, rather than two discrete primiƟves to be explained in their own terms,
assuming it is possible to do this without referring to individual intenƟons.
Bratman's analysis of intenƟon and joint acƟon is very sophisƟcated and abstract. It appeals to the
intuiƟon we have that somehow it all comes down to individuals in cases where joint acƟon is
undertaken and especially if we must Įnd the primiƟve intenƟonal agent in situaƟons where shared
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intenƟons are necessarily involved in the pursuit of goals. And there is that aspect involving raƟonal
deliberaƟon and conscious planning by the parƟcipants to accomplish a shared aim that makes
sense to us. By comparison, Searle's conceptualizaƟon has intuiƟve appeal as well. Yet in contrast
to Bratman's example of painƟng a house, where the task could, if necessary, be accomplished by
one person, Searle's example of performing a ballet in the park suggests that there are situaƟons in
which it is the collecƟve that is the primiƟve agent. Reducing the situaƟon to individuals makes
liƩle sense when it is necessary to not only coordinate but cooperate in a psychological mode in
which the acƟon is not only intended but explicitly makes reference to other parƟcipants in the
collecƟve behavior.
Bratman and State-of-Mind
Michael Bratman’s “The Simple View” (of intenƟon) says we do (acƟon of an intenƟonal kind)
intenƟonally only what we intend to do (Bratman 2005). In the simple view there is a unity of
intenƟon (a mental state) and intenƟonal acƟon (what we do). There is in this unity a root idea of a
relaƟon, something they have in common, but it is not enƟrely clear what that relaƟon is. There are
two approaches to a clariĮcaƟon—one is belief-desire—that intenƟon reduces to the beliefs and
desires of the acƟons of the agent. The second is the simple model oīered by Bratman. While the
Bratman’s view is subject to much contenƟon and debate the point here is not to engage that
controversy, but simply set out the model that Bratman describes.
This “simple view” model makes the relaƟonship between intenƟon as a mind-state and intenƟonal
acƟon one of belief-desire, of doing as consƟtuƟve of the belief-desire of having an intenƟon.
Bratman describes these two common ways to approach the problem of the relaƟonship between
acƟons and mental states. The Įrst is the belief-desire model and it sees intenƟonal acƟon in a
relaƟon to the belief-desire of the agent, but it reduces the intent to act to the belief-desire of that
agent. Bratman disagrees with this model. The second model is what Bratman calls the simple
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model of intenƟon. Bratman claims this model appears to solve the problem of the relaƟonship: for
an agent to intenƟonally do A (some act) the agent must have the intenƟon to do A. The agent’s
mental state at that Ɵme must be such that A is among those things the agent intends (Bratman
1984). Those who challenge the simple view (the second model) argue that there are cases where it
is raƟonal for an agent to act intenƟonally to cause an outcome, but irraƟonal to intend that
outcome. We recognize that it cannot be raƟonal to knowingly have inconsistent intenƟons. If we
pursue mulƟple outcomes that are inconsistent, then we cannot have intended both outcomes if
we know that achievement of both is impossible. This leads to rejecƟng the simple view and we
take a stance that we can do something intenƟonally without intending to do that thing speciĮcally.
The limitaƟons of the simple view are that it does not allow for complexity. In cases of intended
acƟon producing unintended side eīects (even if foreseeable) we do not intend all the
consequences we expect to incur by pursuing the outcome of our acƟons. Another challenge to the
simple view is that there are cases where the expected side eīect is brought about
intenƟonally—we characterize these as intenƟonal when the agent explicitly considers the side
eīect in deliberaƟng the acƟon and where the side eīect is negaƟve. All of this has to do with
individual agents. ComplicaƟons arise when agents are collecƟviƟes.
Summary of IntenƟon and State of Mind
In his review of Georg Meggle's book, Social Facts and CollecƟve IntenƟonality, Ingvar Johansson
said of that anthology: “To give an overall evaluaƟon of this mosaic of an anthology would be like
trying to add colors, shapes, and electrical charges together and then try to Įnd a mean.”
(Johansson 2003). Something similar can be said of an eīort to precisely locate the argument
between Searle and Bratman. It is not yet clear if the argument between them is merely a contest
between asserƟons of reducibility of intenƟons to psychological states in Įrst-person minds
(Bratman) against asserƟons of the irreducibility of we-intenƟons of we-groups (Searle). Searle's
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argument can be construed in a confusing variety of ways. Quite apart from being a statement of
social holism, Searle seems to rely on methodological individualism, but not of the classical sort.
This has consequences for the quality and clarity of his argument. Further, he rests, or seems to, on
the noƟon that collecƟve intenƟonality is in someone's head, and in another's head, but the heads
contain nothing more than that and do not necessarily contain mutual beliefs about intenƟon. Yet
from this he derives a collecƟve intenƟonality among the parƟcipants toward collecƟve acƟon. And
it is not yet clear that Bratman is arguing directly against Searle in the sense that he confronts
Searle's argument directly. This may be because Bratman simply holds that there is no primiƟve
construed as a collecƟvity. While Searle is at pains to explain and defend the reality of two
primiƟves—one of intenƟonal individuals and one of collecƟviƟes, Bratman simply holds that the
intenƟons that relate to all collecƟviƟes must reduce to individuals. Thus, that certain collecƟviƟes
are “minded” in such a way as to be disƟnctly autonomous enƟƟes, and that they thereby
consƟtute persons in the sense that they can be held as moral agents is unsupported in Bratman's
view. Precisely what it is that Bratman argues against Searle is not yet clear in the sense that the
ambiguity in Searle's argument possibly makes Bratman's posiƟon a persistent defense of I-mode
intenƟonality rather than an acƟve deconstrucƟon of Searle's posiƟon. Bratman's posiƟon is more
than a simple rejecƟon of Searle's posiƟon as unpersuasive, but the confused state of Searle's
analysis of social facts and the we-mode collecƟve intenƟonality he asserts wants clariĮcaƟon in
congruence with a further assessment of the veracity of Bratman's adherence to I-mode
intenƟonality.
This segment of this chapter falls short of the aim of precisely locaƟng the argument between
Searle and Bratman, but it furnishes the realizaƟon that there exists a great deal of confusion and
ambiguity with respect to all the formulaƟons of collecƟve intenƟon. The status and consequences
of the debate about collecƟve intenƟon, joint social acƟon and moral responsibility are quite
107
unclear as is the nature and the role of collecƟve intenƟon in joint acƟon. Can we say anything
morally deĮniƟve about Auschwitz and Dresden in terms of collecƟve intenƟon that is more fully
informed by the debate between Searle and Bratman? I think that more fully informed statement is
not yet possible. But it is clear that something like collecƟve intenƟons act to organize and
coordinate collecƟve acƟon and in addiƟon for Searle, collecƟve intenƟon creates social and
insƟtuƟonal facts. Further analysis of these can conƟnue to raise the most important moral
quesƟons. All of this does not go far enough in explaining why we are able, or not, to assign
culpability or moral responsibility to collecƟve enƟƟes when they do wrong.
Both Searle’s and Bratman’s arguments ulƟmately rest on individual intenƟon. Examining the
foundaƟons of Course-of-AcƟon theories of intenƟon are where I will turn next to explore the
possibility of Įnding a grounding for collecƟve intenƟon that does not rely at its root on individual
intenƟon.
Course-of-AcƟon
Course-of-AcƟon does not appear to Įt with a Nexus-of Contracts legal theory of the corporaƟon as
it is described in Chapter 3. Under a Nexus-of Contracts theory a corporaƟon reduces to individual
agents as the only responsible primiƟves for moral responsibility, but sƟll gives rights to
corporaƟons on personhood grounds. There are speciĮc problems with the relaƟonship between
Nexus-of Contracts and Course-of-AcƟon. Nexus-of Contracts theory does not reŇect the reality of
corporaƟons as collecƟvely intenƟonal systems and collecƟons of integrated systems that have real
eīects and have moral standing in a moral community as I will show in Chapter 5. Non-agenƟal
intenƟonal systems are how corporaƟons as complex organizaƟons get things done, but they can
also be held accountable on the basis of their other characterisƟcs. Following a Course-of-AcƟon
perspecƟve an agent—in the convenƟonal sense—is not necessary for an ascripƟon of corporate
moral responsibility on the grounds that a corporate non-agenƟal intenƟonal system can pursue a
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Course-of-AcƟon and answer for what it does.
In contrast to the individual, cogniƟve state-of-mind posiƟon described above, an alternaƟve stance
on intenƟon argues that there is something missing if intenƟon is viewed only as an agent’s
possession of an aƫtude that oīers a deliberate goal-oriented plan. This alternaƟve view says that
intenƟon is not a mental state or a combinaƟon of beliefs and desires. To intend, it is claimed, is for
an agent to adopt a course of acƟon to do something. It is incidental that the agent has a purpose
in doing so, that is, has speciĮed a purpose for the intenƟon with which something is done. What is
important in this is that nothing has to be added to the “intenƟon to do something” to make it an
intenƟon, no state-of-mind, no commitments, no disposiƟon. AdopƟng a course of acƟon on this
view is independent of those things about the intenƟon, or the kind of thing intenƟon is; it is
intenƟon itself that is described by adopƟng a course of acƟon (Scheer 2004).
A conceptual confusion results when state-of-mind theory is used to explain corporate collecƟve
intenƟon, and this confusion is evident in both everyday pracƟce and philosophical theory. We see
this in pracƟce by the way people ordinarily talk about corporaƟons, the explanaƟons people give
for what corporaƟons do and the reasons they aƩribute to those acƟons. And when a corporaƟon
is implicated in an acƟon for which it is alleged to be legally, socially or morally responsible people
oŌen say that the corporaƟon itself deliberately and mindfully intended the acƟon. It is said that
the corporaƟon—and they speak of it as a unitary enƟty—did so knowingly or that it audaciously
Ňouted the law or the norms that it collecƟvely knew, or ought to have known, that constrain or
prohibit such acƟvity. We say things like “GiantVampireSquid Inc. acted wrongfully, they did so with
deliberate intenƟon and they beneĮƩed from their acƟon while we suīered damage and losses.
GiantVampireSquid Inc. ought to be held accountable for what it did”. In the everyday language
commonly used in such situaƟons, allegaƟons appear to be levelled at the corporate enƟƟes
themselves, rather than the individual human beings within the corporaƟon who commiƩed the
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wrongful acƟon (assuming it is possible that those individuals can be idenƟĮed). In this informal
usage the intenƟons of the corporaƟon behind the acƟons are aƩributed to the state of mind of the
corporaƟon itself, just as they would be to a natural human agent. This seems to us at one level to
be a valid descripƟon of the relaƟonship between the enƟty, the intenƟon, the acƟon, the results
and the allegaƟon of responsibility. But on another level and under closer examinaƟon, a complex
and confounding confusion is revealed in such treatment of corporate agents. While it is said that
the corporaƟon has intenƟons, beliefs and desires as well as having knowledge and making
decisions the noƟon that a corporaƟon has a mind in the way that a natural human being does
would probably not be robustly defended by most people. If quesƟoned, most people would say
that, no, a corporaƟon does not have a mind of its own, we just speak of it that way as a
convenience. That is to say, corporaƟons don’t have “wetware”, a term used to describe the brain,
mind and central nervous system of a living human being. Speaking that way is an eĸcient
shorthand that represents the minds and acƟons of those individual human beings within the
corporaƟon who are actually endowed with minds and who are capable of intending. Yet, and
equally undeniably, corporaƟons as collecƟvely intenƟonal groups are real and do have real
consequences in the real world adding to the potenƟal for confusion.
The confusion about mindedness is said to lie in our speaking of corporaƟons one way, that they
have states of mind, that they intend to do things, and they act on those intenƟons. But, at the
same Ɵme, we know in another way that a corporaƟon, an inanimate legal ĮcƟon, does not have a
mind capable of a mental state. It cannot form intenƟons, want things, hold beliefs, or make unitary
decisions of its own as if it were analogous to an agenƟal human being. Can we make sense of this
confused state of aīairs?
There is another way of looking at this. Suppose that people use the convenience of ordinary
speech to describe the damages that issue from corporate acƟon and so they speak as if the
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oīending agent were the corporaƟon simpliciter. But, at the same Ɵme, those people think that in
the end the acƟon ascribed to the corporaƟon actually reduces to individuals within the
corporaƟon. Thus, there is the possibility of an interpretaƟon that is not so confused, but merely a
reŇecƟon of how, on the one hand, people ordinarily and conveniently talk about the world of
collecƟve agents and aƩribute intenƟon to them. And, on the other hand, those same people seek
to ascribe actual culpability to discrete, idenƟĮable individuals within the corporaƟon as the guilty
parƟes for wrongful acƟons. That would leave us with the convenience of speaking descripƟvely of
the corporaƟon—as a whole—as a culpable agent, while we empirically aƩribute the actual
wrongdoing to idenƟĮable individual human beings. This approach suggests that there can be very
liƩle diīerence between the corporaƟon and the guilty individuals in the ordinary speech of the
aggrieved individuals who suīer from intenƟonal corporate wrongdoing. This is because they can
readily disƟnguish between the semanƟc convenience of naming the corporaƟon that collecƟvely
and intenƟonally acts as if it had a mind of its own on the one hand, and on the other blaming the
actual individual human beings, who plan and perpetrate the acƟon whether or not they can be
idenƟĮed and charged with responsibility.
This describes the corporaƟon (the whole enƟty) as an expediƟous stand-in (a form of synecdoche)
for the guilty parƟes (individual human beings). For example, we might hear someone say: “It was
Volkswagen that is to blame for the nitrogen oxide emissions test cheaƟng scandal and VW should
take collecƟve responsibility”. Here again there is the quesƟon of whether corporaƟons and
individuals must have the same kind of mental state to formulate and execute an acƟon. This
demands a peculiar symmetry between the organizaƟon and its individuals for us to say that when
the organizaƟon acted it did so with a state of mind.
When individuals know, but corporaƟons don’t: these are cases where individual agents have
knowledge of intenƟonally bad pracƟces but the corporaƟon as a whole (or its relvant funcƟonal
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subunits) does not know, support or endorse the acƟon. It seems in some recent cases of Įnancial
sector fraud that individual agents may have had a state of mind producƟve of decisions and acƟons
leading to fraudulent corporate acƟon, for example in cases of mis-selling of Įnancial products or
the manipulaƟon of interest rates by other banks. But the corporaƟon itself did not have that same
state of mind, say, because the scheme may have been secret or, closely held within a subunit of
the organizaƟon. Or the fraud may have been so technically complex or intricate that it could not
have been suĸciently understood elsewhere within the organizaƟon or by its oĸcers, as in some
cases of algorithmic trading in securiƟes markets. While it might be possible to say that the
corporaƟon “knew”, despite that knowledge it did not actually have control, because control is
something associated with a state-of-mind condiƟon for the agent. The CEO (an individual human
being) may be an expediƟous stand-in (a form of metonymy) for the corporaƟon (the whole enƟty).
For example, someone might say: “MarƟn Winterkorn, the former CEO of Volkswagen, as the top
oĸcer, is responsible for the nitrogen oxide emissions cheaƟng scandal. He should have known,
and if he did not, then he is equally culpable as if he did”.
When corporaƟons know, but individuals don’t: these are cases where the pracƟces are part of the
operaƟons, culture and ethos of the corporaƟon. For example, consider a case of Įnancial fraud
where the corporaƟon may contrive to commit wrongful acƟons and does so without the
knowledge of many or most of the individuals within the organizaƟon. In the example of Wells
Fargo Bank that opened this chapter, there was fraudulent cross-selling of Įnancial products and
services as pracƟced within a sub-unit of the bank, while the upper management apparently knew
about and enforced the incenƟve structure that compelled employees in the unit to conform to
corporate cultural pracƟces. These were pracƟces that upper management must have known
would defraud retail customers.
People use language that indicates they seem to think about and treat the acƟon of corporaƟons in
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ways very similar to how they treat individual human beings. But this process does not necessarily
lead them to believe that corporaƟons have minds, because people can and do appropriately
disƟnguish between these diīerent kinds of agents without confusion. What they think about
corporaƟons as a maƩer of convenience or eĸciency is diīerent from what they understand
corporaƟons to be ontologically and the kinds of things corporaƟons can believe, desire or intend
and bear responsibility for. In the same fashion, people think about human beings and their
capabiliƟes to put them into an appropriate ontological category and ascribe responsibiliƟes to
them for what they intend, believe, decide and do. AscripƟon of moral, social and economic
responsibiliƟes does not necessarily depend on a determinaƟon of a corporate state of mind when
there is an issue of harm and our reacƟon to it; it is in our nature to feel anger and resentment and
to demand remedy. In contrast, it may be necessary to prove a guilty state-of-mind (mens rea) in
legal cases.
Ontologies do not maƩer here; what maƩers is what is intenƟonally done, not the nature of the
thing doing it, and not our conceptualizaƟon of the intenƟonal state of that thing. There is a
growing need for an appropriate response to intenƟonally harmful corporate acƟons because the
consequences of acƟons by Įnancial sector MNCs are increasingly widespread and damaging. But
to aƩempt to respond by conceptualizing the corporaƟon as if it were idenƟcal (or nearly so) to an
individual, mindful human being cannot meet criteria of conceptual coherence. Both corporaƟons
and human beings are complex enƟƟes, but they are so in diīerent ways. To treat them as if they
were idenƟcal, or suĸciently similar and thus are both capable of state-of-mind, cannot resolve the
issue of moral responsibility. The essence of the issue here is that as human beings we respond to
corporaƟons as we do to other individual human beings—as if they were persons with minds that
have states. The emphasis is on the inappropriateness of the response from those aggrieved by
corporaƟons treaƟng corporaƟons as if they were individuals with states-of-mind.
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IntenƟons tell us about reasons that lie behind acƟons taken, whether they are founded on belief or
desire, or goals or another kind of mental state. These inquiries about reasons are diīerent from
merely asserƟng that a corporaƟon is responsible, or simply blaming it for its irresponsibility or
negligence. But reasons and responsibiliƟes are connected through the idenƟĮable relaƟonship of
what corporaƟons chose to do that is based on their planning and execuƟon as intenƟonal
collecƟve conduct of an intenƟonal system.
IntenƟon is conceptually diĸcult when it is applied directly from autonomous individuals to
corporaƟons. It is complex and analysis of collecƟve intenƟon has relied too heavily on Įnding
analogies with individual natural persons, resulƟng in endless debate, but analogies cannot resolve
pressing issues of harmful corporate acƟon. There are other pracƟcal policies for resolving harmful
corporate social pracƟces. One way is by simply blaming and punishing errant corporaƟons through
a crude uƟlitarianism in which the greatest good is to diminish harmful acƟons to the greatest
extent possible. This would aīord the greatest good to be realized, but in a negaƟve way, the
maximal reducƟon of harm. This kind of uƟlitarianism encounters problems, however, when there
is unjusƟĮable collateral damage to employees, families, communiƟes and those who are
negaƟvely aīected but not culpable for the wrongful corporate acƟon. Although the uƟlitarian
approach may be producƟve and eīecƟve in punishing, it comes at great cost and does not
necessarily yield a deterrent eīect on future acƟon by other corporate agents. It may instead
simply make them more devious (Wilmot 2001).
There is a middle way that focuses away from the ontology of the corporaƟon. This middle way is
not concerned with the mental state of collecƟve agents. It is a methodology of what they
intenƟonally do, the results and the meaning of those acƟons for human communiƟes and the
public good. This keeps us away from anthropomorphizing the corporate agent and treats it as
another, arƟĮcial kind of agent, but not one that has the complete agency of a human being.
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Consequent to the granƟng of rights and personhood to corporaƟons they gain a type of autonomy
independent of their individual members that endows them with a legiƟmate purpose. It is this
contrivance of corporate purpose that diīerenƟates them from human beings (they are not ends in
themselves as are natural persons) but sƟll leaves them subject to ascripƟons of a morality of
phenomena—the outcomes themselves. Even if their acƟons are in accord with their designated
purpose the results may inculpate them as intenƟonal systems for being deliberately irresponsible.
What is to be disƟnguished here is that the exposure to moral responsibility arises not only from
the acƟon in which they engage as intenƟonal systems, but the consequence for those aīected.
The morality of results is relevant to corporate acƟon and its consequences just as is the morality of
intenƟon and acƟon.
What ulƟmately maƩers both normaƟvely and concretely in the approach I am calling a middle way
is future results, i.e., that no future wrong or harm is caused. Rather than seeking simple
retribuƟon through punishment, this can be considered to have the greater uƟlity, because it has
the potenƟal to prevent harmful acƟon while looking forward to relieving unknown numbers of
vicƟmizaƟon, rather than a backward-looking punishment on behalf of those who may be
idenƟĮably harmed by previous acƟons. This does carry a risk of injusƟce for the corporaƟon. The
price of prevenƟon may be to strip the corporaƟon of its capacity to exercise autonomy with
respect to its designated purpose. As a preventaƟve this could be done on behalf of communiƟes or
globally even if that means suspending or vacaƟng a corporaƟon’s license or legal charter. Note that
this does not absolve the individuals involved in wrongdoing in their corporate roles. If the
corporaƟon is held responsible there is no shiŌing away of answerability such that culpable
individuals can escape liability. The middle way suggests that there is an answer to the quesƟon of
whether it is beƩer to protect an uncertain number of individuals or the community against future
harms though prevenƟon rather than the uƟlitarian aim for the greatest decrease of harm as the
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greatest good that can be done.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed approaches to individual and collecƟve intenƟon, and demonstrate
the inadequacy of theories of collecƟve intenƟon that remain grounded in a state of mind
conceptualizaƟon. In Chapter 5-Responsibility I turn to alternaƟve theories that are based on
course-of-acƟon because these approaches do not rely on the state of mind of natural persons as
agents. I think there are possibiliƟes for assigning corporate moral responsibility to non-agenƟal
intenƟonal systems even if they are not agents and not enƟƟes, but because they are corporate
systems by which corporaƟons seek to achieve their aims.
In Chapter 5 I will examine the issue of corporate responsibility for what corporaƟons intenƟonally
do rather than what they are. I will show that there is a reacƟon among those who, to whatever
degree they are aīected, feel that things are out of balance, and there is a sense of unfairness and
injusƟce in giving personhood status to powerful superorganisms such as mulƟnaƟonal and
transnaƟonal corporaƟons. What happened in the speciĮc instance of the GFC brings the confused
legal concept of corporate personhood under much closer scruƟny. Having used their legal
personhood rights to gain great power to control and manipulate the global Įnancial system,
corporaƟons were able to avoid the burden of being held morally responsible for the harms done
and to very largely also avoid and evade legal, social and economic responsibiliƟes. Clearly, and on
a world-wide scale, there has been an expression of moral indignaƟon and outrage at this
imbalance between corporate rights and responsibiliƟes. It will be a central topic of Chapter 5 to
examine how we might understand those reacƟons and issues.
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CHAPTER 5-RESPONSIBILITY
IntroducƟon
In this chapter, I begin by returning to the GFC case study. The main point of the case study is to
demonstrate intenƟon by corporaƟons, as this grounds the need to assign corporate moral
responsibility to them. I then turn to approaches to ascripƟons of moral responsibility. Approaches
that depend on the metaphysics of personhood of corporaƟons, and uƟlitarianism are found
wanƟng. A third approach, Strawson's expressivism, extended to non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems,
is a more pracƟcal soluƟon.
In Chapter 4 I have shown how intenƟonal collecƟve acƟon by Įnancial sector corporaƟons led to
the GFC and despite the clear evidence of fraud, misrepresentaƟon and decepƟon those who ought
to be held responsible have very largely escaped any signiĮcant sancƟon or penalty. It might be
fairly asked if the poliƟcal upheaval of the following decade would have occurred had the GFC not
happened and the global eīects been so pervasive and wide-spread. It is doubƞul that the
populism and discontent that we witness now would be pronounced to the degree they are if there
had not been the traumaƟzing decline in the standard of living for so many. The elecƟon of Donald
Trump as President of the US and the referendum vote for Brexit in the UK are two events that are
claimed to be a direct result of the mishandling of the GFC and the conƟnuing bonuses and
extravagant compensaƟon in the Įnancial sector that is perceived to have caused the problem
(Treanor 2017). These realiƟes have raised many quesƟons in popular media about the social uƟlity
of investment banking (Cassidy 2010).
The quesƟon of Įnancial sector corporate moral responsibility is based on an assumpƟon. The
quesƟon assumes that the interests of individuals and the public interest are both shared and
pursued in common through social cooperaƟon, but also that those interests can be vicƟmised by
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the acƟons of social organizaƟons just as they can be by individuals. This is also true of fraud,
decepƟon, excessive risk behaviour and other dangerous pracƟces in the Įnancial sector. Moral
conduct of systemically important social organisaƟons is a shared expectaƟon among individuals in
social systems to reduce economic uncertainty, Įnancial instability and to promote social and
personal well-being. People perceive what corporaƟons ought to do and not do as a maƩer of
norms and shared expectaƟons for the good of all, and they compare this to what corporaƟons
actually do and the eīects upon the commons. To this people aƩach moral blame if the outcomes
are negaƟve and if those vulnerable to corporate acƟon are intenƟonally vicƟmised. Our
relaƟonships to social insƟtuƟons are mediated by individual and collecƟve reŇecƟon (through
poliƟcal and social discourse) and we make normaƟve assessments through that reŇecƟon about
those insƟtuƟons. Financial sector corporaƟons and individuals have experienced extraordinary
gains in periods of economic booms, but also have been found culpable in fomenƟng Įnancial
crises. Yet they seem to enjoy immunity from the harms they do and, even then, conƟnue to realise
great gains. This mocks the morals and normaƟve expectaƟons of everyone and the communiƟes
that are vicƟmized. Naturally, there is anger that eventually gives rise to strong reacƟve aƫtudes,
acƟve resistance, frustraƟon on a collecƟve scale, mass movements, and demands for jusƟce, if not
for revenge.
Since the 1980s Įnancial insƟtuƟons have increasingly and systemically come to dominate global
Įnance, economics, trade and sovereign poliƟcal power. This dominance is transforming society at
both the macroeconomic and the microeconomic level by altering not only the role of the state, but
the structure of Įnancial markets, how they funcƟon and determines the behavior of public
corporaƟons as well as public and private economic policy at the legal, social and poliƟcal levels.
FinancializaƟon describes the process in which all value is reduced to that of exchange, parƟcularly
through Įnancial corporaƟons, their instruments and markets. Those instruments can be tangible
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or intangible, for example, futures trading in commodiƟes or bonds, or current contracts as
promises to pay between parƟes. Hence, the logic of ĮnancializaƟon is to reduce to a tradable
instrument and make marketable any artefact of producƟon or service, including currencies, as, for
example, in foreign exchange in the form of money markets. All of this is alleged by its proponents
to be aimed at making markets for trading Įnancial instruments more eĸcient and more proĮtable
through removal of barriers to capital Ňows (capital account liberalizaƟon) on a global basis.
CorporaƟons are like markets in that both of them are useful economic, Įnancial and social
phenomena. Among their many useful aspects corporaƟons are social mechanisms for achieving
eĸciencies in the acquisiƟon, distribuƟon and use of resources, organizaƟon of skills and planning
and other aims. And as with markets there are quesƟons about the meaning of corporaƟons and
their impact on our lives. This exposes the existenƟal side of corporaƟons in respect to the basic
structure of society – not just economic structure and insƟtuƟons. It raises quesƟons that cannot
be answered by economics alone, for example, the nature of economic agency, the impact of
corporaƟons on social relaƟons, or the meaning of corporaƟons for understanding freedom.
QuesƟons of moral judgement enter when we pose descripƟve and normaƟve quesƟons of what
markets and corporaƟons should look like, what they ought and ought not to do and how we should
relate to them and they to us individually and collecƟvely. It is clear that market principles (of
exchange) should not be allowed everywhere, for instance in the ownership and trading of human
beings or body parts as a form of property or in corporate takings of life’s essenƟals such as access
to potable water. In asking what the limits are of markets and what is acceptably salable, we try to
Įnd where markets’ normaƟve limits lie. We need a philosophical treatment of markets and
corporaƟons to address their meaning in our lives. In doing this we get beƩer theories and beƩer
self-understanding, but we also can avoid signiĮcant negaƟves including repeated global Įnancial
crises with their impact on poliƟcal processes and on individuals and their communiƟes. The
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quesƟon of how we can reasonably live with global markets and with mulƟnaƟonal corporaƟons
has parƟcular urgency given their growing power, inŇuence and consequences.
Because they are social phenomena there are other important aspects of the economic world and
markets that are not only economic but social and poliƟcal. For example, in the GFC both housing
markets and Įnancial corporaƟons went badly wrong. While it is essenƟal to have the rule of law to
control the operaƟons of markets, the limitaƟons of legal systems (as I have tried to make clear in
Chapter 3) make it imperaƟve that there be other ways of managing and insuring that markets and
corporaƟons remain trustworthy and funcƟon to serve the common good. To answer quesƟons of
equality, jusƟce and freedom requires not just economic theory, but also poliƟcal, social and moral
theory as well.
We need a robust blend of theory and pracƟce, including moral theory, in addressing markets and
corporaƟons because in an imperfect world markets and corporaƟons are not perfectly
compeƟƟve. It will not yield answers to the quesƟons posed by dysfuncƟonal market insƟtuƟons if
society, its legal constraints and regulaƟons are charged as the source of imperfect compeƟƟon and
cause a confounding of free markets, but never the markets themselves as sources of problems.
It would not be possible to provide a comprehensive account of ĮnancializaƟon in this chapter
without giving the whole thesis over to the concept. It is possible though to indicate that
internaƟonal Įnance has come to have very signiĮcant socio-economic power and with that it has
gained the capacity to inŇuence if not dictate legislaƟon and poliƟcal power in favor of Įnancial
insƟtuƟons to the detriment of economic stability and the vicƟmizaƟon of sovereignƟes and their
subjects. In the end, in aƩempƟng to resolve the crisis, it is the subjects of sovereignƟes, the
taxpayers and those who suīer the consequences of austerity programs that have been made to
carry the burden of bailing-out failing Įnancial sector insƟtuƟons and the global Įnancial system as
a whole.
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Pathologies of FinancializaƟon
FinancializaƟon means seeing the world wholly through the lens of Įnancial abstracƟons because it
enables an interpretaƟon of all social and economic relaƟonships as forms of Įnancial exchange.
FinancializaƟon is a totalizing market culture in the sense that markets enclose tradiƟonal social and
economic connecƟons that people have within their communiƟes. These have been known for
centuries as the commons, although they are now typically thought of as land and other tangible
property held or used in common. These connecƟons have been expressed in various forms but
have the character of systems of socially cooperaƟve insƟtuƟons that provide for shared purposes.
These commons have persisted over long historical periods despite challenges from systems of
power such as feudalism or capitalism that would disrupt or deform them to other purposes. These
commons are methods for human beings to cooperate. They are ancient tradiƟons that serve to
protect the shared interests of the many and for individuals and groups in the future. What are the
social funcƟons of the commons? Subsistence through tradiƟons of agriculture and forms of work,
labor pracƟces, access to resources, a form of social power, social idenƟty, equality of customs and
habits of ancient tradiƟons of access to land, water, and other means of reproducƟon of daily life.
The commons is socially cohesive and sustaining triad of natural resources, the common people and
tradiƟonal social pracƟces. Under emergent capitalism this stabilizing system was subject to a
process of commodiƟzaƟon to meet the needs of the nascent industrial order.
There are very diīerent prioriƟes for each type of system – the commons serves diīerent needs and
provides diīerent resources for a broader scope of human interests than the narrower interests
and aims of power systems. Of course, there is creaƟve tension between the commons and power
systems and although these are interdependent, capitalism, especially in the form of neoliberalism,
seeks to dominate and exploit the commons for its own interests to the exclusion of other human
interests. There are complex relaƟonships involved with individualism (of power systems) and
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collecƟvism of the commons. They coexist but neoliberalism seeks to make them mutually
exclusive. These are the pathologies of market enclosures as a form of ĮnancializaƟon characterized
by the private commodiƟzaƟon of resources that are shared in common as public goods.
Neoliberalism is an aberraƟon in human history compared to the long tradiƟons of the commons.
The noƟons of neo-classical economics that assume individual raƟonal self-interest and materialism
with unlimited appeƟtes for possessions and goods are not universal aƩributes of human beings.
These neo-classical noƟons are not the raƟonality of historical human experience and human
nature. CooperaƟon and altruism are advantageous for groups by preserving associaƟon and
mutual aid necessary for the survival and Ňourishing of social groups. These may disadvantage
individuals but favor the fortunes of collecƟves. We observe that rather than being driven by fear
and power relaƟons, people seem to be naturally empathic and mutually supporƟve especially in
episodes of crisis and emergencies. The evidence for this is found in collecƟve responses to natural
disasters and other forms of adversity where strong norms are brought to bear against those who
exploit such situaƟons for their own advantage.
FinancializaƟon as a totalizing, enclosing market culture is short-term and ulƟmately self-defeaƟng
as it seeks ever shorter cycles of gain and exploitaƟon. The commons, in contrast, represents a
long-term view of human existence and the beneĮts of thinking beyond immediate needs and
goals. Historically, we Įnd in legal tradiƟons such as Roman law in regard to property rights and the
Magna Carta with respect to the rights of subjects were responses to arbitrary exercises of
individual power and conƟnue to serve as precedents for contemporary legal systems and human
rights regimes. This protects customary rights against the prerogaƟves of the powerful and provides
legal limitaƟons on presumpƟons of absolute power, depredaƟons upon the commons and protects
the subsistence of the vulnerable against state-sponsored privaƟzaƟon. In our contemporary social
order of neoliberalism market enclosure means a transiƟon away from custom and tradiƟon
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strengthened by individual and social memory to codiĮed legal systems of wriƩen records.
There is among Įnancial elites a temptaƟon to withdraw from direct parƟcipaƟon the social and
poliƟcal world into a kind of gated community of Įnancial insƟtuƟons, private insƟtuƟons and
protecƟve bubbles that insulate Įnancial sector agents from the cacophony of compeƟng interests
in the social world. This can be described as the paradigmaƟc unity of neoliberalism and the
ĮnancializaƟon of relaƟonships. This withdrawal into Įnancial abstracƟons and pursuit of a single
interest – to make as much money as possible without regard for collateral damage in the wider
society – creates a pernicious kind of detachment from the realiƟes of social existence and leads to
treaƟng all social insƟtuƟons and experiences as means to the end of proĮtability, to the exclusion
of all other ends. This raises important quesƟons about ĮnancializaƟon and sustainability, especially
in respect to the commons.
There are foreseeable problems and limitaƟons of ĮnancializaƟon; ĮnancializaƟon and
sustainability are incompaƟble because there is in a single focus on ever-shorter cycles of Įnancial
performance, a resulƟng neglect if not total loss of emphasis on investment for innovaƟon, on
improved manufacturing, and future product development. Long-term proĮtability and capacity are
necessarily sacriĮced for short-term Įnancial gain. This engenders a race to the boƩom of shorter
and shorter Įnancial cycles that progressively focus on the demand for gains that are possible now
rather than a view for the future, its potenƟal and its possibiliƟes. The process of change from
feudalism has been transformed from a negaƟve percepƟon of temporal change represenƟng
processes of decline and decay into a posiƟve sense of progress and growth under industrial
capitalism. The organic cycle of seasons has been transformed to the raƟonalized discipline of the
clock. But there are other consequences of pathological ĮnancializaƟon that aīect communiƟes,
the public good, and the commons.
RegulaƟon has been a compensatory but inadequate answer to the task of addressing the problems
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and predatory pracƟces of corporaƟons that displace the costs of producƟon and consumpƟon
onto the environment and communiƟes. As with the GFC when the risks went bad, the public
shouldered the burden of rescue while the formal legal system could not or was not allowed to
place those burdens on the perpetrators. Thus, the commons was twice vicƟmized, once by
corporate Įnancial acƟon and again to recover the stability of the economic order.
Partly this is due to the vulnerability of the regulatory mechanisms to corrupƟon and corporate
capture. The state as a Įduciary agent cannot ignore these problems but is diverted in the process
by industry concerns about slowing economic growth and violaƟng the principles of free markets.
RegulaƟon of the formal legal kind cannot keep up with the emerging problems and risks and this is
especially the case in the Įnancial sector. There is a persistent cycle of moral and economic crisis in
the absence of a vital and strongly enforced sense of the public good and the integrity of the
commons.
Metaphysics, UƟlitarianism and Strawson’s Expressivism
In cases like the GFC, serious, long-term harms issue from intenƟonal corporate acƟon with
substanƟal costs, both monetary and non-monetary. Those costs are all too oŌen largely borne by
those who are innocent of either parƟcipaƟon or complicity in the acƟon. In these cases, what can
be done as prevenƟon or as remedy becomes a crucial moral quesƟon. I propose that in addiƟon to
legal and other avenues there are three possible approaches to holding corporaƟons morally
responsible. One would be to resolve the quesƟon of the metaphysics of corporate personhood.
The second would be to apply uƟlitarianism to corporate acƟon in the interest of accomplishing a
remedial sancƟoning and preventaƟve cleansing of the temptaƟon to intenƟonal but harmful
outcomes. The third approach is to acknowledge that it is in our nature to react with expressions of
resentment, anger and an urge to punish wrong-doers to protect the social fabric and community
cohesion from those who would sacriĮce it to their own selĮsh interests. I will refer to the third
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opƟon as P. F. Strawson’s expressivism. This view shiŌs the focus from the corporaƟon to those
aīected but helps to shed light on corporate acƟon and responsibility. In all three approaches
aƩaching moral responsibility to corporaƟons is an eīecƟve possibility and together have a
formidable pracƟcal potenƟal if we concede a corporaƟon to be a morally responsible kind of agent,
but one that does not conform to convenƟonal individual deĮniƟons of agent status. In this
concession, that moral responsibility does not rely exclusively on reducƟon to individual
parƟcipants, it is possible to broaden what corporaƟons are responsible for beyond those
intenƟons, acts and omissions ascribed to individual human beings, and these three arguments
demonstrate that corporaƟons are indeed burdened with responsibility.
Because there are limitaƟons with the Įrst two approaches, I argue that an extended version of
Strawson’s expressivism is the best way forward for corporate moral responsibility.62 AcƟons that
we take with respect to corporaƟons and corporate moral responsibility are several. Our sustained
reŇecƟon on the nature of corporaƟons is a form of acƟon, but it has not yielded a convincing
soluƟon to the problem of corporate moral responsibility because the problem of agency and
personhood seems to be intractable. Our focus on the consequences of corporate acƟon, their
doing of intenƟonal, careless or reckless harm as well as the consequences of our acƟons in holding
corporaƟons responsible are also forms of acƟon. But merely reŇecƟng and debaƟng on the one
hand, and uƟlitarianism for the simple good of punishment on the other hand in Strawson’s view
leaves out something essenƟal. It is part of our being human—we are naturally reacƟve creatures
and it is in our nature to react with resentment when we are intenƟonally harmed. We forfeit how
we respond to and interact with the world if we choose a blunt uƟlitarianism. To take a
simplisƟcally blunt approach toward corporate acƟon in circumstances fraught with anger and
62I do not wish to engage in an explanaƟon or analysis of Strawson’s expressivism. I employ the term expressivism
as applied to Strawson and how he uses ‘reacƟve pracƟces’ to describe responses to the behavior of others. ReacƟve
pracƟces as I think of them here are retribuƟve and associated with jusƟĮcaƟon for punishment. The reader is referred
to Metz for more on the nature of reacƟve pracƟces and Strawsonian expressivism (Metz 2008).
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resentment present signiĮcant deĮciencies that are idenƟĮed by Strawson. If we do try to assign
corporate moral responsibility we must have good reasons to do so and good outcomes (uƟlity) if
assignments of corporate moral responsibility are made. Good reasons with respect to the nature
of corporaƟons and the issue of enƟty-agency might be that corporaƟons are indeed agents and
have metaphysical characterisƟcs analogous to human beings. But, again, this is a seemingly
interminable debate and has done liƩle, if anything, with respect to posiƟve acƟons to protect
essenƟal public goods. Good outcomes with respect to uƟlitarianism would concentrate on
consequences and avoid the metaphysics. This changes the quesƟon about corporate moral
responsibility from one about the nature of the corporaƟon to the possibility of achieving beneĮcial
results by holding corporaƟons responsible for what they do. Strawson, however, objects to
uƟlitarianism because it leaves out essenƟal aspects of our humanity and our experience of the
world (Silver 2005, p. 291). Strawson’s concern in his arƟcle was with individuals, not groups,
collecƟves or corporaƟons. And while corporaƟons and people do not act in precisely the same
ways, corporaƟons do act and have real consequences in the real world. Those consequences,
when they reach the scale of the GFC, demand that normaƟve judgements be laid against
corporaƟons and that acƟon be taken to protect the social order and speciĮcally the essenƟal
public good of Įnancial stability.
The subject of this chapter is whether corporaƟons can be morally responsible for their acƟons. In
his arƟcle, Silver's quesƟon is not whether groups can be morally responsible, but what group
responsibility means for the members of the group. Silver assumes groups are morally responsible,
then asks: what does that mean for parƟcipants? I am posing a diīerent quesƟon: is there a way to
hold corporaƟons responsible that does not rely on their theoreƟcally indeterminate nature or on a
puniƟve but deĮcient uƟlitarianism? While corporaƟons can be argued as deĮcient (lacking free
will, bodies, mental states, intenƟonal states) to carry the kind of moral responsibility that human
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beings do as natural persons, Silver argues corporaƟons can bear a kind of moral responsibility.
That is, there is more than one kind of moral responsibility than that ascribed to natural
person-agents. The standard story is that corporaƟons are either just like human beings with
respect to moral responsibility (analogous to the metaphysics of natural persons) or they are not; if
they are not, then they have no moral standing and therefore cannot be morally responsible. It
seems that we have two choices: we are leŌ with either treaƟng corporaƟons as morally
responsible but as a diīerent, collecƟve, corporate kind of moral agent as disƟnct from individual
human beings. Or we can say that corporaƟons are not collecƟve moral agents and thus cannot be
held morally responsible, but they can be held collecƟvely accountable for their acƟons. The array
of reacƟons we have include folk corporate reacƟve aƫtudes – those most people have before
philosophically analyzing and criƟquing their aƫtudes about corporate acƟon. There are individual
reacƟve aƫtudes – those we direct toward individuals for their personal acƟons. And there are
collecƟve reacƟve aƫtudes – those we direct toward groups for their collecƟve acƟons. The
internal structure of corporaƟons (the culture analogous to individual character that inŇuences
corporate personnel) provides the condiƟons for raƟonal warrant (the appropriate human response
to acƟons, states of things; epistemic jusƟĮcaƟon, aimed at truth) of our reacƟve aƫtudes to
corporate acƟon and its consequences.
To come to grips with this problem I am adapƟng Strawson’s argument about individuals to
corporaƟons, but I will address corporaƟons as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems. We could abstain
from direcƟng our natural human reacƟve aƫtudes toward corporaƟons and hold it to be
inappropriate to do so based on their nature as non-enƟty ĮcƟons. We could instead use a crude
uƟlitarianism based on the good consequences that would follow if we were to simply blame them
for wrong-doing, but we would lose something essenƟal about our humanity and impoverish how
we interact with the world. But it is not possible to hold corporaƟons responsible as we do human
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beings given the indeterminacy of their person-agency. It may be possible to hold them morally
responsible another way—through their characterisƟcs as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems, which I
will describe below.
Strawson’s expressivist treatment of reacƟve aƫtudes engenders a powerful pracƟcal proposal for
how we might approach issues of corporate moral responsibility. Those reacƟve aƫtudes express
our humanity, our relaƟons with each other and our insƟtuƟons, and engage us with the world and
the forces and factors within it. In the case of corporate anormaƟve acƟon this is a confrontaƟon
between those aīected by corporate acƟon and that which causes those outcomes.
Non-agenƟal IntenƟonal Systems, Course-of-AcƟon and Corporate Moral Responsibility
An alternaƟve to ascripƟons of corporate moral responsibility as if corporaƟons were natural
persons or legal persons is possible through the use of the concept of non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems. ReŇecƟng on the nature of corporaƟons is not the main issue in this chapter as the
metaphysical quesƟon about the nature of corporaƟons appears to be interminable. This
metaphysical enigma is aggravated by indeterminacy in jurisprudence and legal theory about
corporaƟons. Indeterminacy in Nexus-of-Contracts legal theory speciĮcally allows corporaƟons to
escape moral responsibility as I have explained in Chapter 3. In this chapter reŇecƟng on whether
to act by ascribing moral responsibility is the focal issue and a pracƟcal possibility for corporate
acƟon. My aim is not to Įnd the single best theory or approach to corporate personhood or
corporate moral responsibility, but to understand and show how corporaƟons might be vulnerable
to assignments of moral responsibility at all. The concept of non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems oīers
a way to hold corporaƟons responsible without recourse to metaphysics or a crude uƟlitarianism. A
non-agenƟal intenƟonal system is a social construcƟon, but it embraces Strawson’s ideas about how
it is natural for human beings to react to intenƟonal harms as they do.
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In this part of the chapter I am arguing for an alternaƟve to the standard view of personhood,
agency and corporate moral responsibility. The standard view claims we must Įnd that either
corporaƟons are in some metaphysical sense suĸciently analogous to people so that they can be
treated as ontological primiƟves, or that any assignment must reduce to moral responsibility of the
individuals of which the corporaƟon is comprised. Instead, I argue that it is both plausible and
pragmaƟc for corporaƟons to be understood as morally signiĮcant non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems
and on that basis, they can be held morally responsible. The concepts involved in this are conceived
not as a linear arrangement but are beƩer thought of rather like a mesh or a network; there’s not
necessarily a Įxed order in which these can be assembled for presentaƟon. Thus, I begin with the
concept of raƟonal conversability. Then, because any corporaƟon is a creature of moral agents, and
although it is composed of individuals, when, in a hypotheƟcal situaƟon, the individual human
beings are removed from the corporate enƟty the remainder, the residuum, can be seen as an
enduring, morally signiĮcant, raƟonally conversable intenƟonal system. The system that is created
by moral agents makes the corporaƟon addressable as a member of the moral community because
it has the capacity for engaging in a moral conversaƟon and giving reasons for the acƟons it takes.
Dempsey (Dempsey 2013) argues that if a corporaƟon as it is created by moral agents is understood
as a non-agenƟal system, this is suĸcient for it to be considered as morally signiĮcant. And moral
signiĮcance is adequate to ground non-agenƟal ascripƟons of moral responsibiliƟes to corporaƟons.
This raises important quesƟons about whether moral responsibiliƟes can only be borne by only one
kind of agent, which in the case of corporaƟons would be the individuals of which it is made. The
argument here centres on whether the assumpƟon that an enƟty must have moral agency is
necessary to aƩribuƟons of moral responsibility.
If we understand a corporaƟon as a morally responsible kind of agent, but one that does not
conform to convenƟonal (individual) deĮniƟons of agent status, it may be possible to say that moral
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responsibility does not rely exclusively on reducƟonism. This makes it possible also to broaden
what corporaƟons are responsible for beyond those intenƟons, acts and omissions ascribed to
individual human beings. On this view I argue that because corporaƟons are the creaƟons of moral
agents, and if they are raƟonally conversable as non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems and therefore
addressable as members of the moral community, then as morally signiĮcant enƟƟes they can bear
ascripƟons of moral responsibility for the consequences of their acƟons. How can this be possible?
I said above that there would be a residuum remaining when the individual human beings
belonging to a corporaƟon are removed. We can adduce that residuum as an intenƟonal system for
two reasons. The Įrst reason is that a corporaƟon is formed by moral agents, i.e., the individuals
that create it. They thereby endow it with some (but not all) of the characterisƟcs of those by
whom it was created. It is created, as it were, in the image of its creators, more and less. It is
created as more than its creators because it can do things that individuals acƟng alone cannot. Also,
a corporaƟon does not die, it is not subject to the processes of ageing, it does not sleep or get sick
as human beings do. Shareholders in corporaƟons enjoy limited liability and corporaƟons can be in
many places at once. And a corporaƟon is less than its creators because it does not have the
metaphysical characterisƟcs that are aƩributed to natural persons as agents. For example, it does
not suīer shame or remorse.
The second reason is that a corporaƟon is capable of raƟonal pursuit of its aims and goals. For any
natural agent reasoning is a required capability if that agent is to engage in a moral conversaƟon
with another agent about the reasons for what they decide to do. This is one form of reasoning. By
contrast, to meet the requirement that an agent must be capable of reasoned moral conversaƟon a
corporaƟon as an intenƟonal and a raƟonally conversable residuum must be suscepƟble to moral
address to be a member of the moral community. Moral address is the social process by which a
moral community aīected by the acƟons of another member holds that member responsible for
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the consequences of its acƟons. Conversable raƟonal agents, by engaging in moral conversaƟons as
a form of reasoning, are vulnerable to the judgements of the moral community to which they
belong to give reasons in defence of or to explain what they do. CorporaƟons are thus subject to
what Strawson calls the ParƟcipant ReacƟve Aƫtude (Strawson 1962). This means that we do not
treat corporaƟons as mere objects, but as non-exempt frommoral judgement and not excused from
ascripƟons of moral behaviour. As parƟcipants in the moral community they must answer to it.
I have said that it is possible for corporaƟons to engage in raƟonal moral address by being
conversable with respect to their intenƟons (Ferejohn 2007), (Peƫt 2013). Conversability about
intenƟons in this context connotes the requirement that it is a uniĮed agent that responds to
arguments by members of a moral community that it explain or jusƟfy its acƟons with reasons. The
moral community is composed of moral agents who are aīected by the acƟons of another member,
even if that other member is an intelligent enƟty (a kind of raƟonal unitary agent that is capable of
reasoned exchange and interpretable jusƟĮcaƟon that makes sense of the acƟon), but not a natural
person. CollecƟve intenƟonal acƟon by raƟonal unitary enƟƟes normaƟvely is expected to be
conversably jusƟĮed; typically, this is done through agenƟal explanaƟons of maximising welfare or
by enhancing the public good, or at minimum, not conŇicƟng with or obstrucƟng those outcomes.
In cases of group collecƟve intenƟonal acƟon, only certain kinds of groups – “social integrates” –
can act intenƟonally by integraƟng through internal processes the judgements of their individual
members such that members regard the collecƟve’s intenƟons as their own and are disposed to
respond in concert with the group’s aims and ends. RaƟonal unitary enƟƟes as social integrates are
presumed to be capable of collecƟvely intending to commit to paƩerns of behaviour that are
consistent over long periods of Ɵme and to explain departures from predictable normaƟve
behaviour. Predictability is thought of as a consistency of behaviour. Consistency is essenƟal for a
corporaƟon to do business; counterparƟes, clients and customers must be able to trust that the
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corporaƟon will predictably do what it says it collecƟvely intends to do. The characterisƟcs of
corporaƟons as collecƟve intenƟonal systems that I have cited are: corporate reasoning, moral
address, moral signiĮcance and moral community membership for a conversable collecƟve enƟty to
be interpretable in its reason-giving by the members of the community. They are thus subject to
the judgement of that moral community. A brief review of the grounding of non-agenƟal
intenƟonal systems for moral responsibility highlights these characterisƟcs. Corporate reasoning is
the demonstraƟon of raƟonality through decision systems and processes aimed at pursuit of their
goals. Moral address treats corporaƟons as conversable members of the moral community because
they are morally signiĮcant as interpretable intenƟonal systems. They are morally signiĮcant in the
sense that they are capable of engaging in reasoned moral conversaƟon about their intenƟons and
acƟons. It is this capability for engagement and the exercise of conversability that makes them
morally signiĮcant. As creaƟons of moral agents, corporaƟons have residual characterisƟcs by
which moral responsibility accrues to them as systems.
Following Dempsey (Dempsey 2013, p. 343) we Įnd there are three condiƟons that must be met if a
non-agenƟal intenƟonal system is to be morally responsible. First, it must be systemic in the sense
that it applies a structure of rules to certain kinds of inputs that yields intended outputs
characterisƟcspursuant to its intenƟons. The rule structure does not require that it have the status
of a moral agent. It is a mechanisƟc system of inputs, rules and outputs.
Second, the residuum of the system is suscepƟble to responsibility that is unassignable to the
system’s creators or individual parƟcipants. System complexity is such that assignment of
responsibility solely to individuals is not possible.63 What Dempsey means here by complexity is
spelled out as a creaƟve process whereby a structure of rules is insuĸcient to anƟcipate all the
63Weaver (Weaver 1998) addresses the problem of system complexity and assignment of responsibility to intenƟonal
systems as important aspects in the work Peter French (French 1979), (French 1984) Patricia Werhane (Werhane 1989)
and J.E. GarreƩ (GarreƩ 1989).
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uncertainƟes possible in the input-output process (Dempsey 2013, p. 342). The rules structure
consequently undergoes development as unique and unexpected situaƟons arise and it becomes
more complex over Ɵme as it resolves problems and issues. System complexity becomes such that
it is not possible to hold speciĮc individuals responsible for creaƟng and exercising the proliferaƟon
of rules in highly developed organisaƟons. Nor is it possible to idenƟfy and hold responsible
individuals for the ulƟmate outcomes that the rules, their interpretaƟon and the unpredictability of
what they produce as they aim at a corporaƟon’s intended goals. Considering the massive
complexiƟes of Įnancial sector mulƟnaƟonal corporaƟons operaƟng globally in a wide variety of
legal jurisdicƟons and naƟonal cultures it is not diĸcult to understand the reality that these are
systems beyond the simpliciƟes of reducƟonist methodological individualism. For these two
reasons, the residual aspect of the intenƟonal system accrues to the collecƟve rather than the
individuals that comprise it. Were the individuals to be subtracted from the corporaƟon, there
would remain the rules-based complex system of inputs and outputs, and it is at that remainder
that moral address can be directed.
Third, the corporaƟon and its system of input-output rules is the creaƟon of moral agents who
pursue a line of acƟon to achieve what they collecƟvely intend. It is in this intenƟonal act of creaƟon
and the operaƟon of what is produced by it that suscepƟbility to moral responsibility occurs. By this
they become morally addressable. Can a non-agenƟal intenƟonal system comply with demands that
it respond to moral obligaƟons when it is perceived to have intenƟonally acted anormaƟvely? We
suppose that non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems have the capacity for reŇecƟve self-expression and
can answer the challenges brought against them as non-exempt members of the moral community.
What I have discussed is an alternaƟve to the standard story of person-agent moral responsibility.
While corporaƟons as legal ĮcƟons are metaphysical creaƟons, the inconclusive debate about their
nature and the potenƟal for harm they have demands that we Įnd another way to hold them
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responsible for their intenƟonal acƟon. I have considered if an organisaƟon as a whole can meet
the requirements to be held morally responsible. I am asking whether any corporaƟon should be
able to claim rights as a legal person (construed in the form of a collecƟve enƟty) without bearing
moral responsibility. Following DenneƩ’s and Dempsey’s arguments, I have argued that it is
possible for non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems to collecƟvely intend and bear moral responsibility. It
is possible for them to meet the necessary condiƟons for moral address and as members of the
moral community they bear moral responsibility.64
Course-of-AcƟon, Nexus-of-Contracts and Non-agenƟal IntenƟonal Systems
Nexus-of Contracts theory of the corporaƟon does not appear to Įt with a Course-of-AcƟon view of
collecƟve intenƟon because Nexus-of Contracts reduces corporaƟons to individual agents as the
only responsible primiƟves for moral responsibility. But this confuses the nature of corporaƟons as
legal persons with rights but not as responsible unitary enƟƟes. Nexus-of-Contracts gives property
and liberty rights to corporaƟons on personhood grounds which allows them to pursue their aims
far beyond the original concepƟon of the corporaƟon as an instrument for public purposes and the
common good.
Course-of-AcƟon does not look at the nature of what a corporaƟon is, but at what the corporaƟon
does and the consequences of that acƟon. The speciĮc problem(s) with the relaƟonship between
Nexus-of Contracts and Course-of-AcƟon is that for a Nexus-of Contract theory of the Įrm there is
no corporate enƟty to assign moral responsibility; only individual human beings have moral status
and are suscepƟble to responsibility. Nexus-of Contracts theory does not reŇect the reality of
corporaƟons as collecƟvely intenƟonal systems in pursuit of their own ends and as collecƟons of
64(Shoemaker 2007) does not speciĮcally address collecƟves in his arƟcle aboutmoral address andmoral communiƟes,
but he does oīer in some detail what consƟtutes amoral demand andwho or what has the capacity to understand, apply
and respond to moral reasons. This has applicaƟon to non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems and their membership in a moral
community based on their conversability and other aƩributes.
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integrated systems with moral standing in a moral community. Non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems are
how corporaƟons as complex organizaƟons follow a course of acƟon to get things done. Under a
Course-of-AcƟon view an agent as convenƟonally understood is not necessary for corporate moral
responsibility because a corporate non-agenƟal intenƟonal system can pursue a course of acƟon.
Course-of-AcƟon oīers a systems view of the problem of corporate acƟon with non-agenƟal
intenƟonal systems as the residual ontological primiƟve. CorporaƟons can be beƩer characterized
not by metaphysical personhood and State-of-Mind theory, but by their non-agenƟal intenƟonal
system aspects and as part of the moral community to promote and protect the public interest.
Course-of-AcƟon and a view of the corporaƟon as a non-agenƟal intenƟonal system oīers an
urgently needed pracƟcal alternaƟve to Įnding a mysterious nature analogous to a natural person
in a legal ĮcƟon.
Conclusion
The pracƟcal applicaƟon of the idea of non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems rather than person-agents
that I have discussed solves two problems. It sidesteps the endless debate about the metaphysics
of corporate personhood, the nature of the corporaƟon, its purpose and its social pracƟces. It also
avoids problems that might have worried Strawson if he had considered collecƟves in addiƟon to
individuals—our natural human reacƟon to corporate wrong-doing is validated and how we interact
with the world is legiƟmated. In Chapter 6 I will again address the increasingly dangerous social and
poliƟcal pracƟces of global Įnancial sector corporaƟons and some potenƟal consequences of failing
to hold them morally responsible due to indeterminacy about what they are rather than what they
do.
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Chapter 6—Conclusion
In this thesis I have traced a thread of relaƟonships among three principal philosophical issues. I
began in the third chapter with the problem of corporate personhood and the legal history that has
resulted in the world’s most economically powerful naƟon, the United States, adopƟng a legal
theory and pracƟcing a judicial doctrine that gives corporaƟons personhood rights but also treats
them as non-enƟty ĮcƟons. This has resulted in corporaƟons that under a Nexus-of-Contracts
theory of the Įrm bear no substanƟve responsibility as disƟnct enƟƟes for the harms they do. They
may be legally responsible and subject to social and other sancƟons but in the liƟgious culture of
the US the dominant concern is not with their moral responsibility but very largely with their legal
obligaƟons.
As an example of how an ascripƟon of moral responsibility can arrive on the threshold of a
corporaƟon despite the company's contenƟon that it is operaƟng within the law, it is instrucƟve to
note a recent case from the United States. On 26 June of 2019 employees of Wayfair, a US-based
home furnishings corporaƟon walked out of its headquarters in Boston, MassachuseƩs. The
employees were protesƟng the company’s involvement in selling furniture (beds) to a US
government contractor that operates detenƟon faciliƟes for migrant children on the US southern
border (Taylor 2019). The walkout was preceded by a leƩer signed and sent by 500 of the
employees to the management of the Įrm. The leƩer stated that the company was involved in an
unethical pracƟce in which the employees wanted no part and that the company ought not to
engage. The company responded by staƟng that they were operaƟng within the law and would not
discriminate among its customers. Typically, the maƩer would then have gone to the Įrm’s lawyers
and if an acƟon had been brought by the employees then a long, slow legal process would have
ensued. Instead, by highlighƟng through social media the moral issues of detenƟon of children,
separaƟon of families, poor and unhealthy condiƟons in the faciliƟes, among other issues, the
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company was forced to immediately desist from its pracƟce of cooperaƟng with the government’s
policies, its contractor and complicity in a treatment of children described as inhumane and cruel
by members of Congress (Romero 2019). The negaƟve publicity and threat of a consumer boycoƩ
added pressure to Wayfair to address the issue immediately (Maheshwari 2019). The potenƟal
eīecƟveness of this case illuminates both the potent impact of a charge of moral responsibility that
can be brought against a corporaƟon as well as the disuƟliƟes of a long, slow and expensive legal
procedure.
In the forth chapter I connected the concept of personhood (and its strange divorce of corporate
legal rights from corporate enƟty-responsibility) with the idea of collecƟve intenƟon. Through the
discussion of the case study I have made clear that the GFC was the result of intenƟonal acƟon by
both individuals and corporate Įnancial insƟtuƟons that exhibited a blatant disregard for prudent
and responsible pracƟces. At the same Ɵme those individuals and insƟtuƟons have not only
escaped meaningful punishment but conƟnued to enjoy massive payouts and bonuses while
globally the recovery from the crisis has leŌ naƟons and their peoples suīering the eīects of
austerity and substanƟally retarded economic growth for over a decade since the onset of the GFC.
In the ĮŌh chapter I addressed the problem of corporate moral responsibility and how confused
corporate legal theory about these jurisƟc persons has leŌ Įnancial sector corporaƟons—for all
pracƟcal purposes—immune from signiĮcant assignments of responsibility. I proposed a way to
confront this by treaƟng corporaƟons not as analogues to agent-enƟƟes, a much-debated problem
in metaphysics, but as non-agenƟal systems capable not only of intenƟonal acƟon, but morally
answerable due to their characterisƟcs as collecƟve intenƟonal systems. The characterisƟcs are:
corporate reasoning, moral address, moral signiĮcance and moral community membership. These
are the necessary elements for a conversable collecƟve enƟty to be interpretable in its
reason-giving by the members of the community. They are thus subject to the judgement of that
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moral community.
In this sixth chapter I am concluding that an alternaƟve to a standard view exists. That view claims
we must Įnd that either corporaƟons are in some metaphysical sense suĸciently analogous to
people so that they can be treated as ontological primiƟves, or that any assignment of responsibility
must reduce to moral responsibility of the individuals of which the corporaƟon is comprised as in
Nexus-of-Contracts theory of the Įrm. Instead, I argue that not only is it both plausible and
pragmaƟc for corporaƟons to be understood as morally signiĮcant non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems,
but on that basis they can be held morally responsible. Furthermore, in a pracƟcal sense there is no
opƟon to Įnding a way to rein in corporate acƟon because it is doubƞul another GFC could be
resolved in the same way as that of 2008. It would simply be too costly. I return to the case study to
make this point.
The Case Study Revisited
The onset of the crisis, which was centered in the Įnancial world and went largely unnoƟced at
Įrst, spread rapidly unƟl the aŌernoon of Tuesday, 7 August 2007, when the French bank BNP
Paribas abruptly issued a short press release announcing the temporary suspension of three of their
investment funds. The reason that BNP Paribas gave was their inability to reliably calculate the net
asset value (NAV) of their three suspended funds. This was the consequence, they said, of “... [t]he
complete evaporaƟon of liquidity in certain market segments of the securiƟsaƟon market in the
United States [that] has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality
or credit raƟng” (Paribas 2007).
The inability of BNP Paribas to calculate these NAVs led to a slow cascade of failures that quickly
accelerated in mid-summer of 2008, causing condiƟons in the Įnancial sector to Ňip from a period
of unprecedented, swaggering conĮdence to nearly outright panic. The very real threat of a global
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Įnancial meltdown was pointed toward not only speciĮc Įnancial markets, but much more broadly
at the funcƟoning of the world’s systems of trade and commerce.
What began as a crisis of liquidity in one bank now threatened to freeze markets world-wide and
became a global Įnancial crisis. It is no exaggeraƟon to say that the seizing up of Įnancial markets
leŌ the world on the brink of disaster, a ‘sudden stop’; one that would devastate economic acƟvity.
But this move by BNP Paribas was not the Įrst or only warning in 2007 that something was going
very wrong with the stability of the global Įnancial system. In reality, the BNP Paribas fund
suspension was phase two of this three phase crisis. But the fund suspension marked the start of
the most important and decisive acƟons in response to it. This was when, on Thursday 9 August
2007, the Central European Bank urgently injected into the banking system what it hoped would be
a €95 billion ($131 billion) remedy for its liquidity problem (TeƩ 2007).65 Phase one had begun
earlier, in April of 2006.
Early in 2006 US housing prices, which in no circumstance were expected to ever go down, peaked
and began their unprecedented descent (Sandbu 2017). The onset of illiquidity in the mortgage
markets had become visible by late 2006. Mortgage bond originators had been issuing sub-prime,
high risk, low quality loans, bundling them into highly (but misleadingly) rated bonds and then
fraudulently selling those defecƟve instruments on to other Įnancial insƟtuƟons. But as they did
this, they were revealing to the purchasers neither the riskiness nor the intenƟonally misleading
fabricaƟon of the instruments.66 While a few market observers were commenƟng on this behavior,
65This event marked when ‘sub-prime’ became an evident systemic problem, but it does not indicate the deĮniƟve
start of the global Įnancial crisis of 2007-09. The global Įnancial crisis began not with Bear Stearns or New Century, a US
real estate investment trust (March 2007), but with BNP because that was when interbank funds spiked and liquidity was
reduced or evaporated. It became systemic because it was a shiŌ away from ‘some guys losing money’ in the markets
to a case of illiquidity and asset valuaƟon enigmas across insƟtuƟons system-wide and globally. RedempƟon of these
Įnancial contracts then began to freeze on a broad scale.
66This category of loans, known as ‘sub-prime’, is central to understanding the GFC. The systemaƟcmis-selling andmis-
representaƟonof these instrumentswas part of the deliberate acƟon taken by parƟes to the contracts. These proved toxic
for global Įnancial stability and economic security. The fabricaƟon of ‘sub-prime’ instruments is crucial for understanding
the legal, economic and moral issues involved in party-counterparty agreements and trust relaƟonships.
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by January of 2007 the reigning complacency in the wholesale mortgage markets was striking
(Plender 2007a), (Plender 2007b).
Despite the evidence that hedge funds were underwriƟng increasing amounts of insurance in the
derivaƟves markets (to cover potenƟal losses) those hedge funds did not carry the burden of
solvency margin requirements that insurers were required to meet. This should have put everyone
in the industry on high alert. Not only government regulators but the Įnancial industry as a whole
including the credit raƟng houses and journalists should have raised a loud and sustained alarm
that risky Įnancial behavior was spinning out of control. Ominously, the pieces were falling into
place for a violent, bearish reacƟon. Very soon, the violence commenced.
By February 2007 HSBC, the banking corporaƟon, took an addiƟonal $1.8 billion to cover mortgage
instruments that had been issued to borrowers in the United States who were poor credit risks. At
this Ɵme, it was claimed by market observers that mortgage repayment problems were evident
only among a small segment of the borrowers in the category designated as sub-prime. But
warning Ňags about deterioraƟon in the overall market had already been raised. New Century
Financial, the U.S. real estate investment trust that concentrated on less creditworthy borrowers for
loans, had issued guidance to investors at the same Ɵme that it was restaƟng its earnings Įgures
because they had underesƟmated loan repurchase losses.
On Thursday, 8 February 2007 the ABX index (a credit derivaƟves index that tracked sub- prime
mortgage bond risk) jumped signiĮcantly following the previous day’s warning from HSBC and New
Century that there were problems in their US sub-prime mortgage loan porƞolios. But most
importantly a collecƟon of systemically important Įnancial insƟtuƟons (siĮs) were also revealed at
this Ɵme to have exposure to the deterioraƟng fundamentals in the US housing market.67 Most
67Systemically important Įnancial insƟtuƟons (siĮs) are Įnancial service providers. They are categorized insƟtuƟonally
in one of three ways. They are either depository (banks, trust and mortgage loan companies, and credit unions, among
others) or contractual (insurance companies and pension funds) or investment insƟtuƟons (investment banks, brokerages
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prominent among these SIFIs were the investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.68
This revelaƟon by the ABX index was parƟally responsible for precipitaƟng Bear Stearns’ $3.2 billion
bail-out in an eīort to rescue one of its funds on Thursday, 22 June 2007. This was the largest
bail-out of a hedge fund since Long-term Capital Management was rescued by a consorƟum of
twelve lenders with $3.6 billion in 1998. NegoƟaƟons to rescue another of Bear Stearns’ funds at
risk of a $6 billion insolvency was by this Ɵme also underway. Despite desperate gestures to save its
reputaƟon, Bear Stearns was forced into this acƟon as conĮdence in their solvency and trust
between parƟes began to fail. But it was already too late. The third phase of the crisis followed the
bursƟng of the asset bubble in housing mortgage lending. Investors, both individual and
insƟtuƟonal, began selling with increasing urgency unƟl panic set in as asset prices collapsed. We
are confronted with many Ɵmelines that describe the genesis and unfolding of the GFC. The
descripƟon I have given is a simpliĮcaƟon of the sequence of essenƟal events leading to the
consequences we sƟll grapple with more than 10 years aŌer the price collapse in 2007 (Sandbu
2017).
What is important about the understanding of the GFC for ascripƟons of responsibility is that so
many years later so much remains unresolved about its causes. Economists, purported authoriƟes
on the origin of the crisis, sƟll cannot explain with precision what happened and why. A simplisƟc
explanaƟon is sƟll oŌen heard that the root cause can be found in a piece of 1977 U.S. legislaƟon,
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), as amended in 1995. The amendment to the Act is alleged
to have forced U.S. banks to lend billions to mainly poor black Americans. These loans, known
disparagingly as ‘Liar Loans’ and guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, started the explosion
and underwriters). They are so important funcƟonally to the Įnancial system that, were they to fail, it would cause an
economic-Įnancial crisis. Thus, they are also referred to as TBTF (“Too Big to Fail”).
68Other investment banks in this group were CiƟbank, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Barclays
Capital, but this does not begin to exhaust the list of Įnancial sector insƟtuƟons that were put at risk globally.
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in dubious lending and the subsequent decay in Įnancial stability. Or so it is claimed.69 Seƫng aside
this folk mythology of the US government forcing banks to oīer mortgage loans to Įnancially unĮt
borrowers, there are numerous candidate causes idenƟĮed by serious observers to be the root
source of the crisis. To demonstrate the problems of establishing the source of the GFC and how
those lead to quesƟons about grounding ascripƟons of corporate moral responsibility the
demonstraƟon would have to answer “what happened” in the GFC in the sense of both what
caused the crisis and who or what persons, insƟtuƟons or systems were culpable legally, poliƟcally,
socially and morally. Common knowledge would have us conclude that the consensus causal
element was sub-prime mortgage Įnance fraud and the related Įnancial instruments (derivaƟves,
etc.) employed by Įnancial sector insƟtuƟons. This is a predominant and widely held view in the
business literature; indeed, it is nearly exclusive. However, a closer reading reveals that the issue of
what caused, as opposed to what triggered the GFC is examined in, inter alia, Andrew Lo, “Reading
About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review” (Lo 2012). The cause-trigger quesƟon is
also treated at length in Mervyn King, The End of Alchemy (King 2017) and in Lisa Herzog, Just
Financial Markets: Finance in a Just Society (Herzog 2017). These three extensive invesƟgaƟons all
conclude that there is no consensus on a single cause of the GFC, but there is a collecƟon of
(disputed) elements that contributed to it. Arguing successfully that sub-prime mortgages were the
principal trigger is possible, but they are not the sole, or even the principal, cause. Also, according
to Mervyn King, the global Įnancial crisis was not found in the intenƟonal acƟons of a collecƟon of
bad insƟtuƟons or individuals, but in the systems of Įnancial capitalism (King 2017, p. 3).
The systems of Įnancial capitalism are composed of a range of blameworthy elements. According to
69This claim has been repeatedly debunked, but in true zombie-like fashion it returns and returns. The CRA cannot be
the cause of the crisis because the CRA was in eīect 10 full years before this form of lending began. Fannie Mae, the
agency guaranteeing CRA loans as a government sponsored enterprise (GSE), was not prominent among the subprime
mortgage boom lenders and got involved late in the process. Furthermore, most of the subprime loans were sourced in
private enƟƟes and were not CRA loans, so by the number of loans and their dollar amounts they could not account for
the causal eīect aƩributed to them.
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Lo, the principal elements of the GFC cited in the academic literature are: concentrated economic
power in Įnancial sector corporaƟons (consolidaƟon and poliƟcal inŇuence of the Įnancial
subculture), lack of transparency (including asymmetric informaƟon, concealment, distorƟon,
decepƟon), failures of Įnancial regulaƟon (inadequate monitoring, inconsistency, permissiveness,
lobbying and wilful blindness), regulatory capture, global regulatory arbitrage, failures of Įnancial
corporaƟon governance (poor risk management and excessive risk-taking, over-leveraging and
insuĸcient capital reserves), contagion of bad ideas, under-pricing of risk, implicit government
guarantees for bail-outs (moral hazard), predatory lending, deregulaƟon and ĮnancializaƟon
(securiƟzaƟon) of the US economy, growing capital inŇows to the US, shadow banking, execuƟve
compensaƟon pracƟces (short-termism), and weak US social policies leading to compensatory
homeownership iniƟaƟves (as a compensaƟon to counter-act rapidly rising inequality from
diminishing access to educaƟon, lack of universal health cover, and declining democraƟc input). I
am leaving out Lo’s review of the journalisƟc accounts here because those focus on personaliƟes
and events, and oīer liƩle on underlying causes. There is also an addiƟonal argument that the
Įnancial systems were causal in the GFC, but it was at boƩom poliƟcs that unleashed those systems.
EsƟmaƟng the Costs of the Global Financial Crisis
As I said above, the crisis that began in August 2007 may have led to the greatest transfer of wealth
in human history. It may be true that the wealth transfer (including bank bail-outs) is the
unprecedented, ongoing, and not yet complete. While it may not be possible to reach a precise
assessment of the total monetary cost of the GFC, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
have made an aƩempt. Their study was done in part to counter the rhetoric of complaint from
those in the Įnancial sector that any government interference in resumpƟon of their so-called free
market Įnancial pracƟces would incur economic costs far in excess of the beneĮts of regulaƟon.
This, they say, would harm economic acƟvity, retard investment, inhibit investors, shrink
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employment, and other similar asserƟons. Atkinson, LuƩrell and Rosenblum found in their research
at the Dallas Federal Reserve that, using a conservaƟve esƟmate, the costs of the GFC— including
loss of economic output, Įnancial wealth, psychological consequences, skill atrophy from extended
unemployment and other costs—were from 40 to 90 percent of one year’s economic output (GDP)
in the U.S. This conservaƟve esƟmate translates to $6 – $14 trillion (in 2012 dollars) or between
$50,000 – $120,000 that has been forgone by every household in the U.S.
Atkinson, LuƩrell and Rosenblum also looked at the total value that would have been lost by the
Ɵme the economy returned to a rate of growth equivalent to pre-crisis levels. They examined two
possibiliƟes. One possibility calculated that if resumpƟon of the growth rate were to take unƟl 2023
then the value lost would be 40-90 per cent of one year of US GDP. Again, in 2012 dollars this would
fall somewhere between $6-14tn. But considered on a per capita basis, this represents between
$19,000-45,000. The second possibility was by taking a more pessimisƟc posture the researchers
found their assessment yields a loss of 65-165 percent of annual U.S. GDP, or $25tn. This is an
approximate, but astonishing $80k per capita (Atkinson, LuƩrell, and Rosenblum 2013). Yet these
esƟmates assume a full return to normal growth, something which has not happened and, based on
the historical record of successive Įnancial crashes, seems not impossible but certainly highly
unlikely to happen before the next crisis arrives.
Obviously, these Įgures are only for the U.S. If similar esƟmates were to be made that would
include the total global impact the monetary losses alone must be astronomically high if they are
on a similar scale to the U.S. domesƟc losses.70 But these esƟmates of the negaƟve consequences
of the GFC are not comprehensive. They do not include either non-monetary costs or the future
money costs of the GFC that are yet to be realized. To make esƟmates inclusive of non-monetary
70This would include the costs to the people in the hardest-hit socieƟes of Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece.
To cite these countries is not to diminish the total global costs, but merely to reemphasize the human, non-monetary toll
taken by the crisis.
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costs researchers would have to contend with reducƟons in living standards, wealth decline,
deterioraƟon in the well-being of the working populaƟon, and long-term joblessness.
For example, unemployment in the U.S. that rose to its maximum between 2008 and 2012 had the
eīect of reducing total wages by $900bn, equivalent to an addiƟonal year of US economic acƟvity
(Porter 2014). Much more diĸcult is making esƟmates of the declines in physical and mental health
as well as the unemployment eīect that aggravates poverty and crime. Other eīects are those on
the structure of families and suppression of household formaƟon. I will only menƟon (but not
describe here) the experience of emigraƟon and economic self-exile that have been the
consequences of the GFC by those in the worst-aīected countries.In Ireland, Greece, Spain, and
other countries those who leŌ their homes and countries of birth did not experience an easy thing.
All that was familiar – a mother tongue, customs, social pracƟces, family and kin, and culture were
leŌ behind in the hope of Įnding work and a stable life elsewhere. These are costs that do not
readily fall into a spreadsheet or cost-beneĮt analysis. It is not diĸcult to see that the net cost of
the crisis in human terms is probably incalculable. This is because accompanying the wealth
transfer there has been a series of successive geopoliƟcal crises across the United States and
Europe involving global socio-economic instability, raising persistent quesƟons about the legiƟmacy
of naƟonal governments as well as economic opportunity costs that simply cannot be calculated.
What we do know is that the creaƟon and misapplicaƟon of these instruments has led to a series of
outcomes devastaƟng to the economic stability, autonomy and well-being of hundreds of millions
of people. And while claims are made that gross domesƟc product (GDP) Įgures show countries are
returning to pre-GFC levels, GDP does not measure the human suīering and pain, the erosion of
trust, and certainly not the opportunity costs that were incurred by this crisis.
The reality of deĮciencies in current economic analysis is that more than ten years aŌer the onset of
the GFC economists sƟll cannot provide a precise idea of either how much it cost or what caused it.
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Without doubt, the crucial task of making a coherent conclusive measure of losses is fraught with
methodological complexiƟes. The case is also a counterfactual. It is one of making a comparison
between a world that might have been, a world in which there never was a GFC, and the world in
which the crisis actually happened. Furthermore, there is a variety of ways— both quanƟtaƟve and
qualitaƟve— in which the consequences of economic retardaƟon were felt and the global standard
of living fell. Following Atkinson and his colleagues we have by their most conservaƟve esƟmates a
$20,000 per capita loss in the U.S. This number, if extrapolated appropriately to the rest of the
world should be suĸcient to dismiss any argument that re-regulaƟon or government interference in
Įnance pracƟces would be too costly for the sector or the economy at large to bear. No maƩer
what the costs of implementaƟon, compliance and diversion (from primary Įnancial acƟviƟes) of
regulaƟon, if those regulaƟons were to provide stability and avoid another crisis they would be
more than jusƟĮed. This should be obvious if we take into account the inesƟmable global
non-monetary costs of the current crisis, especially the opportunity costs for generaƟons of people
who will suīer impaired economic prospects and reduced standards of living. These indirect and
non-economic harms may not be measurable in economic terms, but they are nonetheless real.
There is a larger problem reŇected in the preceding descripƟon of the deĮcient state of our crisis
epistemology. The larger problem stems from our lack of knowledge about how the GFC was
caused and what policies might be best suited to prevent a recurrence. A signiĮcant reason why this
is crucial is that despite the complexiƟes and uncertainƟes of the GFC of 2007-09 the next crisis is
likely to emerge from causes that are at root very similar if not exactly the same, but will appear at
that Ɵme to be of an enƟrely diīerent character. ConvenƟonal economic analysis steadfastly
suggests that only exogenous factors could cause a failure of markets to self-correct or for either
the Įnancial system or the economy as a whole to suīer a disrupƟve shock. According to market
theory it would have to be, in other words, something from outside the working of markets. It
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could be unwarranted government interference through regulaƟon or legislaƟve meddling, for
example. But the failure is almost certainly likely to be endogenous to the systems of the Įnancial
sector. There are two potenƟal sources for an endogenous failure-inducing shock.
One source is that economic agents have a powerful incenƟve for taking very large proĮts if they
can successfully circumvent, outwit or manipulate any micro-prudenƟal mechanism designed to
minimize risk. In the case of the GFC it was the relaƟvely small (compared to the size of the Įnancial
system as a whole) sub-prime mortgage lending that triggered a cascading series of events that led
to the global crisis. But the mulƟvariate causes that allowed the trigger to set oī the crisis lay deep
within the malformed structure of the Įnancial system. The sub-prime mortgage market was a
sub-unit of a much larger structure, but a crisis only requires one point of failure, such as a
parƟcular sub-market. And, if the stability of a whole system rests on trust relaƟonships, it is
vulnerable to a malevolent contagion. When the trust evaporates in a sub-market then the whole
system can become suscepƟble to failure as party-counterparty trust relaƟons break down.
Regulatory prevenƟon of every speciĮc form of risk pracƟce and rule-defeaƟng technique is
impossible. This is so because there are powerful forces driving economic agents to Įnd ways
around any regulaƟons or supervision to realize large proĮts. The root problem is how to ensure
the trust relaƟons within the larger Įnancial system and prevent catastrophic harm that follows a
failure of trust. This, I will argue, is a moral issue and not one only of technical economic proĮciency
in market supervision or micro-prudenƟal authority by policy makers.
A second source of endogenous shock is that it is not only risk, as such, that needs to be subject to
macro-prudenƟal authority by regulaƟon and supervision. The more important second source is
uncertainty. Risk in Įnancial markets as it is commonly understood is measurable and subject to a
variety of technical control measures, up to a certain point. Taken as a whole the Įnancial system is
unfathomably complex and risk management becomes impossible at that scale. But the risks in
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speciĮc markets are becoming beƩer understood and safeguards can be implemented to prevent
knowable sources of disrupƟon and shock. Uncertainty, unlike risk, is unknowable and emerges
with each cycle of changes in the Ňuid dynamics of Įnancial systems. The problem here is that
uncertainty as an unknown is frequently made visible as the result of something going very wrong.
In addiƟon, there are economic agents at work in those systems who Įnd in uncertainƟes the
opportunity for great gain through working against the Įnancial system. They do this by exploiƟng
its vulnerabiliƟes and intenƟonally creaƟng or Įnding complexiƟes to use to their advantage and
against the public interest. Financial systems are not staƟc. By their nature they are dynamic
because they funcƟon as a result of interacƟon of human beings and other systems in funcƟoning
Įnancial insƟtuƟons. If these system parƟcipants, both human and non-agenƟal, are
unaccountable, if they are impossible to understand in terms of the reasons they have and give for
what they do, then holding them responsible for the consequences of their acƟons becomes
impossible as well. These issues raise quesƟons about Įnancial stability and responsibility given the
rapid transformaƟon of Įnancial markets by the implementaƟon of arƟĮcial intelligence (AI)
systems.71 These AI systems may contribute the next endogenous shock and consequent global
crisis and therefore bear a closer look for both the risks and the uncertainƟes they present. In the
next crisis we may well Įnd ourselves asking the same quesƟons about who was responsible as we
do in the GFC. Rather than looking for causal agents, however, it may be that AI and other systems
will be the focus of our enquiry as they come to play an ever-greater and more obscure role in
Įnancial insƟtuƟons. Our quesƟons will again raise issues of moral addressability and conversability,
71ArƟĮcially intelligent systems generally fall into two main categories. One is rules-based, which is relaƟvely simple
and constrained to the rules that are programmed into it. The other is neural networks, also someƟmes described as
deep-learning systems. Deep-learning is a collecƟon of processes enabling distributed machines to generate knowledge
from experience. These are computers and soŌware systems that learn from digital data but without explicit program-
ming. Deep-learning systems are used in predicƟon analysis, text analysis, and image classiĮcaƟon and can work with
very large-scale unstructured data sets. SpeciĮcally in Įnance, AI based on neural networking are having a major impact
on a wide range trading decisions, paƩern recogniƟon, fraud detecƟon, porƞolio and wealth management as well as
the wholesale displacement of repeƟƟve tasks among many other applicaƟons. It is someƟmes semi-faceƟously said of
these technologies that if we all were to die, the AIs would go on trading.
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but they will be about the systems themselves. We naturally expect that individual human agents
give reasons for their intenƟonal acts and omissions; it is not at all yet clear if the same can be
expected of non-agenƟal systems. But the quesƟon demands our aƩenƟon as AI-based Įnancial
systems rapidly gain importance and increasingly dominate global Įnancial acƟviƟes.
There are those who argue that AIs are a kind of group agent and as agents they have moral
standing. Depending on how they are deĮned and the essenƟal criteria that are used the debate
conƟnues. Again, it is my aim to avoid this argument in metaphysics and consider whether
non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems might be beƩer candidates for our concern. The quesƟon I come
back to is not if we can have groups as agents (Tollefsen 2015), but if we can have systems that are
not agents, yet are capable of being held morally responsible on the grounds that they are subject
to moral address and meet the requirement of conversability (Peƫt 2013).
Looking Forward
Looking forward to the next crisis and what may be its principal causal factors we have to
acknowledge that, looking backward, we sƟll do not understand the GFC of 2007-09. We sƟll do not
have a good enough understanding of the event-speciĮc causes and factors. The next instance will
probably appear to be very diīerent. But rather than concentraƟng on event-speciĮc causal
elements, if it is possible to Įnd underlying systemic causes and factors common to Įnancial crises
in general then it may be possible to appropriately assign moral responsibility. To do this, there is a
wide array of quesƟons that need to be answered if we are to properly anƟcipate and possibly even
prevent AI-based Įnancial sector involvement in the next major crisis.
The record of progress since 2009 in terms of addressing systemic risks is not encouraging. There
are sƟll TBTF Įnancial insƟtuƟons speculaƟng in derivaƟves and regulatory oversight is inadequate.
In the U.S. there has been no reinstatement of the Glass- Steagall Act or anything resembling it to
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separate retail banking from the dangers of wholesale banking. Instead we see a sustained eīort on
the part of Įnancial sector corporaƟons and governments to roll back exisƟng, limited, inadequate
regulaƟons such as Dodd-Frank and to blunt the eīorts of regulatory agencies by appoinƟng
ministers and secretaries acƟvely opposed to regulaƟon. At the same Ɵme, there are reducƟons in
staĸng and cuts to resources at the regulatory agencies. While this is happening, there are sƟll
incenƟve programs in place at TBTF banks that generously reward those who engage in risky
speculaƟon. And, in the case of Wells-Fargo CorporaƟon, a paƩern persists of commiƫng serial
fraud absent any apparent sensibility that their systems of incenƟves conƟnue to cause destrucƟon
of trust in essenƟal insƟtuƟons of Įnancial life. The lack of reform in credit raƟng agencies is
exempliĮed by the cavalier and negligent deĮciencies of Equifax in 2016 by failing to secure their
Įnancial records systems against penetraƟon and theŌ by hackers, something that has exposed
millions of people to idenƟty theŌ and ruined credit raƟngs.72
As AI systems seem desƟned to become more fully autonomous, their original design and the
intenƟonal acƟons that will iniƟally be programmed into them become central to our moral
concerns. It seems safe to assume that AIs will soon come to predominate in the Įnancial sector
and further development will follow. This ampliĮes the need for audiƟng AI system performance.
An essenƟal quesƟon is whether non-agenƟal intenƟonal systems in the form of AIs deployed by
Įnancial sector corporaƟons can plausibly be made to answer for their intenƟons and acƟons when
they become self-learning. Non-auditability can mask bad intenƟons on the part of those who
develop and use Įnancial AIs, hence non-auditability is favorable for those trying to avoid
72At least 145.5 million U.S. individuals, approximately 44 per cent of the populaƟon, were impacted by this breach.
It was caused solely by the failure of the credit raƟng agency Equifax to take even minimal steps to secure their systems
against a well-known vulnerability. And it was one they had been repeatedly warned to patch, which they neglected
to do. It is altogether possible that the culpability for this neglect lies with senior management of Equifax. Apparently,
they were answering only to the demand for maximizaƟon of shareholder value. Hence, any costs incurred in securing
their computer systems would have diminished accumulaƟon to the boƩom line and thereby depleted share value. This
appears to be malignant short- termism at its worst.
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accountability. In the Įnancial sector, regulatory eīorts cannot compete against ill-intenƟoned
actors who will seek out speciĮc uncertainƟes, i.e., unknown system vulnerabiliƟes, to exploit them
and to mask those exploits. At the same Ɵme, regulators cannot anƟcipate every possible system
conƟngency because the Įnancial system is inĮnitely complex, dynamic and Ňuid, creaƟng endless
exploitable uncertainƟes. Given that there are these strong incenƟves to bring AI into the Įnancial
sector especially the reducƟon of labor costs, providing these same tools to those intent on gaming
the system and the potenƟal for Įnancial instability is a very real risk. The costs to society are
potenƟally very high.
In such cases of non-auditable, exploitaƟve AI, who or what will be morally responsible—the
corporaƟons that deploy the systems? Or will it be the AIs as they become more fully self- suĸcient
(superintelligent), autonomous and self-learning?73 My concern in this study is less with the nature
of the causal enƟƟes, however, than with the consequences of their acƟon and who (or what) will
answer for those consequences.
The near-term potenƟal (and looming) threat, however, lies within shadow banking—there are
segments of the Įnancial sector shiŌing to shadow banking and hidden risk. This is due to the
percepƟon that re-regulated Įnancial markets and closely scruƟnized Įnancial sector insƟtuƟons
are constrained from recklessness and thus less proĮtable. What is diīerent about shadow banking
that makes us more vulnerable and likely to be vicƟmized are their unregulated and opaque
operaƟons. Because they are not subject to scruƟny and oversight to protect the public interest
they represent great uncertainty for Įnancial stability. The scope and scale of the instruments and
Įnancial volumes are hidden generaƟng greater unknowns with respect to leverage and global risk.
In view of the moral hazard at work following the global Įnancial crisis of 2008, the Įnancial sector
73I am using the concept of superintelligence in AI as integrated, non-domain speciĮc machine intelligence, and not
narrowly domain-constrained as, for example, computer applicaƟons developed only for playing chess, or the simple
trading of stocks.
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may be driven by demands from investors and principals to conƟnue risky behavior, but it also may
be simply impossible to bail out the Įnancial system in the event of a shadow banking crisis due to
the volume of the debt involved. There is no quesƟon that this would be catastrophic for the world
Įnancial system.
The next global Įnancial crisis will in all likelihood be intolerably costly. It is not a maƩer of if this
will occur, but when and how extreme it will be. It also raises the quesƟon of how rescuing the
Įnancial system, if indeed that is possible, will aīect those who will be asked to pay to re-stabilize
an essenƟal public good. But beyond the restoraƟon of Įnancial stability and economic security, the
loss of trust in essenƟal Įnancial insƟtuƟons that was experienced in the GFC of 2007-2008 is not
only a crucial public policy maƩer, but a central moral issue. I have proposed a pracƟcal approach to
addressing these quesƟons through conceptualizing corporaƟons as non-agenƟal intenƟonal
systems and treaƟng them as members with moral standing in the moral community. The weight of
legal, social and moral judgements may in combinaƟon sustain a normaƟve environment in which
Įnancial sector corporaƟons will again serve democraƟc values and the common good rather than
only their own private interests. Doing nothing is not an opƟon.
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APPENDIX
Case Study of Sub-Prime Fraud, IntenƟonal VicƟmizaƟon and Moral Responsibility
The case study of this thesis is about sub-prime mortgage fraud. Because it is a very complex topic
and one that is technically diĸcult I want to put the Įnancial instruments and processes into simple
terms that illuminate the philosophical problem of intenƟonal and foreseeable harmful corporate
acƟon without having it overwhelm the whole project. This requires that seƫng out the case study
remain a largely, if not exclusively, descripƟve exercise.
A vast number of books and arƟcles have addressed the causes and consequences of the global
Įnancial crisis of 2008. Those publicaƟons range from the highly technical to the highly popular and
provide a broad qualitaƟve spectrum of views and explanaƟons for what happened. Michael Lewis’
The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Lewis 2010) has been one of the most popular owing
to Lewis’s journalisƟc skill and ability to tell a superĮcially highly engaging story. Consequently,
there are many reviews, again of varying quality, that provide an introducƟon to and overview of
The Big Short. Therefore, I will not revisit the basics here. I assume anyone reading this has a grasp
of the narraƟve that Lewis oīers. What I want to do is indicate some problems, oversights and
misleading elements in this book as they pertain to the issues of the Įnancial sector and corporate
moral responsibility in this thesis.
Lewis’s treatment is also alleged by wide popular consensus in the media to be an accepted
narraƟve or standard story of the crisis, one that is informaƟve and authoritaƟve about the sources
and mechanisms leading to the GFC of 2008. The outcome of the crisis conƟnues to aŋict global
socio-economics more than a decade later with persistently slow global growth and threatens to do
so far into the future. Because Lewis’s misleading portrayal is a standard story it invites scruƟny. My
aim is to raise some quesƟons about claims within what has become the oĸcial popular narraƟve
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about the global Įnancial crisis and its putaƟve causes. Some of these claims are easily dismissed.
Others are stubbornly diĸcult and need to be scruƟnized closely as they will inform and
substanƟate the claim that Įnancial sector corporaƟons can be held morally responsible for their
intenƟonal acƟons.
One thing should be obvious – we need to understand with some precision and rigor what
happened and who and what caused it because we probably cannot endure another global
Įnancial disaster. Seƫng aside yet another debunking of the long-discredited, simplisƟc asserƟons
that it was all explained as the fault of feckless borrowers who took on loans they couldn’t aīord or
that it was merely the government forcing banks to oīer loans they didn’t want to make and similar
diversions from a more rigorous examinaƟon, I will focus on some essenƟals to demonstrate the
intenƟonal nature of the decepƟon perpetrated by the Įnancial insƟtuƟons and their parƟcipants.
There is a sustained eīort by certain parƟes to create a parƟcular interpretaƟon of how we
understand the causes of the global Įnancial crisis and how we direct our reacƟons toward those
involved. One element of that interpretaƟon is in managing the portrayal of the history of the crisis.
This involves construcƟng a misleading story line or false narraƟve of the actual sequence of events
that seems not only plausible, but also serves to convince those not interested in enquiring deeply
into what happened or a close examinaƟon of the claims, assumpƟons and asserƟons involved. The
other element is to redirect blame away from those individual and collecƟve agents who, in a
complex mixture of greed, hubris, fraud, betrayal of trust, incompetence and ignorance took acƟon
resulƟng in what remains an ongoing global crisis. With a more criƟcal view, can we neutralize
those distracƟons and get a more precise, more rigorous understanding of the reality and hope to
prevent a recurrence?
A Brief Review of Short-Selling and the Subprime Crisis
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It is not necessary here to review the complete history leading up to sub-prime fraud of the early
2000s and the ensuing global Įnancial crisis. I will brieŇy focus on the immediate causes to provide
context for criƟcism. This case study does not examine the long historical trajectory from say,
BreƩon Woods (1944), or even earlier.
Short-selling lies at the heart of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and it is there that I will focus my
aƩenƟon to detail the intenƟonal collecƟve acƟon taken by Įnancial sector corporaƟons leading to
the global Įnancial crisis. Short-selling—at its simplest—Is making a bet that a security (a tradable
Įnancial asset) is going to fall in price. It involves the use of Įnancial instruments to bet against
other instruments that are expected to decline in value or go into default due to failures of the
underlying collateral that supports the instrument’s value. If the short-seller has good informaƟon
that the security in quesƟon is going to decline it is possible to make signiĮcant gains on the bet
against the less knowledgeable holder of the security.
In the case of the sub-prime mortgage crisis those who took short posiƟons on the mortgage bonds
issued by the large investment banks were not moral heroes beƫng against evil insƟtuƟons as in
The Big Short; they were agents complicit in the problem and created the instruments that drove
the engine of doom toward crisis. One thing we must know is how did the short-sellers drive the
engine of doom? This involves a cast of characters. The dramaƟs personnae included mortgage
lenders, banks that package mortgage loans into bonds, banks that re-package bonds into Įnancial
derivaƟves called collateralized debt obligaƟons (CDOs), and the raƟngs agencies (Fitch, Moody’s,
Standard and Poors) that cerƟfy and approve each stage of the process. The remaining members of
the cast are the borrowers – the homeowners (primarily Americans, but also others throughout the
developed economies) who would ulƟmately lose their homes, jobs, pensions, middle-class lives,
health and well-being in the process of default and collapse.
Default risk is a constant in banking; it is the risk that a borrower cannot repay a loan. Banks found a
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way to make a Įnancial product out of default risk that could be sold to other investors at a
plausible price. The proximate cause of the global Įnancial crisis of 2008 was the originaƟon and
sale of a form of Įnancial instrument by JP Morgan, the investment bank, called a credit derivaƟve
that was designed to advantageously exploit default risk. These instruments were variously rated
with labels such as “triple A” (indicaƟng the lowest risk of default) or “BBB” (signiĮcantly greater
risk) by the credit raƟngs agencies (Standard & Poors, and others) and sold by Įnancial sector Įrms
to investors as if those debt instruments were comprised of a certain quality of secure obligaƟon. In
fact, the instruments (the securiƟes) were typically derived (hence the name) from a mixture of
some with high quality and some with much lower quality debt having a higher probability of the
underlying collateral at risk of default. This is decepƟon. The raƟngs indicated higher quality and
safety than was true of the securiƟes. The cleansing mixture of high and low-quality securiƟes
laundered the bonds that were created from these, making those bonds appear beƩer than they
were. Laundering of sub-prime risk was the whole point of the CDO as a Įnancial instrument and
the parƟes intenƟonally made the CDOs look safe when they were known not to be. This is a form
of fraud because it intenƟonally misidenƟĮes the scale of the underlying risk to the investor.
Mortgage bonds are sold in Įxed income markets. This is because the Ňow of funds is Įxed on a
monthly or quarterly schedule, or some other regular underlying paƩern of payment that acts as
collateral. Anything forming a contractual debt with a revenue stream (comprising monthly
payments) can be pooled and securiƟzed. For example, student loans, car loans, credit card
payments, gym memberships, or even non-debt assets such as subscripƟons for services or access
to informaƟon are eligible as long as they generate receivables (usually in the form of regular
payments). In the case of sub-prime mortgage fraud, when the underlying collateral of the
securiƟes (e.g., in this case the collateral is a Ňow of monthly mortgage payments) failed due to late
payments and defaults by insolvent or impoverished mortgage purchasers then the bonds (the
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securiƟzed instruments) failed as well.
In the US the failure of the housing market was in large measure due to the adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs) that were oīered with low teaser rates of interest to credulous buyers, with the
low rates lasƟng typically for only two years. When the teaser rates expired and the interest rate
jumped the buyers suddenly found themselves unable to meet their obligaƟon to pay. The result,
spread over a huge number of defaulƟng borrowers, crashed the sub-prime mortgage bond market
seƫng oī a crisis of insolvency among all the parƟes and counter-parƟes involved in the
originaƟon, proliferaƟon and redempƟon of the securiƟes. When the crisis came, it rapidly spread
around the world. The resulƟng contagion eīect dispersed throughout the global Įnancial system
threatening to bring down the whole decadent structure. Due to the globally electronically
interconnected nature of the Įnancial system and its insƟtuƟons, the crisis propagated swiŌly, and
in the aŌermath damaged and in some cases destroyed lives, families, communiƟes, jobs, pensions,
house prices, industries, and most importantly, trust in essenƟal insƟtuƟons.
To further explain the mechanism a sketch of short-selling and the essenƟal mechanism of credit
default swaps (CDSs) can be shown to act as fuel for CDOs. These are the sources that ampliĮed the
risk taken by the large Įnancial insƟtuƟons leading to the crisis. The relaƟonship among originaƟon
of CDOs, shorƟng with CDSs and the raƟngs agencies made them all complicit in the fraud. It is not
hard to see that the subprime mortgage CDOs were toxic in the form of bond issues and that they
were sure to fail due to the poor quality of the underlying credit-worthiness and high default risk of
the borrowers. Yet there was a huge and endless appeƟte for these in the Įnancial sector despite
the transparency of the faulty instruments for those willing to understand them. But the strategy
for the banks selling these instruments in the period leading to the global Įnancial crisis was how to
produce more CDOs. By selling oī the risk to others and creaƟng yet more to be sold this worked
because the raƟng agencies conƟnued to make toxic bonds look credit-worthy. This relieved a bank
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making the loan of any concern with the quality of the borrowers.
CDSs are best thought of simply as an insurance policy. CDSs allowed banks to swap their loan risk
to other investors, making Įnance safer and freeing the banks to oīer yet more credit. To purchase
a CDS is to bet that something is going to fail and if it does the holder of the CDS gets paid for the
failure. Purchasers of CDSs pay an annual premium for them just as with any insurance. That is their
cost. But the pay-oī can be many mulƟples of the premium – tens, hundreds or thousands of Ɵmes.
This insurance in the subprime mortgages loan fraud is a wager against what is sure to default (fail).
In this case purchases of CDSs as a form of short-selling is to work for, not against, the toxicity of the
faulty mortgage bonds. ShorƟng here is beƫng against the large banks who were selling the bonds
to gullible investors as well as the issuers of the CDSs. These insƟtuƟons were relying on the main
assumpƟon for conƟnuing to sell CDOs, mortgage loans and insurance against default (CDSs) – that
there had never been substanƟal defaults on housing loans. This is the familiar gamblers’ fallacy of
using the staƟsƟcally meaningless past to make predicƟons about the future. These were the
mechanisms and techniques of systemic crisis and operated to make the crisis inĮnitely worse.
Imagine a CDO composed of bonds made up from AAA rated mortgages. It is shaped like a tower,
with the highest-risk, lowest quality bonds at the boƩom tranche (a tranche is a level or slice of the
tower). The upper levels are composed of bonds of increasingly higher quality. Now compare an
ordinary CDO made up of bonds of sub-prime mortgages, pooled together with the underlying
collateral conceived of as the payments on the mortgages made each month. The security of this
Įnancial instrument is formed from the assurance that the mortgage holder will make the payment
to avoid losing the house to foreclosure for failure to pay the monthly debt.
The Ňoors or levels of the structure of a CDO, called the tranches, can be made salable. Each Ňoor,
or tranche, represents a collecƟon of mortgages rated at a certain level of risk. A CDO can have a
number of Ňoors, some of which are the lowest quality (BBB) at the boƩom (called the mezzanine
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level) and some of the highest quality (AAA) at the top as well as numerous Ňoors in between with a
variety of raƟngs. A mezzanine CDO is composed of sub-prime mortgage bonds rated BBB. A CDO
composed of the lowest quality, riskiest mortgages was a structured Įnance CDO, but intenƟonally
not referred to as a sub-prime-backed CDO for reasons of buyer percepƟon. In mezzanine CDOs,
tranches of these worked to toxify the bonds and make the whole structure vulnerable to small
percentage failures within certain classes of CDOs.
By gathering all the BBB mortgage loan CDOs from towers #1 and #2 into a third structure of only
BBB rated CDOs the originators submiƩed these to the raƟng agencies who would then rate them
as, for example, 80
New home loans were generated to meet the demand for CDOs which were then sold on to
investors. Thus, loan money Ňowed to home buyers who paid sellers (loan generators). The supply
of loans conƟnued to grow and serve as raw material for the bonds. But there weren't enough low
credit score Americans taking loans to generate the necessary demand to saƟsfy the appeƟte of the
investors. Investors demanded more and more loans be made available as investment
opportuniƟes.
The increasing demand for products produced purchases of CDSs (recall that the short sellers buy
CDSs as insurance against the deĮcient bonds (CDOs)). But there were not enough CDOs being
generated so the producƟon process changed to the syntheƟc output of CDOs made of CDSs; the
more syntheƟc CDOs, the more there were (through replicaƟon) for the sellers (JP Morgan, Morgan
Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutschbank, and other investment banks) to oīer to investors of the
ersatz, syntheƟc CDOs in the absence of suĸcient numbers of sub-prime loans of actual houses.
This generated a separate market in CDSs speciĮcally as insurance against syntheƟc CDOs (those
that were made up of CDSs).
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This led to the creaƟon of a market in syntheƟc CDOs – these are CDOs with CDSs inside the bonds;
they are bonds made up of CDSs, which are not mortgage-backed, but made up of the insurance
contracts based on the probability that the underlying bonds will fail. The counterpart to the
mezzanine CDO described above is the syntheƟc CDO composed of CDSs on BBB CDOs. When a
CDO is composed of a mix of variously rated bonds, the most expensive CDS that can be bought is
based on the highest risk bonds in the CDO that is being insured by the CDS. Thus, the premium to
be paid, as with any insurance policy, is set by the riskiest mortgages in the bond made from the
collecƟon of mortgages. But if the CDS insurance cost is based on the lower-risk components in the
bond, then the premium is lower, making it a more aƩracƟve instrument, but one that pays oī just
as if it were based on the most-likely to fail components. Together ordinary CDOs and syntheƟc
CDOs are the Engine of Doom, hence the subƟtle of Lewis’s book. They were certain to bring the
Įnancial system into crisis and to require a rescue that could only be eīected by governments due
to the size and scope of the crisis. This explains why there were so many losses, far in excess of the
number of sub-prime loans to unqualiĮed buyers and borrowers of whom there were far too few to
have brought down the global Įnancial system.
Compare this with earlier purchases of CDSs as insurance against sub-prime mortgage CDOs. The
game had now changed such that the short-seller and the seller of decepƟvely rated bonds are both
on the same side of the trades. Thus, more CDSs means more syntheƟc CDOs which means more
syntheƟcs sold to investors at higher levels of risk leading to more CDSs to cover the syntheƟc CDS
risk. Again, those on the other side of the bets were actually in the same game (on the same side)
as the short-sellers.
When this Įnally and inevitably failed, the rescue of the Įnancial sector was a historically
unprecedented taking of public resources (in monetary terms) to save the systemically important
Įnancial insƟtuƟons (now known as “siĮs”), and also referred to informally as “Too Big To Fail”
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(TBTF) and to save the capital markets from their own hubris and incompetence. Accompanying this
pillaging of public resources and instanƟaƟon of prolonged naƟonal Įscal consolidaƟon (austerity)
programs to protect the most vulnerable banks there have been persistent eīorts to change the
dominant narraƟve of these events. The aim is to obscure the possibility of any ascripƟon of
culpability to the principal agents. However, in Lewis’s view the short-sellers were heroes and
personaliƟes, not villains. This is not a credible interpretaƟon of the facts of the case and leaves the
social order vulnerable to future threats of the same kind.
I have tried to describe the intenƟonal mechanisms of sub-prime mortgage fraud above because to
understand the threat of intenƟonal Įnancial vicƟmizaƟon it is necessary to know something about
how it works. Consumer Įnance aims to cheat the poor. The poor in this instance are not just
Įnancially or economically poor, but poor in economic understanding, poorly Įnancially educated,
those experienƟally disadvantaged and desperate with respect to their status and social standing.
These are all among the poor being cheated. But we must also know that this of course includes
those in the Įnancial sector who sought to beneĮt from what they could not take the trouble to
understand, especially with respect to the risks and the consequences of derivaƟves and how they
were misused. The claim is made that nobody in the credit markets understood what was
happening in the housing bubble created by fraudulent sup-prime mortgage lending. This is not
true. But in Lewis’s story, the short-selling heroes are the only excepƟon. This is misleading. But
exploring this would have greatly complicated Lewis’s reporƟng and propagaƟon of the standard
story. There remains an essenƟal but unanswered quesƟon – many people in the credit markets
were aware of the growing risks, but why does Lewis, among so many others, ignore what was
known, and by whom, about the systemic risks and what might have been done to avoid the
resulƟng global crash?
Blame ShiŌing
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Who was not at fault for the Įnancial crisis? The global Įnancial crisis was not caused by US
low-income borrowers. The housing bubble was global, not local, and collapsed globally not just
locally in the US. This is why the fault cannot be aƩributed solely to US borrowers of no money
down loans. There simply weren't enough of them to cause a global crash. And those who want to
blame the US Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) (1977) have to acknowledge the evidence which
shows where the US housing bust did occur and it was in the suburbs, not in the CRA areas. Neither
was the global Įnancial crisis caused by GSEs (Government Sponsored Enterprises, e.g., Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae). Empirically, underwriƟng of sub-prime mortgages was mostly by private
non-banking Įrms, not GSEs, and not by regulated depository banks. Thus, it wasn’t the
government that primarily caused the crisis.
In an aberrant housing-centric view of the macroeconomy, it has even been claimed that it was the
Federal Reserve Ɵghtening of monetary policy in 2008 that caused the global Įnancial crisis. This
bizarre alternaƟve view argues that because the housing bust actually started in 2006 with
evidence of declines in housing acƟvity the Fed should have managed interest rates beƩer. But this
would have been ineīectual because loosening of rates would not have addressed the acƟon of the
investment banks and their faulty Įnancial products. David Beckworth and Ramesh Ponnuru
oīered this cause and eīect explanaƟon in a 27 Jan 2016 New York Times Opinion piece Ɵtled
“Sub-prime Reasoning on Housing” (Beckworth and Ponnuru 2016). In this scenario, the
perpetrators were unregulated private mortgage originaƟon Įrms working as private securiƟzers
who were exempt from lending standards. These originators created and bundled low- and
no-quality loans into securiƟes mixed with other higher-rated collateral and the securiƟes were sold
as AAA bonds both to the naïvely credulous and those who knew beƩer but were willing to
overlook everything in the pursuit of short-term gains.
Concluding Remarks on the Case Study
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I have tried to show in this secƟon that Įnancial sector corporaƟons are a salient case study for this
project for the following reasons: their acts are not only deliberate and aimed at speciĮc outcomes,
but their acƟons produce negaƟve consequences that aīect individuals as well as communiƟes.
They are capable of vicƟmizing by harming and injuring individuals and communiƟes without regard
for Įnancial stability, the consequences for their vicƟms or what it will cost to restore Įnancial and
social order. VicƟmizaƟon then causes resentment and harshly negaƟve aƫtudes among those
vulnerable to Įnancial sector corporate acƟons and demands for moral judgements follow from
this. In the sub-prime mortgage fraud episode there was conscious knowledge both among
corporate individuals and as standard pracƟce within the Įnancial sector organizaƟons that
intenƟonal acƟons were being taken to defraud, deceive and mislead consumers of these Įnancial
products.
It was also not unforeseen what the consequences would be for the Įnancial system when the
structure of derivaƟves collapsed. Far from no one seeing what was coming, it was a maƩer of
individual and collecƟve agents being captured by short-termism that allowed these intenƟonally
decepƟve pracƟces to conƟnue. Since the global Įnancial crisis that followed there have been many
books and commentaries about the causes of the global Įnancial crisis. Lewis’s story, a massively
inŇuenƟal best-seller, is entertaining and instrucƟve, but ulƟmately it is misleading because its
primary aim is mass market entertainment, and not a thoroughgoing criƟcal analysis of a serious
socio-economic and philosophical problem caused by intenƟonal corporate acƟon. His morally
simplisƟc story is about personaliƟes (“good guys versus bad guys”) of individual short-sellers rather
than systemic failure and the consequences for the commons issuing from a Įnancial industry
which is now essenƟal to modern life globally.
The case study is an illustraƟon of systemic intenƟonal manipulaƟon of a segment of Įnancial
system investment in Įnancial products known to be of low creditworthiness, unsustainable and
163
systemically dangerous and destabilizing. The long-term consequences have been devastaƟng.
There has been a crucial loss of trust in Įnancial insƟtuƟons, an extended period of only parƟal
recovery from market failure, and the world came close to a global Įnancial collapse. The
short-term consequences have been no less serious. There were mulƟple bailouts, punishing
austerity for sovereignƟes involving contenƟous macroeconomic policies (Įscal consolidaƟon)
when private debt became sovereign debt, as well as prolonged, depressed economic condiƟons
for the global economy, and loss of jobs, pensions, homes, and individual and business
bankruptcies. Austerity policies that suppress economic acƟvity but protect Įnancial sector
insƟtuƟons from the consequences of debt lowered growth rates because a loss of tax revenues
diminished GDP gains, acted as a drag on employment growth, and led to secular stagnaƟon.
From Michael Lewis’s book and those like it we are aware of the apparent causes for the Įnancial
crisis, but as I have tried to show there are deeper concerns to be considered. When we ask “How
did this happen?”, we see that regulatory capture by Įnancial sector corporaƟons is only one part
of the problem. When we consider the responsibiliƟes borne by corporaƟons, experience has
taught that sancƟon regimes must be obligatory because compliance cannot be assured if they are
voluntary. This is the same idea as with self-regulaƟng markets generally. The idea rests on
fallacious assumpƟons and biƩer experience. As to the credibility of government sancƟoning
mechanisms it appears that governments have no credibility, there are no alternaƟves except
massive public pressures. When we ask why so liƩle has been done to Įx this broken system we
confront the belief system of non-interference in markets with respect to laissez-faire. This is
complemented by the reality that the response to the global Įnancial crisis was barely suĸcient
and a more radical remedy was successfully avoided.
There is also the ascendance of the Įnancial system over the social system that is a pernicious
inversion of socio-economic prioriƟes. Private interests are powerful and well-organized and they
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are highly focused on their self-interests. Financial secrecy and the specialized language of Įnance
makes accessibility nearly impossible for non-specialists. Furthermore, there are various forms of
concealment including tax havens, tax inversions and secrecy that hide corporate wrongful acƟon
behind the curtain of trade secrets and proprietary informaƟon. A lack of transparency is enabled
by private interests operaƟng in the opacity of legal regimes that protect them from scruƟny. Finally
there is compeƟƟon among sovereignƟes for hosƟng corporate headquarters and tolerance for
risky Įnancial economic acƟon through tax arbitrage, labor arbitrage and legal jurisdicƟon
shopping. Freedom of mobility for capital (through oī-shoring and out-sourcing of Įnance), but not
for anyone else leads to corporate immunity and loss of accountability. This makes it impossible to
hold Įnancial mulƟnaƟonals to account for their acƟons. Structural, regulatory and Įscal reforms
have been deferred or avoided altogether but remain essenƟal for genuine Įnancial stability. Under
these circumstances the prospects for Įnancial security and economic stability indicate that things
are geƫng worse, not beƩer.
This case study is meant to help illustrate one primary goal – that people collecƟvely deserve and
require Įnancial and economic stability to be able to have Ňourishing lives despite the power and
inŇuence of private interests. However, things seem to be worse following the global Įnancial crisis
because of poliƟcal fragmentaƟon among states that are systemically fragile and there is a lack of
adequate public regulatory authority at the internaƟonal level to address corporate acƟon with
appropriate and eīecƟve sancƟons. There is as yet no way to organize and implement a global
authority for consistent, eīecƟve regulaƟon and control. This is due primarily, but not exclusively,
to a lack of eīecƟve regulaƟon at the naƟonal level, but with daunƟng internaƟonal complicaƟons.
The Įnancial system is working, but only for the few. For the rest it creates repeated crises for which
they, the rest, are compelled to pay in various ways. This is leading to a profound loss of trust, a
sense of curious freedom for some, but uncertainty, insecurity, and unfreedom for all the others.
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In summary, the case study contributes to explaining and answering the important philosophical
quesƟon of assigning moral responsibility to corporaƟons. Financial sector corporaƟons are a good
case study for this project because as I have tried to show, they act intenƟonally, their intenƟonal
acƟons led to consequences for individuals and communiƟes, the consequences can vicƟmize by
harming and injuring individuals and communiƟes, these cause reacƟve aƫtudes among the
vicƟms of corporate acƟons and moral judgements follow.
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